


JPRS-UPA-90-052
13 SEPTEMBER 1990



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-052

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Kemerovo Dispute Regarding Party Property

90UN2656A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 16 Aug 90 p 2

[Report by Staff Correspondent A. Parshintsev: "Judgment or Reconciliation: Who Inherits the Property of the Kemerovo Oblast Party Committee?"]

[Text] Kemerovo—The ruckus over CPSU property was raised after the decision of the party obkom buro on the inadmissibility of using the "Kuzbass" party printing combine to publish the newspaper of the Union of Workers, *NASHA GAZETA*. In the opinion of the buro, this newspaper contains "tendentious and deliberately unobjective material directed against the CPSU."

The party's adversaries immediately hurled at the obkom threats, ultimatums, and demands to turn a portion of the polygraphic capacity over to *NASHA GAZETA*. The slogan even resounded, "Nationalization of CPSU Property is the Only Path to Liberation!" At the crest of this wave, the second session of the oblast soviet of people's deputies adopted a resolution to condemn the resolution of the party obkom, seeing in it an attack on glasnost and freedom of speech, an attempt to bind an independent publication with political censorship.

"Why should the CPSU strangle itself with its own hands by facilitating the appearance in *NASHA GAZETA* of publications under the garish rubric of 'Materials discrediting the CPSU,' b willingly or unwillingly taking itself out of the political arena, self-elimination?"—this question disturbs many Kuzbass communists. The admirers of the newspaper of the Union of Workers ask,

"Where then is an independent publication supposed to be printed if the CPSU monopolizes the polygraphic base?"

It would be more just if the Union itself and the editorial board were to solve this problem. They have the money to acquire polygraphic equipment.

But the session acted otherwise. It adopted its own decision in counterbalance to that of the obkom: To inventory the property of the CPSU, and until the completion of the inventory, to prohibit the realization of party organ decisions concerning CPSU property adopted without the consent of the presidium of the oblast soviet of people's deputies.

The obkom did not object to the inventory, but the demand to halt their decisions bewildered not only the obkom, but many people's deputies only vaguely familiar with the laws as well: direct evidence of their violation. The obkom buro proposed to the soviet presidium and to soviet Chairman A. Tuleyev that the decision be considered once more at a regular session and rescinded as being illegal. The reply was terse: There are no grounds to reconsider the decision.

Oblast Procurator N. Seleznev appealed to oblast soviet Chairman A. Tuleyev in an open letter. He reminded him that the CPSU's right to property as a social organization is established in Article 10 of the USSR Constitution, in the articles of the RSFSR Civil Code, and in the USSR "Law on Property in the USSR," which entered into force starting 1 July of this year.

At the same time, the 9 April 1990 USSR "Law on the General Principles of Self-management and Local Economy" gives local soviets the right to allocate and administer only the property of enterprises, organizations, and institutions in the body of the local economy."

Return of Ethnic Germans to Autonomous Homeland Supported

90US1218A Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 29, 17-23 Jul 90 pp 30-32

[Article by Konstantin Isakov and Marina Shakina: "Imposed Divorce—German Autonomy on the Volga: Pros and Cons"]

[Text] [Georgy Trapeznikov] "To restore justice, to heal the injured ethnic identity of the people, that type of statehood which once existed must be restored."

[Heinrich Grout] "The whole state mechanism continues to work towards the forcible assimilation of Germans."

[Robert Korn] "It is not enough to satisfy the cultural requirements of the Soviet Germans. We must become the equal of other peoples of the USSR."

[Eduard Bagramov] "Lawlessness in relation to the Soviet Germans must be eliminated, as well as the reasons that caused a hostile attitude to Germans and painted the 'image' of them as enemies."

[Valery Frizen] "I do hope that the president of the USSR will be able to put to use his sweeping powers; the time has come for him to say clearly: 'yes' or 'no' to the autonomy of Soviet Germans along the Volga."

[Igor Pleve] "The Declaration of Human Rights in this country doesn't work. It is little wonder, therefore, that there is no moral equality among the peoples of the Volga River area."

[Valentina Yarskaya] "All forms of the USSR's ethnic-territorial division are hopelessly outdated. We must realize that statehood must be not only ethnic, but also economic and territorial."

The invitation to take part in the discussion on the position of Soviet Germans was accepted by members of the national social, political, cultural and educational society of Soviet Germans Vozrozhdeniye (Rebirth)—its President Heinrich Grout and Executive Secretary Robert Korn, scholars Valentina Yarskaya, Doctor of Science (Philosophy) and Igor Pleve, Candidate of Science (History) of Saratov, Valery Frizen, Candidate of Science (Philology) and Eduard Bagramov, Doctor of Science (Philosophy), and Georgy Trapeznikov, Candidate of Science (History) of the Marxism-Leninism Institute of the CPSU Central Committee.

What is Happening

Our magazine has written about the fate of Soviet Germans many times. One of the 12 ethnic groups deported in the Stalinist era, the Soviet Germans today are 1 of the 3 ethnic groups who have failed to return, after partial exoneration, home, to the Volga River area where between 1918 and 1941 there was first a German autonomous region and then an autonomous republic. Scattered all across the country, the Germans have been deprived of any chance of retaining their ethnic identity,

language and culture. Heinrich Grout says there has been growing conviction among them that they have to choose between being assimilated or emigrating to West Germany.

Last year 105,000 Soviet Germans left the Soviet Union. As for this year, if the emigration rates of the first months continue, the emigration of Soviet Germans will total no less than 135,000.

How can one look at this? Some are indifferent: If you don't like it here, then leave. Others profess sympathy with the Soviet Germans but do not go any farther, because they have quite a few problems of their own. And there are also those who have accused the Soviet Germans of group egoism. If everybody wanted autonomy, Russia would be divided into isolated princedoms.

There is a state commission "for deciding practical questions related to the restoration of the rights of Soviet Germans," but its activity has been as hazy as its name. Meanwhile, the population of the Volga River area, alarmed by rumors of the restoration of autonomy, have emphatically protested. Vozrozhdeniye has presented an ultimatum to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers: if autonomy is not re-established by the end of the spring session, all Germans will, in protest, leave for West Germany. The session has not adopted any decision yet....

Apparently, the march of events has taken a dramatic course, because the Germans have set their eyes exclusively on the centre. In turn, Moscow has tried to continue outdated policies in the new situation, to use power methods, which, incidentally, did not have the desired effect even when the command-and-administrate system was at its prime. For instance, Dinmuhamed Kunayev and Leonid Brezhnev in 1979 agreed to found an areas of German autonomy in the Yermantau district of the Tselinograd region to keep Germans—good workers—in Kazakhstan. That backstage deal provoked mass nationalist rallies, which were also targeted against the Germans. Apparently, that sad lesson should be remembered by those who have been offering the Soviet Germans today that they restore their autonomy where it has never been.

True, opinions of the local population cannot be ignored. Moscow can no longer rule the destinies of peoples by making arbitrary decisions in favor of restoring the autonomy of this or that group. On the other hand, the criticism of the centre on the part of the local authorities is either hypocrisy or a good excuse to shirk responsibility. One can also understand the Soviet Germans, who have been waiting for the restoration of their autonomy for nearly half a century. Vozrozhdeniye's ultimatum is a gesture of despair, hopelessness and lack of certainty that anything can change. Any yet, only a clearly formulated position of the country's leadership can either suspend the exodus of Germans or... on the contrary, increase it.

A political statement must come before everything else—all of our guests were unanimous about that.

As long as there is no political decision, nobody will move to the Volga River area, says the Germans. Let's imagine that a decision has been taken. In the current situation, the Saratov region may respond with an explosion of protest by the local population, the more so since there have already been warnings to that effect. Will the Germans take the risk of moving there after all? Even now they do not feel secure. Not long ago, 206 Germany families in the Saratov region applied to the West German embassy for entry visas. Fears for their safety were the reason.

Confrontation Along the Volga

Why are the local residents against the restoration of German autonomy which existed there before the war? Why have the assemblies of rural communities been proclaiming their territories as "free from German autonomy"? Publications in the local press and leaflets give an idea of what kind of arguments are used by the opponents of autonomy.

Economic arguments: "The restoration of German autonomy in areas where the necessary social, economic demographic and political conditions have not yet emerged would be untimely." "The district [Sovetsky—the Author] is strategically important in terms of oil and gas supplies to various regions of the country and abroad." "Poorly considered resettlement of the German population of our district [Krasnoarmeisky—the Author] must be prevented due to the lack of necessary conditions to receive and accommodate the people."

Political arguments: "The restoration of the rights of Soviet Germans at the expense of the rights of other ethnic groups is a deviation from the party's nationalities policy and the principles of equality in our state." "In the centre of Europe, efforts are underway to form a new German state with great economic and military potential and it is unclear to us what ties there will be between that state and a German republic on the Volga, if it is ever to appear." "We are not going to be an appendix of West Germany and we want to have economic and political independence."

"The artificial establishment of a German republic in the heart of Russia must be prevented." "Put an end to the preferential treatment of one ethnic group against the 120 others living in the Saratov region." "We don't want the Volga River area, calm for so long, to turn into another trouble spot."

Historical arguments: "The question of founding a third Germany—in our Motherland!—is being decided behind the people's backs. What the Kaiser failed to do in 1914 and Hitler in 1941, the activists of the Vozrozhdeniye committee have been trying to do now with the help of Moscow and Bonn." "Were the efforts of the Soviet people to defend their land, the Volga and to

strengthen the people's friendship all in vain?" Vozrozhdeniye activists have been demanding compensation for suffering from Stalin, but who will compensate for the death and suffering of tens of millions of people? For the famine and devastation our people suffered from Hitler?"

Other arguments: "In the current situation there are objective conditions for meeting the spiritual and cultural requirements of any nationality in this country without state-territorial units." "We don't want another Karabakh on Russian soil."

Do most people in the Saratov region think that way? The Otechestvo (Fatherland) society of Krasnoarmeisk believes that 95 percent of the region's residents are against autonomy. But that is the result of an opinion poll in the Sovetsky district alone. Thirteen thousand people were questioned. However, from the point of view of Saratov scholar Igor Pleve, the poll was biased. There has been evidence that in some villages people were forced to vote "against." Besides this the results of the poll held in defiance of any scientifically approved method can give only a distorted picture of public opinion.

Georgy Trapeznikov is certain that any serious resistance on the part of residents of the Saratov region is out of the question. He rates the members of the camp of the opponents of German autonomy on the Volga at 17-20 percent of local residents. In his view, a biased attitude towards autonomy was engineered by local party and government functionaries, who have felt that the social tension in the region due to bad living standards, and food shortages, would sweep them out in the next election. They created the "image of the enemy" in order to retain power. Eduard Bagramov described that as "nationalist populism," an attempt by the authorities to woo a certain part of the population in a bid to retain their posts.

Valentina Yarskaya warned against illusions. Today's population of the Volga River area is different from the one that lived there before the war. Almost none of these living in the region today remember how various ethnic groups and cultures coexisted before the war. Along the Volga there are quite a few immigrant settlers and marginal groups, and there are districts where the percentage of the criminogenic population is rather high.

All this prompts the alarming conclusion: nobody has ever studied that vital problem in earnest. How can one expect the centre make balanced, reasonable and justified decisions? Why shouldn't a group of independent experts be formed apart from the State Commission who would not only develop a concept of regulating interethnic relations, but, which is particularly important, of forecasting those relations?

A Basis of Mutual Understanding

Whether spontaneously generated or engineered by apparatchiks, the resistance to German autonomy on the

Volga is a fact of life. Vozrozhdeniye's demands for the restoration of autonomy at once, have only increased that resistance. Wouldn't it be better to start handling the problem from the other end? The basis for initial consolidation and mutual understanding should be looked for in the observance of civic, social and economic rights put on record by the Constitution and the international treaties to which the Soviet Union is a signatory.

Apparently, such a step will not be very easy to take. Confrontation has gone so far that the right of the Volga River Germans to return home is questioned in principle. Even if the Saratov or Volgograd regions are prepared to welcome back individual German families, this does not mean that local bosses are going to take into account their ethnic requirements. True, the Germans have the right to send their children to German schools and have access to German books in their library. But it would be naive to think that the local authorities will build schools, libraries and publishing houses for them. Meanwhile, we must see it as a cause of honor to give them these rights everywhere, including the Volga River area.

This is precisely what V. Yarskaya said. If we realize that autonomy does not have to be necessarily ethnic, that it is much more important to have economic and territorial autonomy, apparently none of the local residents will be against the return of Soviet Germans to the land of their ancestors.

The structure of the Soviet state has so far not allowed any ethnic group to exercise its specific interests without a special state-territorial unit. G. Trapeznikov argued that in ethnic statehood each smaller nationality saw a guarantee of its development. If we want a fundamental transformation of our system, we can give the Soviet Germans the same rights as to other ethnic groups only by creating an appropriate juridical and material basis for the revival of these rights. For that, there must be bodies of ethnic statehood, and the restoration of autonomy.

The budgets of the Saratov and Volgograd regions are set. In this situation the German resettlers are only contenders for somebody else's piece of the "pie." Says Valentina Yarskaya: "Whereas the Germans feel ethnic despair, the residents of the Volga River area live in social despair. The economic crisis there takes the form of inter-ethnic conflicts and a confrontation of misunderstood interests."

While We Argue...

The Soviet Germans cannot have a decent life without autonomy, and that cannot be restored without changing the social atmosphere in the Volga River area. Is this a vicious circle?

The position of the center is seen clearly in the USSR Supreme Soviet Declaration "On Recognizing Unlawful

and Criminal the Acts of Repression Against the Forcibly Resettled Peoples and on the Guarantees of Their Rights." In part, the declaration says: The USSR Supreme Soviet believes it necessary to take the appropriate legal measures to restore unconditionally the rights of all Soviet peoples that fell victim to repression," including the Soviet Germans.

So the issue in question is not so much passing new legal acts as taking action on already enacted ones. It would be quite logical to state that Germans in the USSR have the right to self-determination and to restoring their statehood on their native land, not necessarily now but in the future.

What is the result of our meeting? Probably, Valery Frizen was right when he said that "round table" discussions make no sense to him, that they never go any farther than words.

Indeed, while we kept arguing, the Ulyanovsk region invited several thousand Soviet Germans to settle there permanently. The settlers have been promised good and diverse job prospects and loans to build housing and schools. A joint communique has already been signed by the regional Soviet of People's Deputies and the Ministry of Education and Youth Affairs of the West German state and Lower Saxony on economic and cultural cooperation. The German paper Nachrichten has begun to come out in the regional center and regional radio and television have begun broadcasting programmes in German.

Yet, however significant and tangible the initiative of the Ulyanovsk region may look, it will be unable to solve all the problems of Soviet Germans. Consequently, the public's attention has to be drawn again to that urgent problem, to the fact that Germans are an ethnic group of Russia, that they are Soviet citizens and that the state is responsible for them. If that ethnic group leaves this country Russia will be poorer for it.

The restoration of autonomy along the Volga will require tremendous and multi-directional efforts. There must be a thorough education campaign. To change the social climate in the Volga River area, there will have to be great flexibility, a readiness to compromise, and new ideas. Who is going to do this? In the first place, the centre, which, according to Robert Korn is directly responsible for what was done to the Germans.

Action must be taken along two lines—from above, by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Russian Parliament, the president, the central press and national public organizations and funds; and from "below"—citizens' diplomacy and efforts by the local intellectuals and democratically-minded authorities.

It would be worthwhile to hold a juridical examination of publications in the Saratov press and of leaflets distributed in the region. In some cases, one has the feeling that their contents, general tone and language

may incur punishment under the article of the Russian Federation's Criminal Code on the incitement of ethnic hatred.

At last, should not a conference of local residents and the German public be held in the Volga River area in order to issue a joint declaration? Not a protocol of differences, but a declaration of what can unite.

Ispolkom Chairman on Leninakan Reconstruction, Financing Progress

90US1143A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
23 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with K.D. Ambartsumyan, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leninakan City Soviet, by Yu. Davtyan: "Inertia of Thinking"]

[Text] [Davtyan] Perestroyka has been underway now in our nation for 5 years. The slogan of the day has become the long forgotten "All Power to the Soviets!" But since the beginning of the renewal of society, not much power has been added to the soviets. There are reasons for this: the first is that power has never been surrendered voluntarily and the second is the inertia of thinking. For this reason, the people's deputies must show principledness and wisdom in order to take this power into their hands. And not only political but primarily economic. Our talk was with the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leninakan City Soviet, K.D. Ambartsumyan, and involved the essence of economic power.

[Ambartsumyan] Finally, after some 70 years, the unanimous opinion has been reached that administrative-command levers do not operate and for this reason economic ones must be employed. Our economic activities have also been negatively influenced by the system of centralized management. We know to what this has led in such a great and multinational country. The ways out of this stalemate were recently set out in the report by N.I. Ryzhkov. From this it is clear that changes will occur, aside from all else, in the work of the city soviets. In particular, in relations with the industrial enterprises. These relations will differ sharply from those which existed previously. At present, power rests with those who direct cadre policy, those who appoint and discharge the leaders. As of now, we have not worked out an ordered system and we do not have a scientifically sound approach to resolving the cadre question. For this reason, it seems to me, the program for converting to a market economy cannot be implemented before we have trained the leading cadres and introduced a system for their placement. At present, it is already clear that we must abandon the universal leaders and introduce narrow specialization, that is, approach this question on a differentiated basis.

[Davtyan] Yes, it would be possible to give many examples when a person has worked (sequentially) as the party secretary, the head of a movie theater, a plant director or a kolkhoz chairman. Possibly, I exaggerate somewhat,

but unfortunately this is a fact taken from life. But let us return to our subject. What is the essence of economic power?

[Ambartsumyan] As for now, for the soviets, economic power means to have at their disposal money and materials and to use them at their discretion. The aim of using economic power is to increase the well-being of each city resident.

[Davtyan] Karlen Daniyelovich Ambartsumyan, what income makes up a city budget?

[Ambartsumyan] There are many sources. It is hardly worth listing them all. A city budget is figured proceeding from the planned expenditures. According to the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 1987, these expenditures are to be distributed by sources. I feel that it makes sense to speak only about the permanent sources, as they basically cover the expenditures. These include the enterprises of the Union and republic level located on our territory. They deduct up to 20 percent of their profit into the city budget. Also among the permanent sources are the city transport organizations. They surrender all the profit to the city. There is also an item of income received from the cooperatives. As a result, 70 percent of the budget consists of deductions from the industrial and transport complex of a city.

[Davtyan] How much was the city budget last year?

[Ambartsumyan] Last year the city budget was 60,475,000 rubles. This was more than in 1987 when the city spent 51,770,000 rubles. During the current year, we already have 63,270,000 rubles.

[Davtyan] Are these funds sufficient for the development of the city?

[Ambartsumyan] Not completely. But the republics, in understanding our concerns, is helping us. At present, our problem is not a lack of money but rather a lack of construction organizations.

[Davtyan] And the articles of your expenses?

[Ambartsumyan] We distribute the funds to the Rayispolkoms, the administrations of the utility and housing systems, public education, health and so forth. The percentage of funds allocated to them changes annually, depending upon need.

[Davtyan] That is the idea. In actuality, we observe something different. The drivers at their own expense repair state-owned vehicles and purchase their parts. For this reason because of the bad roads they do not want to operate on the city outskirts. Possibly it would make sense to give a portion of the profit earned by the enterprise to the drivers themselves so that they could keep the vehicles in proper working order?

[Ambartsumyan] You are right. But the problem of spare parts exists throughout the nation. We have struggled and are struggling against the negative factors which

arise due to the shortage but we have been struggling basically by increasing the control bodies and for this reason there have been no results. Quite on the contrary, the negative aspect has been exaggerated. Hence, the only way is to eliminate the deficit. And in speaking about our relations with the enterprises, I had in mind our aid in solving the fundamental problems for production. Thus, the superior organizations have not always responded to the requests of our enterprises and we help them.

[Davtyan] According to the USSR Constitution adopted in 1977, the soviets were to be given greater rights, but for some reason they did not use them. What measures have been taken now to that the soviets could fully use their rights?

[Ambartsumyan] The mechanisms and levers already exist. But at times they do not operate. We are all to blame. Each defends his own interests. The enterprises defend theirs and the ministry theirs. We still have not learned to subordinate ourselves to the laws.

[Davtyan] In this context, the question has repeatedly come up of revising the assortment of products produced by the city enterprises and it has been proposed that certain enterprises be restructured to produce goods needed by the republic and the city. What do you feel about this?

[Ambartsumyan] I am also against restoring the enterprises which are harmful for the environment, which are energy- and metal-intensive and so forth. We must also at first rely basically on the local raw material resources. With market conditions, this factor can be crucial and influence the economic situation of the city. After the earthquake, there was an opportunity to respecialize our enterprises, but, unfortunately, due to the lack of money for rebuilding the enterprise, the gorispolkom could not take advantage of the moment. The Union ministries allocated the required funds to the city but at the same time demanded the production of goods needed by them. So now it is too late to change anything. However, in the future we will work so that our enterprises cooperate both with the Union enterprises and with overseas ones. For this reason, I fully support the policy of the republic Council of Ministers which has set out to use its own funds to establish joint enterprises and purchase imported technology. In this manner, we will achieve high quality of the produced commodities.

[Davtyan] Karlen Daniyelovich, should the enterprises be subordinate to the local soviets?

[Ambartsumyan] First of all, the enterprises should have freedom. But at the same time, they should also consider the interests of the city, as the enterprises serve the city inhabitants. For this reason, the gorispolkom should monitor the activities of the enterprises to the degree that this concerns the citizens. Overseas they have understood one truth: the higher the standard of living of the people, the higher labor productivity and quality of the work. And although from the very outset of the

formation of the socialist state, we have proclaimed that the highest aim of our state was increased prosperity of the people, up to now we have paid more attention to the machine tools as mechanisms than we have to people. The nation still does not have viable laws which would speak about a fundamental revision of our views concerning man. At present, much is said about increasing labor productivity but the people must do this and they need the necessary conditions for this.

[Davtyan] And not only normal working conditions but also living ones. The latter are basically the concern of the gorispolkom.

[Ambartsumyan] Yes, we now give great attention to this fact. But after the earthquake, the number-one problem has been and remains even now the rapid erection of housing. Here is a simple example: I have no roof over my head and for this reason it is hard for me to think and work normally under such conditions.

[Davtyan] How have relations developed between the gorispolkom and the cooperatives?

[Ambartsumyan] I personally and my colleagues view the cooperatives positively. They are our future. I feel that in the future they must rectify the errors of the state sector. But their activities must be monitored because they operate spontaneously. At the same time, we are endeavoring not to suppress them, that is, we are giving freedom of entrepreneurship.

[Davtyan] How many of them are there now in the city?

[Ambartsumyan] Around 260.

[Davtyan] Do they transfer money to the city budget?

[Ambartsumyan] Of course. They are considered enterprises. We approach them in a differentiated manner. We plan less deductions for those cooperatives which produce products for the city. As a whole, over the first quarter of this year, the cooperatives transferred some 564,000 rubles to the city budget. Let us state directly that this is a goodly amount.

[Davtyan] You have said that at present the city has more funds than necessary. How can you explain this?

[Ambartsumyan] The problem is that the city construction organizations are small and maximally overloaded. We have enough money to pay their wages. There is even a surplus. In order to create the construction complex of the city, with the republic Council of Ministers, we have decided to establish design-construction associations on the basis of the Leninakan Construction Trust and the Repair Construction Trust. We also intend to increase the construction sites established by the republic ministries and which help us in their area. Such sites have been established by the republic Ministry of Health, the State Committee for Consumer Services for the Public and so forth. Of course, it is impossible to implement this idea all at once and it takes time.

[Davtyan] The construction organizations called in from Russia and Kazakhstan after completing their work are to leave Leninakan their production facilities. How does the gorispolkom intend to employ these?

[Ambartsumyan] In using this occasion, I would like to inform the readers that all the organizations called in from other republics are using in Leninakan their own material-technical, financial and labor resources. We should all be grateful for their generous, fraternal aid. Now as for the essence of the question. Honestly speaking, initially there were such discussions but now we have our doubts. This was caused by the behavior of the Belorussians who worked in Kirovakan. They, having left, took all the production facilities with them. But let us be optimists: if we are left these things, we will distribute them to the construction organizations. But at the same time, we will develop our own facilities. Although at present both the outside as well as our own local organizations need manpower and their number must be doubled. Many of our people have undergone good schooling in the Russian and Kazakh trains.

[Davtyan] What is your main task now, Karlen Daniyelovich?

[Ambartsumyan] Rebuilding Leninakan. We are doing everything possible to carry this out. But we, the members of the gorispolkom, would like to work for the future. But now we are basically concerned with routine questions which relate to the competence of the rayispolkoms. One can feel the mistrust of the rayispolkoms and a general inertia. Only in time and with better organization of the work of the rayispolkoms will the attitude of the people change toward the rayon authorities. And then we will be able essentially to be concerned with the prospects of developing our city and solving those questions which will arise tomorrow, that is, to anticipate the future of the city.

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Council Chairmen on Congress

90UN2291C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 28 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with V.V. Isakov, chairman of the Council of the Republic of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and R.G. Abdulatipov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by N. Garifullina: "The Long Road Ahead"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] Russians followed the proceedings of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR with unremitting attention for more than a month. Now it is time to analyze and interpret the results. Immediately following the forum, we asked V.V. Isakov and R.G. Abdulatipov, the leaders of the two chambers of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, to answer the following questions:

1. What do you think of the results of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR?

2. The Russian bicameral parliament has become a reality. What are the first things your chamber plans to do?

3. What do you think the congress taught us?

Today we are publishing their answers.

"Russia Is Ready for a Major Advance"

[Isakov] I am looking at a page of the 22 June edition of the newspaper, where the title of the article "The Last Day?" includes a question mark. It does seem to me that the congress came to an end at least three times, and deputies were turning in their cards because they had voted for the continuation of the meetings and the continuation of the discussions. I think this is an indication of how serious and meticulous the deputies were who did not agree to settle everything in a rush and demanded serious and thorough discussion. As far as the results of the congress as a whole are concerned, I feel they were extremely important and decisive, especially with regard to the main issue—the state sovereignty of Russia. The Declaration of Sovereignty and the decree adopted the last day on the delineation of the powers of the center and the RSFSR (regarding the new draft union agreement) are the best foundation, in my opinion, for the Supreme Soviet's formulation of Russian sovereignty in more specific state documents, for the transformation of the Russian economic system, but this time on a modern basis, and for the establishment of the republic's economic powers. The foundation for this has been laid. Besides this, several other important matters were discussed. I repeat, the results of the congress were quite decisive.

The primary objectives of the Council of the Republic are defined in the Constitution. We have to complete the formation of commissions and committees. We have already established the appropriate commissions by title or, to put it more precisely, by sphere of responsibility, and all we have to do now is to elect two chairmen and complete the "construction" of our joint committees with the Council of Nationalities.

Another matter of extreme importance is the formation of the government. The prime minister has already been elected, but now his cabinet has to be installed. It is clear that there can be no delays in this important work in the present dynamically changing atmosphere. After a week's recess, the chambers will begin appointing committee and commission members and discussing the nominees for the prime minister's team.

Today I had a conversation by wireless with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, and he expressed the opinion, with which I agree completely, that it will be extremely important to establish strong contact between republic, oblast, and city levels and the next level of government. Unless we have this kind of strong contact, the efforts of republic officials will be futile because there will be no one to carry out their decisions, and these decisions will not have the necessary impact. For this reason, I feel that

we should have meetings as soon as possible, perhaps while the party congress is still in session, with representatives of soviet organs on the oblast level and the heads of the soviets of big cities to decide the relationship between local and republic government agencies, so that we will be acting in unison, and so that instead of hampering what I would call the autonomy and creativity of local soviets, we will direct this creativity into a single, common channel.

Here is what I would call the main lesson: Bureaucratic methods no longer work in the preparations for forums of this kind or in the actual proceedings. The congress agenda made up by the bureaucratic staff was discarded literally on the very first day, and for 2 weeks the congress fought with its presiding official—People's Deputy of the USSR V.I. Kazakov, chairman of the Central Election Commission. As a jurist, I feel that the Constitution does allow the replacement of the presiding official after the first meeting. Although there were constant arguments over this by deputies, I think it would not be unconstitutional if the second meeting were to be conducted by a provisional working presidium, as many deputies suggested.

The second thing the congress taught us is that our parliamentary democracy is still only taking its first steps. There is still a great deal of what I would call demagogic froth and a great deal of self-advertisement. This naturally prolonged the discussion and irritated the television viewers and radio listeners who were following the proceedings of our congress. I think it would also be wrong, however, to interrupt the deputies or limit their speeches. This could eventually leave us with only a few vestiges of democracy. Apparently, we will have to go through the natural process of accumulating experience before these excesses go away by themselves, in the same way that they are now gone from the Supreme Soviet, the work of which is businesslike on the whole, although I do feel that its decisions could be more dynamic.

The third lesson, of course, is connected with the congress' key decisions of fundamental importance on sovereignty. I am referring to the vote in favor of the Declaration of Sovereignty. V.I. Kazakov's attempt to delay the decision on this matter and to keep it off the agenda evoked a friendly and quite natural reaction from the deputies, but it was included on the congress agenda because there were more than a thousand votes in favor of this and only three against it.

It is here, while I am answering SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's third question, that I would like to talk about our leader—the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, who was elected by the congress. Now it is even difficult to imagine that someone else might have been chosen. The election of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was one of the main reasons for the dynamic proceedings of the congress, the reversals, and the ultimate results. I think any other results would have left the deputies feeling profoundly dissatisfied, and they would have

evoked the same sense of dissatisfaction in those who were keeping track of the proceedings.

Russia is ready for a major advance, it has the strength to do this, and I am certain that it can be accomplished through the concerted efforts of soviets on different levels and the Supreme Soviet of the republic.

"We Share the Same Home"

[Abdulatipov] I am certain I will not be the only one to say that the most important congress decision was probably the adoption of the Declaration of Sovereignty, because declaring sovereignty is the same as acknowledging the Russian national identity. Without this, the establishment and development of the nationality might be impossible. We are living in a multinational state and in a multinational republic, and this means that the interests of all nationalities must be taken into account. When the congress was in session, however, we could already sense the dissatisfaction of the representatives of autonomous republics with the Declaration of Sovereignty. Why? For years we have been conducting a policy in which the national-state entity is treated as an ordinary administrative unit—an oblast. The republic is called autonomous, but its party committee is called an obkom. When some deputies at the congress said that this was a national-state entity, they aroused the objections of the very people who had seemed to be the most democratic of all democrats. The people who loudly demanded (and around 200 deputies even left the hall as a sign of protest!) that Lithuania be granted complete freedom and that the nationality be granted self-determination, did not even support the already constitutionally supported principle with regard to national-state entities during the discussion of the declaration. I am not trying to say that these deputies are against it. It is most probably a case of misunderstandings and old stereotypes.

Another important event was the acceptance of the Decree on Authority as a fundamental statute, although I must say that I feel ambivalent about it. Some parts of it are unacceptable, and as long as we are talking about autonomy, the delineated of functions, and the transfer of all power to the soviets, all of this requires precise regulation. The absence of this kind of decree is the reason why the Communist Party is still the target of endless accusations, although the party has not been in charge of economic affairs ever since it transferred them to the jurisdiction of the soviets long ago.

Different blocs and groups of deputies were carping at one another at the congress, and although we could not completely overcome our biased stereotypical approach to, for example, the communist faction or the democratic faction, we were convinced nevertheless of the possibility of compromise and cooperation. It is important to overcome stereotypes. Many deputies won their mandates on the strength of vehement criticism of the party and the party staff. Many of the people at the congress who did not know me at all voted against me

simply because I worked on the CPSU Central Committee staff for around 2 years. The fact that I am a scholar and a specialist and that I am knowledgeable in my field did not interest anyone. After I had a chance to meet some of the deputies and work with them in the Council of Nationalities, however, many of those who had voted against me changed their minds and realized that the "apparatchiks," who have gained an enemy image in recent years, are normal people—and, furthermore, people who know how to get the job done. To some extent, I gained the same kind of insight. After we began working together, many of us sensed that we have a great deal in common and that there are many more things uniting us than dividing us. The main thing we have in common is our concern about Russia's future.

The first thing the Council of Nationalities has to do is overcome the suspicions and doubts of those who wonder whether the chamber is necessary at all. Many people believe that this is a superfluous organ. Some speakers suggested this over and over again. If they had been given a chance, they might even have put the existence of the chamber to a vote. These feelings did exist. For this reason, we will have to prove the need for the Council of Nationalities with our work, although it would seem that the need for this organ in such a multinational republic as the RSFSR is completely obvious.

Another important thing we have to do is to keep the existence of the chamber from being used as a way of setting the autonomous oblasts and krais of Russia in opposition to one another. Unfortunately, this has already happened. In particular, the draft of some kind of declaration on the creation of a commission on culture in the Council of the Republic was even being distributed at the congress. What can I say? Let them create it if they have to, but using this as an occasion to say that the Russian nationality would be represented in their commission and non-Russians would be represented in ours.... No, this is wrong. The restoration and development of national cultural traditions, languages, and the historical heritage will concern all of the national groups in Russia, and this certainly includes the Russian people. We are sharing the same home and we must strive to make it a happy and peaceful home.

There is something else I have to say. As a council chairman, I do not feel completely comfortable talking about this, but I think that we should stop ranking republics: This is a union republic and that is an autonomous republic.... It would be best to simply call all of them soviet republics. This would be a guarantee of equality. Apparently, we will have to start solving ethnic problems within the emerging system of self-government. In the 1920s the system of self-government worked quite well in the sphere of ethnic relations. There were national kolkhozes and rural soviets, and they

solved all problems having to do with language and culture, but these responsibilities were later assumed by the state, and then by the party, and this is how we arrived at our present situation. We must employ more flexible and democratic methods of investigating and satisfying ethnic needs.

Our most immediate objectives concern the drafting and adoption of a whole package of legal statutes: a law on the federation, a law delineating the functions of subjects within the federation, and a law on the conclusion of a federation agreement in Russia itself, which has never been done. In spite of all the difficulties and complications, I think we should go all the way and implement the principle of self-determination. This is not only a Marxist principle, but also an accepted world practice. National cultural societies and centers are being established, but there is no law to regulate their activities. This is also our responsibility. Territorial issues will also require investigation by legislators to distinguish between simple claims and legitimate demands, especially in cases involving the restoration of justice in the treatment of repressed national groups.

The state of the congress itself and of its work will be a reflection of the state of our society and the situation in the country. The idea of perestroika was genuinely constructive, but people did not feel that it was giving them anything tangible. If we cannot give them something concrete in the socioeconomic sphere at this time, now that we have reached this turning point, the society will begin moving toward an unfamiliar socioeconomic system. Of course, this would be the most radical solution for some groups.

In recent days, delegates have been experiencing a euphoric sense of autonomy and independence and the conviction that the congress can accomplish anything at all. This tendency could cause deputies to lose their sense of reality and ignore the present situation. Whereas we once idealized and praised everything, today we are going to the other extreme by pretending that we can do everything.

I hope our sense of responsibility does not fail us! I am not saying this just to underscore the fact that I am now working with B.N. Yeltsin, but I have to say that the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, in contrast to many of his campaign slogans and speeches, is much more sensible and objective now that he has assumed such heavy responsibilities and is apparently aware of their gravity. In the same way, now that we deputies have begun work, have come into contact with real life, and have gained a sense of responsibility, we must become—no, not more conservative or more radical—more sensible. We must have a sense of our strengths and weaknesses, of what we can and cannot do, and take responsibility for the present and the future.

New Leningrad Mayor Interviewed

90UN2754A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 29, 29 Jul-5 Aug 90 p 11

[Interview with Aleksander Shchelkanov, chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet, by Andrey Chernov: "A Loader Turned Mayor"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Chernov] Alexander Shchelkanov is the newly elected chairman of the executive committee of the Leningrad City Soviet.

[Shchelkanov] I was a loader for three months a year ago, explains Shchelkanov. I quit the Navy in December 1988 after a heart attack and couldn't find a job in Leningrad. That was the time of structural changes and retrenchments in research institutes. I did some loading after school and, having consulted my doctors, took a loading job. Many people said this was degrading for a former Naval captain.

[Chernov] Forty candidates ran for mayor. You got 80 per cent of the vote. What kind of welcome were you given by members of the executive committee formed before perestroika?

[Shchelkanov] There was no sharp opposition, or open displeasure. Most likely few dared stage a mutiny against the new captain.

[Chernov] Are you a member of the party?

[Shchelkanov] I resigned from it in December 1988.

[Chernov] "Sabotage" is a word we've heard increasingly. Leningrad TV broadcast several reports about sausage dumped in the forest and loads of perished meat.

[Shchelkanov] If I had proof, I would be able to say it was sabotage. The above reports were presented by TV sleuth Alexander Nevzorov in an impossibly rightist, if not extremist manner. Watching them one felt mad and like destroying something rather than trying to put things right. What actually happened is that the sausage was found unsafe by sanitary inspectors and thrown out.

[Chernov] The City Soviet in Leningrad has introduced alcohol rationing. What do you think will be the impact?

[Shchelkanov] The decision has been taken and my task is to carry it out. The city has a stock of alcohol but has no bottles to put it into. Following the rash anti-alcohol campaign resolution, bottles were destroyed by industrial means. Now people would rather keep the empties at home than return them. The Baltics have raised the prices of hard drinks, and profiteers are shipping Leningrad vodka there. This is why the city voted for rationing.

[Chernov] Today ration cards are the reality and Leningrad as a free economic zone is a dream.

[Shchelkanov] Yes, we've just started working on the concept, and at this point I'm unable to say if Leningrad is going to be a free city or if it will have a special economic status.

[Chernov] Have you got your own team?

[Shchelkanov] I wanted to have tough and knowledgeable deputies. The former deputies aren't bad per se but because they stick to old practices. One of the stronger contenders for my economic reform aides is the well-known economist Anatoly Chubais. He would surely bring in some of his people. My objective today is to get inside information about the city. We've set up a commission to try and find out what our city and its managerial services are really like. Everybody can see that Leningrad is poorly supplied with food. Things are even worse as regards its manufacturing industries, food refrigeration facilities and public transit. The city is sick. But it can be cured. Today, not tomorrow, before it's too late.

[Chernov] My last question. Supposing the military coup of which neo-Bolsheviks dream becomes a reality. What'll you do?

[Shchelkanov] The news would reach me outside my office, on a train bound East. What would I do? The same thing, perhaps... Generate contacts between people and try to persuade them that a new move is necessary.

Sverdlovsk First Secretary Retires

90UN2291B Moscow POISK in Russian No 23,
8-14 Jun 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "When the Road Ahead Is Not Clear..."]

[Text] Something surprising occurred during the second stage of the recent oblast report and election party conference in Sverdlovsk: the resignation of the first secretary of the CPSU obkom, Candidate of Technical Sciences Aleksandr Gusev, who was elected to this office just 2 months ago.

This is obviously an unprecedented occurrence, especially since the delegates still remember what a landslide victory Gusev won—a vote of approval from 532 of the 658 delegates!

Aleksandr Petrovich made a statement at the conference to explain how and why he had arrived at this decision. There were many reasons, but the main one was the lack of any clear indication of how the party should act today, at a time of crisis in the CPSU, the emergence of a multi-party system, and the transfer of power to the soviets. Many people feel disoriented, but few dare to admit it, especially in public.

Leningraders Polled on Baltic Issues

90UN2499B Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
16-21 Jul 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by L. Keselman, director of the Center for the Study and Forecasting of Social Processes in Leningrad: "The 'Baltic Question' in the Eyes of Leningraders"]

[Text] "They will sell nothing to Russians and they won't talk with them." "They want to expel (deport) all Russians." These are hardly the sharpest comments making the rounds in Leningrad about a year ago after alarming programs of Central Television, TASS announcements and speaking tours by leaders of the Baltic interfronts. In August 1989 the statements of the CPSU Central Committee thundered out on the situation in the Baltic republics.

At that time, the Center for the Study and Forecasting of Social Processes of the Northwestern Division of the Soviet Sociological Association first posed several questions to Leningraders.

How did Leningrad view the Baltics? The results of the poll turned out to be unexpected in many ways. Its results were not published in Leningrad, but "VECHERNIY TALLINN" published them with great enthusiasm. The main result: over half of Leningrad's adults spoke out against attempts to interfere with self-determination of the Baltic republics. This was in September, when the possibility of secession was considered rather hypothetical.

A half year later, in February, after M. Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania was over, during which the question of Lithuania's sovereignty was hardly theoretical any longer, we again approached the city's residents. This time, the new newspaper of Leningrad journalists "Chas pik" [Rush Hour] published the data obtained without any difficulties.

Several months have passed, during which there have been the Act of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania of March 11, and abolition of Article 6, and introduction in the country of the institution of the presidency, and the official blockade of the republic...

At first, these events were considered very important, as changing the entire situation, but after a few days they were overshadowed by a dozen others, just as important...

Yet even so, despite the fact that almost all union republics, including Russia, have adopted declarations on the priority of republic laws over national ones, the "Baltic question" remains in the center of attention.

In the second half of June of this year, our center approached Leningraders for the third time. Previously, we asked, "If the Baltic republics' population votes for leaving..." This time it was somewhat different: "Now that the parliaments of the Baltic republics have voted to leave the USSR, should our government prevent this?"

Unconditional agreement with this was voiced by 13 percent of those questioned; another 11 percent supported this version without particular certainty. Against them are 43 percent which categorically do not agree with the possibility of interference, and another 23 percent who do not accept interference not quite so categorically. The remaining 10 percent do not at present have a firm position on this question.

We should recall that just under a year ago 31 percent of the city's residents supported the possibility of interference (56 percent were against it), while in February 24 percent favored preventing secession, and 65 percent were against.

This stability of attitudes indicates that the basic attitude towards the "Baltic topic" has already been formed in Leningrad, and events fundamentally altering this attitude are extremely improbable. Based on this stability, local authorities can at least formulate a stable policy towards the Baltics.

As can be seen from the table's data, the attitude towards self-determination by the Baltic republics among representatives of various social groups has its own, sometimes sharply expressed specific features. For example, among persons over 60 years of age, although attitudes are constantly thawing we see the greatest number of those who believe that "the central government should prevent the Baltic republics' departure from the USSR." It is not difficult to note a leaning towards imperial stereotypes among unskilled blue- and white-collar workers. Workers in the management bureaucracy also do not stand out by their liberalism in this question, as well as military personnel and those in the police, although recently the number of those favoring the right of nations to self-determination has already noticeably increased among them. The most radical on this issue are representatives of students and the intelligentsia in humanities and technical fields.

If in February differences in attitudes towards the Baltics between CPSU members and non-members were barely visible, in June the number of advocates of an imperial policy among communists exceeded by two times the corresponding number among non-members of this party, which is quickly losing its members. One explanation for this is the growing departure (not always judicially documented) from the CPSU of a substantial number of people with an antitotalitarian, and thus anti-imperial, orientation.

Before suggesting that the reader study the table below, we wish to direct his attention to the fact that, as can be seen from the data cited, the pivotal point of the attitude of our city's residents towards the fate of the Baltic republics is their idea of the consequences of self-determination for the Russian-speaking population living there. In the final analysis, only a radical deterioration in the life of this group of Baltic residents can change (for the worse) the attitude of Leningraders towards the situation there. But even if we use only interfront sources of information, this is not foreseen.

**Attitude of Different Leningrad Social Groups Towards the Possibility of the Baltic Republics Leaving the USSR
(September 1989, February and June 1990)**

"The central government should prevent the Baltic republics from leaving the USSR."

	agree			disagree*		
	September	February	June	September	February	June
Total Population of Leningrad	31	24	24	56	65	66
women	29	25	24	60	62	64
men	33	23	25	52	63	68
under 30	19	14	17	70	77	77
30-45	28	19	20	59	71	70
45-60	36	29	28	51	60	63
over 60	48	37	36	34	48	46
unskilled blue-collar workers	40	47	37	44	30	44
skilled blue-collar workers	36	23	31	51	65	57
unskilled white-collar workers	40	26	27	44	53	48
semi-skilled white-collar workers	39	33	22	44	54	64
university and middle-school students	18	22	13	73	82	83
technical intelligentsia	26	19	22	62	73	72
humanities intelligentsia	23	15	21	68	79	76
management workers	34	23	24	58	58	64
military and police	31	37	34	50	51	63
CPSU members	34	25	40	56	66	54
non-CPSU members	30	23	21	56	65	68
low sociocultural status	44	44	25	34	43	38
high sociocultural status	22	10	11	70	84	85
believe in the possibility that the Russian-speaking population's life could get worse			41			49
do not believe this			9			84
Total Leningrad Population	31	24	24	56	65	66

* The total of "agrees" and "disagrees" may be less than 100 percent, since some respondents did not have a definite position.

Latvian Independence Movement's Program

90UN2501D Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 4 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Mirdza Vitole, deputy chairman of the DNNL and leader of the DNNL Buro, by T. Mass: "The Nation or Democracy? Concern for the Fate of the Latvian People Has Forced the DNNL to Settle This Question in Favor of the Nation"]

[Text] On 27 June, at the headquarters of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia [DNNL] a press conference was held during which the leaders of this organization acquainted the representatives of the republic mass information media with the new program of the Movement.

After the press conference, our correspondent T. Mass met with the Deputy Chairman of the Movement and the Leader of the DNNL Buro Mirdza Vitole and asked for comments on the main provisions of the new program.

[Vitole] The aim of our new program is to create a Latvia where the Latvian people will be the master in their own land.

[Correspondent] But how will the other peoples feel in such a Latvia?

[Vitole] At present, the most difficult question for us is the question of citizenship. The zero variation is not suitable for us and we consider it a threat for the Latvian people. If the zero variation is adopted, then all the population living at present in Latvia would receive the right to vote and would vote for a referendum. And we know that a referendum by a majority of votes would determine that Latvia would not withdraw from the Soviet Union.

[Correspondent] Your new program provides the granting of citizenship to those non-Latvians who demonstrate their youthfulness and loyalty to an independent Latvia. In what manner can someone measure this loyalty and utility? It seems to me that such a formulation is somewhat hazy. In all civilized countries there are firm laws on citizenship.

[Vitole] For us, any law on citizenship is unacceptable. We feel that the elections were undemocratic because the army took a large part in them. There is only one way out: to adopt a provisional election law and organize elections to the Sejm. Only such a government could resolve the question of citizenship.

[Correspondent] Who, in your opinion, could participate in the electing of such a government?

[Vitole] Those who have the right of citizens: the indigenous population and those non-Latvians who lived in Latvia prior to 1940 and their offspring. The remainder should earn the right of citizenship and bring benefit to the liberation of Latvia.

A Latvian nationality should make up 75 percent of the Latvian citizens. Otherwise, the state loses its national feature.

[Correspondent] Thus, in the Latvian inhabitants, non-Latvians comprise 25 percent of the total number of citizens. And what is to be done with the "excess"?

[Vitole] This does not mean that we will pick up sticks and drive them out. But we feel that the Russian people also long for their nation. At present, we are ready to establish ties with Russia in order to help the people return to their fatherland. There are areas which are ready to welcome these people. But all the questions will be settled by a peaceful, democratic means.

(Historical Reference. In the Program of the Union of the Russian People which existed under the monarchy in Russia, there was a point about the peaceful emigration of the Jews to Palestine: "Let them depart and we will even pay." This union was considered to be of the Black Hundred. Times change and now such an approach is even considered democratic?)

[Correspondent] In your program the demographic crisis of the Latvians is linked to the nationality question and I have always thought that here the economy was involved.

[Vitole] No, in Latvia the demographic crisis has been strongly influenced by the migration processes. The Latvians have no hope that life will become better while the newcomers at present are settling in faster and more comfortably. And it turns out that this is at the expense of the indigenous nation. At present, the Latvians must be a strong majority among the inhabitants and not only among the citizens.

[Correspondent] But how will not the citizens but the residents feel in an independent Latvia?

[Vitole] The independent Latvia will observe all human rights. The standard of living will not differ for the citizens and noncitizens only the latter will not have the rights and duties of citizens. But this will also have its pluses as the noncitizens, for example, will be free from army service....

[Correspondent] Judging from the economic point in the program, noncitizens will be "freed" from entrepreneurship activity. Let me quote: "In the economy Latvian national capital should prevail and the action of foreign capital will be controlled. We demand that the large-scale, middle and small private sector and the plots of land be solely in the hands of Latvian citizens."

[Vitole] The program then goes on: "All nations can conduct their cultural life but small cultural associations are at their own expense. State allocations are to be provided only for large national groups."

We want to carry out a demographic policy which with the aid of taxes and social actions could ensure a natural increase for the Latvian nation.

Finally, we are in favor of a Baltic Union.

[Correspondent] Thank you for the conversation.

United 'Left' Movement in Latvia Urged

90UN2501B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH

in Russian 3 Jul 90 p 1

["Appeal to All Parties and Organizations Considering Themselves as the Left Wing in the Latvian Political Spectrum"]

[Text] As a result of strengthening the process of overcoming the old authoritarian values, Latvian society has gained an opportunity to advance toward a humane state under the law. The national rebirth of the Latvian people and the appearance of an opportunity to realize cultural and national autonomy by other groups of the public allow one to hope for the possible harmonizing of interethnic relations. Our society is becoming more open to ties both with the West and with the East.

At the same time, the changes occurring in Latvian society, along with the democratic trends, have engendered an entire series of negative phenomena. Political instability is growing, and the social sympathies of man have deteriorated sharply. Under these conditions, the process of the polarizing of political forces has accelerated. In the leftist spectrum of the republic's social life even now there are two Social Democratic Parties, two Communist Parties and a whole series of political organizations and movements with similar programs. Unfortunately, in parallel with this the processes of mutual rejection between many of these organizations are strengthening and this objectively leads to a weakening of the democratic movement.

On the other hand, as a reaction to the past and the attempts of the partocracy to keep power, anticommunist and antisocialist attitudes grew along with the rejection of the idea of democratic socialism in the mass mind. These attitudes have spread not only to the old communist structures but to the entire leftist movement in the republic as a whole.

For continuing the democratic processes in Latvia, at present it is extremely essential to form a developed political system for society which would include only those forces which are ready on a legal, constitutional basis to struggle for power. Only a free competition of ideas and the appearance of alternative proposals as a guarantee against a monopoly on power can lead Latvia out of the very profound crisis into which it has fallen as a consequence of the short-sighted policy of the previous leadership.

The united leftist movement of Latvia could include all those organizations which unconditionally recognize the aspiration of the Latvian people for independence, who are ready to defend the interests of the people regardless of their nationality, who feel that under the conditions of a free market the public forms of ownership have not

exhausted all their capabilities. Old political structures could also participate in such a movement under the condition that they recognized the crimes and errors committed in the past and abandoned totalitarian values. The Latvian leftist movement can introduce a civilized character into the relations between the different parties and organizations as well as strengthen the republic's centrist forces.

In this context the Union for Progress of the Latvian Youth and the Democratic Movement Third Way propose examining the possibility of strengthening the Latvian leftist movement under the conditions of current Latvian realities. We feel that there is a possibility, in maintaining the independence of all the organizations and parties, to coordinate activities to defend the interests of the highly-skilled hired labor, the youth and pensioners. Such an agreement would help in fighting more effectively for democratic changes in Latvia, thereby providing aid to the bodies of power in the republic.

For exchanging opinions on the prospects for the development of the Latvian Republic, we propose holding a forum of the Latvian leftist forces and this would serve as a point of departure for forming a Latvian leftist movement. Its preparation, the elaboration of the necessary documents and determining the representation of the political organizations and parties at the forum could be the responsibility of a working group from representatives of all the interested forces. Having discarded our ideological prejudices and mutual dislike, we should work for the forum of the Latvian leftist forces to become a noticeable step in stabilizing the movement toward a democratic society under the law. We are also hoping for fruitful collaboration with the democrats from the neighboring republics including Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine and for whom the questions of organizing a leftist movement are extremely timely.

Undoubtedly, there should be the question of coordinating actions within the limits of the Baltic with our friends from Estonia and Lithuania.

In this context we propose that all parties and organizations wishing to participate in the forum of the Latvian leftist forces state their support for this idea and send their representatives to the preparatory work group. We feel that this must be done prior to 1 August, and the forum itself held in mid-September 1990. You can obtain the necessary information by telephoning 331376 or in room 301 at the address, 45/47 Kirov Street, Riga.

Ya. Urbanovich, secretary, Union for Progress of Latvian Youth (Latvian Komsomol) Central Committee;

A. Vorontsov, chairman, Council of Coordinators of the Democratic Movement Third Way.

Latvian Citizens Congress Sets Program

90UN2501A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 3 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by LETA Correspondent Yelena Kovalenko:
"The Position of the Citizens Congress"]

[Text] Currently many political associations in the republic are inspired by the idea of restoring Latvia's state independence. Each of these has endeavored to analyze and assess the work of the superior body of power in Latvia, the Supreme Soviet, and to outline its own program of activities along the path of sovereignty. Not so long ago these questions were discussed by the participants of the Baltic Assembly and the leaders of the independent Baltic communist parties.

On 30 June and 1 July, there was held the Second Session of the Citizen Congress of our republic and this was in Riga. The agenda for the work of the session proposed a debate on the political situation in Latvia and the tasks of the Citizens Congress and on legislation to restore the constitutional bodies of state power. (Let us immediately recall that the Latvian Citizens Congress feels that the current parliament is not legitimate, as it was elected not only by the citizens of Latvia but also by the representatives of other states.)

In addition to this, the session provided its own assessment of the activities of the Supreme Soviet. The resolution adopted by it stated that the current parliament is not carrying out substantial measures for actually restoring the independence of the Latvian states. In the opinion of the delegates, it is not carrying out deoccupation and has not repealed the service of Latvian citizens in the USSR Armed Forces. The session urged that the Supreme Soviet specifically state its attitude toward these questions.

The session participants also discussed the basic principles in the law on Latvian citizenship, on the normalizing of relations between Latvia and the Soviet Union and on the agrarian policy.

The central provision of the decision on agrarian policy look as follows: the Citizens Congress recognizes as valid the property rights of the Latvian Republic including private ownership of land. This right must be restored according to the provision of 16 June 1940. The land is to be returned to the former owners or their offspring. Only those persons who had Latvian citizenship prior to 17 June 1940 and their offspring have the right to receive the land back as their own property or for unlimited use.

The relations of Latvia with the Soviet Union, upon the decision of the session of the Latvian Citizens Congress, should develop on the basis of the Peace Treaty With Russia of 11 August 1920. This notion is also found in the Appeal to the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin. This states: "The Latvian citizens would be very gratified to have beyond the eastern frontier not the artificial formation of the USSR but rather an independent and democratic Russia with

which it would be possible to have peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous economic relations."

Activities of Lithuanian Parliament Hit

90UN2501C Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 4 Jul 90 p 1

[Report by Baltia LETA: "Statement by Plenum Participants"]

[Text] Vilnius—The activities of the newly elected parliament and government of the republic have caused a varying response in Lithuania. Thus, the organ of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee on the CPSU Platform LITVA SOVETSKAYA has published a statement on the political situation in Lithuania as adopted by the participants in the recently held Third Plenum of the Republic CP Central Committee on the CPSU Platform. In negatively assessing the policy of the Lithuanian leadership, the plenum participants viewed the decree of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on the start to issuing as of 20 June 1990 identifications to Lithuanian citizens as an act of most flagrant pressure on the republic inhabitants. This act, the statement says, is aimed at splitting the republic population and at isolating those who wish to keep citizenship in the USSR and Lithuania.

The statement condemns the actions which have assumed an evermore provocative and reactionary character as can be seen by the destruction in Kaunas on 14 June 1990 of the monuments to V. Kapsukas and F. Dzerzhinskiy and the desecration of the monument to the Communards. Combined with the appeals in the mass information media for commencing an overt struggle against the Soviet occupiers for independence to the last drop of blood, this heightens political tension and deepens confrontation in society, the plenum participants feel.

In line with this, the Plenum of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee on the CPSU Platform has stated that the resolution of Lithuania's problems is possible only on a basis of the decree of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The plenipotentiary representatives of the Lithuanian Civil Committee should participate in all dialogues of the republic government with the USSR government as an equal party.

19 July Supreme Council Session Report

90UN2498A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Jul 90 p 1

[ELTA report: "Informational Announcement of a Session of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] On 19 July, at a session of the Supreme Soviet, draft laws were presented on the principles for a system of state social security and the employment of the population of the Lithuanian Republic. Speaking on the main provisions were the Deputy Albertas Simenas, the head of the chair at Vilnius University, Docent Ipolitas

Nekroshyus and the Deputy Minister for Social Protection Mindaugas Stankavichyus.

The deputies decided to instruct the Commission on Public Health and Social Questions as well as other groups of authors of documents together with the Commission on the Rights of Citizens and Nationality Affairs, to continue preparing the drafts for discussion.

The Deputy Egidijus Jarasiunas presented the draft Law on the Bar of the Lithuanian Republic.

The parliament instructed the Commission on the Legal System to assess the comments and prepare a draft for discussion in the autumn session.

The Deputy Zenonas Juknevičius presented the draft of the Law on the Procuracy of the Lithuanian Republic. The Procurator of the Lithuanian Republic Arturas Paulauskas shared his notions of it.

The Commission on the Legal System and the group of authors of the draft and the workers of the republic Procuracy were instructed to submit an edited document at this very session.

The Deputy Godiminas Vagnorius submitted for a first discussion a draft of a Law on the Economic Commune of the Lithuanian Republic.

The deputies approved the draft. The Commission for Economics is preparing it for a second reading.

The Deputy Virgilijus Kacinskas and the leader of the Inspectorate for Cultural Heritage Naglis Puteikis introduced the draft Law on the Inspectorate for Cultural Heritage of the Lithuanian Republic.

The Chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Vytautas Landsbergis spoke on the preparations for the talks of the Lithuanian Republic with the RSFSR.

The deputies basically approved the conclusions submitted on the initial principles for concluding a treaty on relationships and collaboration between the Lithuanian Republic and the RSFSR. The membership of the Consultative Commission for Talks With the RSFSR was approved. A decree was adopted on the talks between the Lithuanian Republic and the RSFSR.

The Chairman of the Commission on Self-Management Affairs Stasys Kropas introduced the supplements to the Law of the Lithuanian Republic on the Principles of Local Self-Administration.

Adopted were the Law on Amendments to Article 6 of the Law of the Lithuanian Republic on the Principles of Local Self-Administration and the Decree on the Procedure for Applying Article 3 of the Law on the Status of the Deputy of a Local Self-Administering Soviet.

The Lithuanian Minister of Agriculture Vytautas Knasys answered questions from the deputies.

Information was heard by the Lithuanian Minister of Internal Affairs Marijonas Misiukonis on crime in the republic.

The Assistant Chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Aleksandras Abisalas read a Statement of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet about 21 July as a day of the illegal incorporation of Lithuania in the USSR.

U.S. Diplomats Visit Lithuania

90UN2498B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Jul 90 p 1

[ELTA report: "Visit of U.S. Diplomats"]

[Text] On 18-19 July, the republic was visited by the U.S. Deputy Council General in Leningrad, [John Parnell], and co-workers from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, [David Marx] and [David Giddens].

The diplomats were received by the Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Government, Romualdas Ozolas. The guests met with the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Algirdas Saudargas and visited the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Supreme Soviet.

The diplomats were interested in the prospects for the talks with the USSR, the possibilities for the direct collaboration of the Lithuanian Republic with Russia, the Ukraine and other republics of the USSR, in the activities of the Baltic Council to achieve complete independence of the Baltic countries. The guests were acquainted with the main areas of Lithuanian foreign policy and basic attention was paid to the necessity of the involvement of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the Helsinki process.

Lithuanian Minister's U.S. Visit Viewed

90UN2498C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Jul 90 p 1

[ELTA Report: "From a Trip to America"]

[Text] On 18 July, returning from the United States was the Lithuanian Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs Algirdas Saudargas and the Chairman of the Commission for Restoring the State of the Republic Supreme Soviet Godiminas Serksnys. The members of parliament were visiting in the United States upon the invitation from the Lithuanian Representative in Washington and to the Holy See Stasys Lozoraitis.

The Minister A. Saudargas and G. Serksnys and S. Lozoraitis who accompanied him met and talked with the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. Participating in the meeting were the Head of the European Desk of the State Department [Raymond Saïtes], the Head of the Political Desk [Robert Kimmet], the Head of the Eastern European and Yugoslavia Desk [Jimmy Sweihart], the

Head of the Baltic Desk [John Zerol] and the Representative of the State Department for Press Affairs [Margaret Tutweiler]. At the meeting which was held in a friendly atmosphere, the ministers spoke about the position of Lithuania over the approaching talks with the USSR and they discussed other important questions.

The republic minister of foreign affairs met with the Representative of the American National Security Council [Robert Gates].

The guests from Lithuania visited Capitol Hill, where they met with a group of U.S. congressmen. There was a talk on the general political situation in Lithuania and on the preparations for talks with the USSR, and the possibility was discussed of granting humanitarian aid to Lithuania in an amount of \$10 million.

Lithuanian-Georgian Economic Cooperation

90UN2498D Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Jul 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Direct Ties Are Developing"]

[Text] In Tbilisi a treaty has been signed on collaboration between the Council for the Economic Rebirth of Georgia and the Lithuanian Association of Industrialists. This provides for the greatest possible development of ties between the enterprises comprising these public organizations.

New Lithuanian Political Organizations

90UN2499A Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
16-21 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Lauras Belinis and Gediminas Vitkus, political scientists and instructors at Vilnius University, by LETUVOS RITAS observer Aushra Maldeykene: "They Will Find Support or Disappear. Several Brush Strokes to the Portrait of Lithuania's Traditional and New Political Organizations"; date, place not given]

[Text] [LETUVOS RITAS] You are representatives of a profession that is still rare in Lithuania. From a professional viewpoint, how does our new parliament's work look? Everyone keeps talking about unity, but at the same time they are breaking into groups.

[Belinis] So far, in our parliament are acting not groups, but individuals, around whom gather admirers. The formation of parliamentary parties is still in the future. The personalities exert pressure on the parliament through their authority. E. Vilkas pulls in one direction; V. Chepaytis, in another. There will be a genuine political demarcation not when the members of parliament will be relying on their own ideas (even brilliant ones) or on a formal number of voters, but when their support becomes distinct social layers.

[Vitkus] However, the present situation is fully natural. We are freeing ourselves from the chains of totalitarianism, trying to leave the condition of a society of

abstract, faceless masses, a society with an amorphous social structure in which only the "leaders" and the "masses" are clearly distinguishable. Our deputies were elected solely on the basis of an emotional "for" or "against" totalitarianism. It was sufficient to convince the voters that you are "against," that you have no clear sins in the past, to win the support of "Sajudis," and success was guaranteed. There is no diversity of social interests, so the newly created parties are not distinguished by their diversity. We are observing merely the struggle of personalities, of leaders and their supporters. There's nothing wrong in this. In any democratic country politics are created by personalities, but they cannot represent only their own ambitions.

[LETUVOS RITAS] I've been trying for a long time to understand the positions of parliament members, the platforms of the newly created parties, if only in the sphere of economics. Everywhere one can hear in them the call: "Give us a market!" The same as one could previously hear: "Give us communism!" You would probably agree that populist attitudes are now predominant?

[Belinis] That's putting it too lightly. Everything is now being drowned out by a chaotic and eclectic mentality. Populism was a higher form of social consciousness.

[LETUVOS RITAS] What could you say about the political organization being created, the March 11 party?

[Belinis] One can observe the tendency that parties try to find their social support in society. In the final analysis, they either find it or disappear. The March 11 party is itself a political support for certain government circles. These circles need a political mouthpiece, and they are creating it.

[Vitkus] There is still insufficient information for any definitive evaluations. Only the names of the initiators behind the party's creation are known; these are some of the leaders of "Sajudis." So this party's basis is probably different from that of other newly created ones (I am not talking about "daytime" and "nighttime" KPL); it is motivated by a general ideology of national liberation.

[Belinis] Information on the party is contained in the appeal of the initiative group to the people of Lithuania. It is true that the organizational structures have not yet been defined. One thing is clear: it is a parliamentary party, it represents the government, not society.

[LETUVOS RITAS] Does it have any chance to become a force?

[Vitkus] It was born too late, the opportunity to form a two-party system has been missed. We will remember this when the elections approach. We have a majority electoral system (one district, one deputy). Parties will join together. In my opinion, this party will have to be in the right-wing bloc. One thing is unknown: who will become this bloc's leader. If the 11 March party inherits the "Sajudis" structure, then it might become the leader.

[LETUVOS RITAS] Your evaluations of another political organization being created, the Union of Liberals?

[Belinis] The liberals are to a significant degree a club organization. What are its chances for becoming a party? The members of the union, being liberals, are unwilling and unable to do this. There is a great paradox in this. At least the liberals have clearly specified their social support. They advocate private property.

[LETUVOS RITAS] The activity of the Lithuanian League of Freedom is judged very contradictorily...

[Belinis] I have associated with the league's members a good deal. This is not a party. It is an inevitable social phenomenon: a group with clearly expressed radical views. It is useful as a red line in a thermometer, enabling the temperature of public emotions to be determined.

Tajik CP Draft Platform for 21st Congress Outlined

90US1016A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 10 May 90 p 3

[Tajik CP Draft Platform for 21st Tajik CP Congress: "For the Democratization and Humanization of Society"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The platform of the Communist Party of Tajikistan proceeds from the acknowledgement that the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic is an integral part of a federated whole—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—and that its party organization is an organic part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This unity stems from our past and from the road we traveled together in the struggle for social reform and national revival. The party organization of Tajikistan is being renewed along with the rest of the party and is acquiring a new image based on a common politico-ideological foundation, with the ideal of democratic and humane socialism at its core.

The renewed Communist Party of Tajikistan will be a party of the socialist choice, with the creative development of Marxism-Leninism as its ideological-theoretical basis and a communist future as its ideal. It will represent the interests of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia and will base its policy on scientific analyses of current realities.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan supports the program for the revolutionary renewal of society in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress, entitled "On the Road to Humane, Democratic Socialism," and will base its activity on the fundamental premises of this program.

With a view to changes in public life, the Communist Party of Tajikistan will also apply common party principles creatively during the determination of policy aims

with consideration for the distinctive features of the historical, socioeconomic, ethnic, and spiritual development of the republic.

1. The Results of Past Efforts: Achievements and Distortions

The Tajik people associate the modern era in their history with the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The transformations accomplished as a result of the revolutionary activity of the laboring masses (of local nationalities), with the active assistance of the Russian proletariat, gave the Tajik people and other people of Central Asia broad opportunities for revival and progress. The restoration of the Tajik state system delivered our people from centuries of fragmentation and the threat of extinction.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan rejects the nihilistic view of the past and the tendency to concentrate only on negative events in assessments of the Tajik people's past history. During the years of Soviet rule the workers of the republic accomplished genuinely revolutionary transformations with the help of all the fraternal peoples: They eliminated the patriarchal and feudal relations we had inherited, corrected our economic and cultural backwardness, established modern industry and agriculture with the aid of increasingly intense integration, and secured remarkable progress in cultural development. Tajikistan became an integral part of the country's unified national economic complex.

In addition to this, the Communist Party of Tajikistan also sees and acknowledges past errors, irregularities in the construction of socialism, and mistakes in the pursuit of the policy of perestroika, which have influenced the state of affairs in the economic, cultural, and ideological spheres.

The failure to comply with the Leninist ideal of federation, the prevalence of authoritarian methods of administration, and the concentration of the absolute majority of powers in the center slowed down the economic and social development of the republic.

In the absence of a comprehensive approach to the development of the Tajik SSR national economy, which was regarded primarily as a source of raw materials, the tyranny of union departments and the rigid restrictions on the construction of small and medium-sized enterprises limited the size of the Tajik economic and social base.

Disparities between agriculture and the processing industry perpetuated the unbalanced, primarily agrarian nature of the republic economy.

Tajikistan still occupies one of the lowest places in the country in terms of such extremely important indicators as per capita national income, income growth rates, social labor productivity, public health services, children's pre-school establishments, and many others.

The high number of able-bodied individuals in the republic who do not work in national production is accompanied by an acute shortage of professional workers, especially in construction and the main branches of industry. The percentage of workers and engineering and technical personnel of local nationalities in electronics, the chemical industry, machine building, metalworking, and hydraulic power engineering is still too low.

There are many unsolved problems in the development of culture, public education, health care, and public leisure and recreation. The socioeconomic development of the republic is not keeping up with population growth in Tajikistan.

The current situation in the socioeconomic, political, and spiritual development of the republic has presented the Communist Party of Tajikistan with difficult problems of a crucial nature which must be solved without delay.

II. For the Economic Autonomy of the Republic Under the Conditions of the Renewed Federation

The Communist Party of Tajikistan considers the consistent pursuit of a policy securing the economic autonomy of the republic to be essential. The most important area of this policy concerns the transition to self-management and self-funding, which should be based on the development of a variety of forms of ownership and the creation of equal conditions for their operation and competition (or competitiveness) and presupposes the exclusive right of the republic to own, manage, and use its natural resources.

This transition will be accomplished in line with the principles of the radical economic reform in the country, the exclusion of all autarchic and disuniting elements from the republic economy, the precise delineation of union and republic jurisdiction in planning, budgeting, taxation, credit, and prices, the guarantee of economic autonomy for enterprises, the encouragement of all forms of commercial organization, and the institution of stricter accountability in economic operations on republic territory.

Communists must assist in the pursuit of an active party policy of establishing and developing a planned market economy in their places of employment, in government and administrative bodies, in production, and in the service sphere. Special importance will be attached to the decentralization of territorial administration, the transfer of all local self-government to soviets of people's deputies, the reinforcement of their autonomy in the compilation of plans and local budgets, the regulation of relations between local government bodies and enterprises located within their territory, and the management of the system of economic levers and incentives (taxes, benefits, prices, tariffs, etc.).

The main accelerating factors will be the development of intra-republic and inter-republic economic ties, vigorous

activity by the republic in the world market, the formation of joint ventures, and other forms of cooperation with fraternal republics and foreign countries.

The present demographic situation in the republic demands the equalization and elevation of regional socioeconomic standards, and this will necessitate the planning and implementation of comprehensive programs:

For the creation of new cities and rayon and the further development of existing ones, the development of mountain communities, and the restoration of some of the previously depopulated villages on a new social basis;

For the efficient distribution of modern small and medium-sized enterprise in light industry, machine building, the construction materials industry, agriculture, and other branches in close coordination with the construction of housing and social and cultural facilities;

For the training and retraining of skilled workers, engineering and technical personnel, and scientific personnel with a view to projected structural changes in the economy and current tendencies in scientific and technical progress;

For the development of large health resorts and alpine tourist centers in the republic, which will create many jobs for the population, increase foreign currency resources, and facilitate the resolution of economic problems.

The most immediate objectives of the republic party organization are the correction of the agrarian-rural material emphasis in the economy, its reorientation for the manufacture of finished goods, the elimination of the current serious lag in scientific and technical progress, and the transfer of the economy to primarily intensive channels of development with consideration for the creation of new jobs.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan advocates the priority development of processing enterprises, storage facilities, delivery systems, and other elements of the production infrastructure to alleviate the food crisis. To this end, all forms of farming should be developed—state, cooperative, collective, individual, contract, tenant, family, and others.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan will always defend the interests of the laboring public, take resolute action against black marketeers and embezzlers of socialist property, and wage a struggle to eliminate corruption and speculation, group egotism, and regionalism and to strengthen state, labor, and production discipline.

III. Social Policy—The Main Aspect of Perestroika

The Communist Party of Tajikistan sees its main objective as the radical restructuring of social policy so that it will focus on the individual. It will do everything within its power to augment the volume of food and consumer goods production and services, to reinforce the public

health system, particularly health care for women and children, to lower the infant mortality rate, to increase the average lifespan, to effect the social reorganization of rural communities, and to step up housing construction.

The Communists of Tajikistan advocate reliable guarantees of the rights of people to work and laws securing the employment of the republic population.

Some immediate objectives are the restoration of the disrupted territorial ecological balance and the planning of economic and legal measures to protect the environment and promote the intelligent use of the republic's natural potential.

It will be of fundamental importance to secure social justice, the elimination of undeserved privileges, and the creation of a healthy social climate for the development of highly educated, active, and free individuals.

The republic Communist Party advocates a sweeping program for the humanization of education, the guarantee of its continuity, the creation of the necessary material and spiritual conditions for the education and upbringing of the younger generation, the elevation of the social status of teachers, instructors in VUZ's and secondary specialized academic institutions, and educators in pre-school establishments, the encouragement of families and the public at large to aid in the resolution of fundamental problems in public education, the drafting of an integral program defining specific areas of scientific research, the restructuring of secondary and higher education, the training of personnel, and the development of new academic literature.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan assigns primary significance to the protection and care of the cultural heritage, historical monuments, and other physical elements of our culture and the revival of traditional folk crafts. It will make a vigorous effort to prepare and carry out a comprehensive program for the development of culture in the republic and secure the necessary material-technical, financial, and personnel resources.

In the sphere of cultural development, the party organization wholeheartedly supports creative freedom and the encouragement of young talent and opposes authoritarianism in the cultural sphere, spiritual poverty, aesthetic mediocrity, and the complete commercialization of art.

It will be necessary to pass the appropriate law and conduct an integral youth policy in the republic with a view to the demographic situation and to the fact that children and young adults constitute the majority of the population. The future of our society will depend on the kind of education they receive, the kind of spiritual values they are taught, and the kind of experiences they have in family and social relations. The Communist Party of Tajikistan attaches special importance to the development of public health care, intelligent family planning, and concern for the social strata and groups experiencing the greatest need for social support.

The attainment of these objectives will be facilitated by plans for the development of new organizational forms of employment for women with flexible work schedules, their vocational rehabilitation, and their release from heavy physical labor and work in hazardous conditions, the resolute improvement of the care of orphans, the disabled, and labor and war veterans, and the expansion of the charity movement.

IV. The Democratization of Republic Politics

Only a solid legal basis will make humane democratic socialism possible. The most reliable ways of achieving this are the observance of the law by each citizen and the establishment of a rule-of-law state and the self-regulating socialist society.

The policy of the Communist Party of Tajikistan proceeds from a recognition of the will of the republic population as the basis of authority, the establishment of a rule-of-law state in the Tajik SSR, and the provision of all citizens with real opportunities to participate in making important decisions on governmental and public affairs.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan feels that it will be necessary to step up the passage of laws guaranteeing the political activity of the republic population: laws on the press, on sociopolitical organizations and movements, on the rights of small ethnic communities, and other laws without which a democratic society cannot exist.

When decisions are made on governmental matters, the minority will have the right to express autonomous opinions, defend its position, and demand the reconsideration of controversial issues or their review by superior bodies.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan will play its leading role within the framework of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Tajik SSR and will be willing to engage in dialogue with anyone in favor of the renewal of the socialist society.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan will base its new relations with constitutionally authorized sociopolitical organizations on dialogue, debate, and cooperation. It will base its relations with the Komsomol on ideological unity, comradely cooperation, and interaction and will regard it as an important source of new members; it will base its relations with trade unions on support for their activity in the interests of the laboring public.

The procedure of forming public associations and parties must be stipulated in laws and in the Constitution of the Tajik SSR. The Communist Party of Tajikistan believes that there should be legal prohibitions against the formation of parties, organizations, and movements whose programs, charters, or activities publicize antisocialist ideas, violence, and inter-ethnic friction or profess extremist or unconstitutional aims.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan advocates the improvement of the electoral system and the methods of organizing and holding elections to soviets on all levels. It will conduct political work to promote participation by its representatives in the legislative and executive branches of government. This will not be formal work, but real work aimed at the democratization of society by giving the masses a chance to compare programs, goals, and ideals and then choose the political force or individual capable of confirming the accuracy of the chosen pattern of development and its correspondence to the public interest. Through Communists and non-members, it will defend the need for the corps of deputies to represent workers, peasants, women, youth, veterans, and other strata and groups which are not sufficiently involved in public administration and need help in defending their vested interests.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan wants the soviets to become genuine organs of governmental authority, consistently expressing the will of the people. They should be endowed with the necessary powers, and this will be facilitated by legislation on local self-government.

The principle of the separation of powers, presupposing the actual division of functions among legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, is a key element of effective government. The strict observance of this principle will create the necessary balance in public administration and guarantees against abuses of power.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan will promote the establishment and development of self-managing systems, the establishment of legal guarantees, and the observance of civil rights and freedoms. The freedom of the individual is the main accomplishment of perestroika, and our chief function will consist in guaranteeing opportunities for the exercise of this freedom. In our multinational republic, the Communist Party will take the initiative in drafting the kind of laws that will not only guarantee the inviolability of, and respect for, the honor and dignity of all nationalities and ethnic groups living in Tajikistan, but will also guarantee their safety.

We need daily legal education for the public, more qualified legal personnel in the national economy, and the heightened involvement of arbitration and judicial services in law enforcement.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan believes that the formation of a rule-of-law state will be a comparatively lengthy process, during which the appropriate structural governmental bodies and an integral system of laws will take shape, and that this will be accompanied by the reinforcement of traditions serving as guarantees of the Soviet individual's rights and freedoms, the state's responsibility to the citizen and the citizen's responsibility to the state, the augmentation of the authority of law, the strict observance of laws by all party and governmental bodies, public organizations, groups, and citizens, and effective work by law enforcement agencies.

The radical renewal of republic life will necessitate the establishment of a new Basic Law of the republic, which must be consistent with common human values, the basic principles of democracy, and international legal standards and must reflect the vital interests of the peoples of the Tajik SSR.

V. Ethnic Policy—A Constituent Part of Perestroika

The Tajik SSR is a multinational republic, inhabited by people of many nationalities and ethnic groups. For this reason, the success of perestroika and the future of the republic will depend largely on future inter-ethnic relations.

The ability of party organizations to foresee and influence the reconciliation of ethnic groups in a positive way, always bearing in mind that delays in handling socioeconomic, cultural, and family matters could have undesirable consequences, is acquiring special importance.

The resolution of purely economic, social, and cultural problems, however, will not be enough to eliminate all problems in inter-ethnic relations. They have their own specific causes, and these can only be eliminated through purposeful action in the sphere of ethnic policy.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan will plan its activity to harmonize inter-ethnic relations in line with the CPSU platform.

Using this document as a guide, the Communist Party of Tajikistan will strive:

1. In the sphere of the self-determination of nationalities:

To secure the economic, political, and spiritual development of the Tajik SSR as a sovereign state within the structure of the new Soviet Federation on the basis of a new union agreement;

To harmonize inter-ethnic relations and to establish mutually beneficial ties between the union republics and the union, representing their integral entity, with a view to the distinctive features of Tajikistan.

2. In the sphere of the development of autonomous entities:

To expand the rights of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and its ability to make its own decisions on economic, social, and cultural matters and preserve ethnic traditions and the languages of the Pamirs.

3. In the sphere of the rights of nationalities and the rights of the individual:

To promote the continued consolidation of the Tajik people with a modern economic, social, and personnel policy, the thorough development of culture, the elimination of regional biases, and the consideration of regional differences;

To improve the social structure of the Tajik nationality and show concern for the cultural, social, and personal needs of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and other strata;

To effect the consistent and timely implementation of the Tajik SSR Language Law, which is intended to aid in the correct resolution of language problems by stating the relationship of the Tajik language (Farsi), as the state language, to the languages of other national groups living in the republic and by recognizing the Russian language as the official language of inter-ethnic communication;

To guarantee the actual equality of all languages, the free choice of the language of instruction, respect for all of the languages used in the republic, favorable conditions for the development of Tajik-Russian and Russian-Tajik communication, and the observance of the constitutional rights of citizens with any other native language;

To create a sociopolitical atmosphere assuring people of any nationality that they are full-fledged citizens of the Tajik SSR;

To recognize the cultural uniqueness of the nationalities and ethnic groups living in Tajikistan, grant ethnic communities the right to make their own decisions on matters in regions heavily populated by these ethnic groups, and give them opportunities to form their own social, educational, religious, and other associations and have their own press organs, schools, and cultural and religious centers, on the condition that the exercise of these rights will not inhibit the free development of other ethnic communities, will not be used for the purposes of self-isolation or confrontation, and will not impede the affirmation of common human values and the harmonization of inter-ethnic relations;

To affirm internationalism in all spheres of life, signifying not the merger of nationalities, but the community of interests and solidarity of workers of different nationalities and ethnic groups, and to create the necessary conditions for the thorough development of each nationality and the cultivation of patriotism based on historical awareness and a knowledge of the spiritual values accumulated by earlier generations;

To develop cooperation with the people of fraternal republics and friendly foreign countries in science, literature, and the arts as a major factor in the mutual enrichment of national cultures;

To create an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding in each labor collective, neighborhood, and academic institution and to reject chauvinism, nationalism, and racism in any form.

VI. The Communist Party of Tajikistan—An Organic Part of the CPSU

The Communist Party of Tajikistan will make its own decisions on organizational, personnel, and financial matters, engage in publishing activity, and participate directly in fundamental decisions on partywide affairs.

The republic party organization will work with other party organizations, including foreign ones, on the basis of direct ties.

In view of the real possibility of a multi-party system in the republic in the future, the Communist Party of Tajikistan feels that no member of the CPSU should simultaneously belong to other parties, endorse a split in the party, form factional groups, or join nationalist organizations.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan will accomplish its renewal by means of a self-cleansing process and the thorough democratization of party affairs. It supports the affirmation of glasnost in party affairs, the rejection of obsolete forms of work, and a relentless struggle against bureaucracy.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan will plan its work in line with the principles of genuinely democratic intra-party debate and decisionmaking procedures and will perform its work in an atmosphere of party camaraderie, guaranteeing collective leadership, the pluralism of opinions, the freedom to criticize, a variety of approaches and platforms, the organization of referendums in special cases, and the right of the minority to express its position as long as it complies with the majority decision.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan reaffirms the territorial-production principle—i.e., the maintenance of party organizations in production and other collectives—and wants Communists to take an active part in the formation of superior party organs and their staffs and in the activities of social organizations and self-government agencies. Primary organizations will be granted broader authority and will make their own decisions on their structure, operational plans, and forms of activity and will have a chance to influence the decisions of superior party organs and the implementation of these decisions.

Under present conditions the functions of oblast, city, and rayon party committees must undergo substantive changes. One of their main objectives will be the gradual transition from authoritarian methods of administration to political methods. Their principal duty is to offer practical assistance to primary party organizations in work directly with party members and non-members, in finding the right approach to the augmentation of party ranks, and in making higher demands on Communists in the pursuit of the party's strategic line and the reinforcement of discipline.

Each party organization should display autonomy in its political work with the population of the republic and do this work efficiently, with a view to changes in the social situation, make extensive use of the progressive customs and traditions of the people, and develop meaningful communication with people in their own neighborhoods.

The role, rights, and functions of all elected party bodies must be enhanced considerably. Elected bodies should

be formed with strict consideration for the political, professional, and moral qualities of Communists, their level of competence, and the social structure of the party organization.

The new role of the Communist Party of Tajikistan will also make new demands on its Central Committee, as the organ of collective leadership, and will necessitate the establishment of the appropriate new structures for the organization of its work.

It will also be necessary to improve the structure of the party staff, enhance its competence, and accomplish the qualitative renewal of the style, forms, and methods of activity to exclude the possibility of the performance of the functions of elected organs by the party staff. The staff will perform analytical and advisory functions and carry out decisions, and its size will be determined by the elected organ.

The existing system of personnel work must be revised to discourage the formal bureaucratic approach, regionalism, and protectionism.

The perestroika, democratization, and humanization of all sphere of life in the republic will require the radical renewal of all ideological party work on the basis of closer contact with the masses and wide-ranging dialogue on all current events in the country and republic.

This work should be more dynamic, open, creative, and people-oriented and must reflect changes in socioeconomic and political affairs through the renewal of the content, forms, and methods of the work of party organizations and Communists.

The new conditions will necessitate the elaboration of a scientifically sound theory of ideological indoctrination by the Communist Party of the republic to reflect its qualitatively new role in perestroika and social renewal. The creation of the integral system for the study and forecasting of sociopolitical processes and public opinion must be stepped up, and a program must be drawn up for the perestroika of party propaganda and mass political work in collectives and neighborhoods.

Our ideological efforts must concentrate on popularizing the Marxist-Leninist outlook, defending it, and developing it creatively for the purpose of instilling the population, especially youth, with high political, moral, and spiritual standards and respect for traditional values.

The republic Communist Party realizes that this important and difficult work cannot be performed without the more creative use of intellectual potential and the extensive and active participation of the intelligentsia, party and labor veterans, and the veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

In order to unite all workers in the republic, believers and non-believers, on the perestroika platform, the party will strive to develop dialogue and cooperation with believers and members of the clergy in the spheres

of charity, peace-making efforts, morality, inter-ethnic relations, environmental protection, and the preservation of historical and cultural monuments. With recognition for the priority of common human values and for the sake of socialist renewal and common interests, the party will strive to put an end to intolerance for religious beliefs and for atheistic views.

Communists acknowledge the right of each individual to freedom of conviction but they will nevertheless actively defend their own ideological views and their own approach to philosophical matters.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan feels it is impermissible to use the religious factor for destructive political purposes or for displays of religious fanaticism leading to violations of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Tajik SSR and of human rights and is opposed in principle to the expression of separatist and extremist views and attempts to discredit the party and the Soviet order and destabilize the situation.

Party organizations will continue publicizing Soviet laws on religion, criticizing the ideology and practice of clericalism, and conducting sociological studies of religious attitudes and public opinion on religion. The methods and organizational forms of atheistic work will have to be revised, and the training of scholars of Islamic history and propaganda personnel will have to be improved radically. This work will have to be reorganized in the overall context of the party strategy for the development of the spiritual sphere of socialism.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan supports the inalienable right of each citizen to have access to any information not classified as a state secret and advocates the continued expansion of glasnost in the republic. It will do everything within its power to make glasnost an important means of influencing public opinion and of encouraging participation by the laboring public in policymaking and in all governmental and public affairs.

With a view to the important role of the news and propaganda media in the renewal of society and the exercise of glasnost, the Communist Party of Tajikistan will assist in every way possible in their activity on a democratic basis and the strict observance of legality and will influence them through the Communists working in the media.

The republic Communist Party is opposed to disinformation in the press and on television and radio, the use of the media in the egotistical interests of individuals or groups, and their use to incite inter-ethnic discord and publicize ideas alien to humane and democratic socialism.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan regards its press organs as an important means of carrying out party decisions and of performing ideological indoctrination and organizational work and will direct their activities.

The new editors and chief editors of party publications should be installed at plenums of the appropriate party committees.

The Tajik CP Central Committee would like to hear the opinions, comments, and suggestions of Communists, non-members, veterans, youth, and all inhabitants of the republic with regard to the draft platform for the 21st congress of the republic Communist Party and hopes that the collective discussion will aid in the renewal of the party.

Makhkamov on Changes in CPSU, Tajik CP Role
90US1201A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 10 Jul 90 p 1

[Speech by K. Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajik Central Committee and chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet: "To Win a Vanguard Role"]

[Text] Comrade delegates! Of fundamental importance for our debate on the current moment and the party tasks, it seems to us, is the thesis set out in the Political Report that the vanguard role of the CPSU cannot be imposed on society. It can only be won by an active struggle for the interests of the workers and by practical affairs for the sake of their implementation.

We see the task of today in moving toward the renewal of society and the state through the renewal of the party. During the period of glasnost, much has been said and written about the errors of our party over its almost century-long history. In my opinion, significantly more has been said than was actually the case. However, the criticism of the CPSU is not calming down, and constantly new accusations are being leveled against the party. We are being accused not only of today's problems, but also those which the nation can expect tomorrow. Here none of the new politicized organizations is in any rush to assume responsibility for solving the socioeconomic problems of the current moment.

I do not trust that the political opponents of the CPSU have not learned the rudiments of democracy and where there is the right to act there is also the duty to be responsible. And we, the CPSU, are still constantly engaged in self-flagellation and an exhausting intraparty struggle. The mutual mud-slinging both within the party as well as between the parties, the political groups and formations, when they, in becoming swept up, become removed from the grounds of worker interests is in no way to the betterment of the fatherland. This can only serve the selfish interests which are far removed from the goals of the people of those initiators of the unending squabbles on the lamentable background of the deteriorating life of the working people and their unsatisfied desire for economic and political stability. In this context, I want to say definitely that the ongoing attempts to involve us in the useless debates can push the CPSU onto the sidelines of sociopolitical life. They carry a destructive force, a moral one directed not only against the party but also against society as a whole, for, remaining in a

state of internal party discord, we are unable to count on a positive effect either from the president or Soviet power which has been renewed on all levels. There cannot be real strong, effective power without relying upon a powerful, well-developed political structure such as the party. In other words, such "renewal" of the CPSU is capable of further destabilizing the sociopolitical situation in the nation. One of the most painful manifestations of social instability in recent years has been the problems of interethnic and interregional relations. Without resolving the difficulties arising here, a further renewal of either the society or party is inconceivable. We do not have the right not to notice this obvious linkage. In this context, it is essential to state that the decisions of the special Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the party platform on nationality questions have not been effective, since the state legal mechanisms resolving them have not been established or are not operating.

We must accelerate the elaboration of the states treaty of union. It is naive to assume that having pulled apart the party along national and regional lines and having destroyed the socialist principles of federative relations, someone will be able to make an abrupt jump to the heights of well-being and social justice.

In order to actually move forward, it is essential to look soberly at the past. Over the decades, the Union republic communist parties had been incorporated in the functioning of a unitary state. Being only formally independent and for this reason only formally reflecting the aspirations of the people of whom they were the political vanguard, they unilaterally and at times senselessly carried out the so-called "social" imperative of the center. The consequences of such an orientation are well known. These were minimal sovereignty of the republic party organization, the ignoring of the existing national interests and priorities and, finally, the distorting of relations with the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, particularly with that portion concerned with organizational and cadre work. The central apparatus in the recent past repeatedly took arbitrary decisions and then at its own discretion, changed positions sometimes contrary to the ideas of the congress and party conference. Responsibility for these vacillations was placed on the communists in the republics, on the local party bodies and their leaders who could not help but be seen in the eyes of their people as conservatives holding onto the old and onto power.

Actually, things could not go differently as long as the CPSU as a whole was adapted to serving the authoritarian-bureaucratic system. Having critically analyzed our recent past, the 21st Congress of the Tajik CP nevertheless decisively voiced its own position: we are in favor of a united CPSU but here we also favor a degree of real independence for the republic communist party which would allow us ourselves to set specific political goals of activity and ways of attaining them, proceeding primarily from the interests of the people. On such principles, we feel, economic relations should also be based for the

union of sovereign Soviet republics. At present, everyone is speaking about the economic independence of the regions. We also see no alternative to this. But how can there be complete independence for republics, for our mountainous Tajikistan, in particular, which in actual terms has become a raw material supplier for the enormous national economic organism of the country. For this reason, the republic does not have a developed infrastructure or prospects for rapid industrial development with a priority focus on satisfying the social needs of the public. Add to this the extreme limitation of irrigated arable land, less than 0.11 hectare per capita. And this with an acute demographic situation, when a quarter of the able-bodied population is not engaged in social production.

Undoubtedly, hard-to-predict but inevitable difficulties await society and the party in the initial stage of the transition to a market economy. This is confirmed by the reaction of the people not only at the distant approaches to it. In all of this, in the event of the adoption of the appropriate legislation by the Supreme Soviet, we decisively favor the formulation "regulated market relations" and with the clarification "based on a differentiated approach" considering the specific features of the individual regions, for example, the problem of supplying food products which comprise the basis of a traditional diet. All the regions have their particular features. And consideration of them will largely determine how the people themselves and a significant portion is even now on the brink or beyond the line of poverty, will manifest their attitude toward a market economy and its proponents.

In speaking about this at the Congress, I want to emphasize that the economic policy of the CPSU at present, as never before, should be adequate the realities of the life of the nation's peoples. It must be said directly that each republic individually, relying solely on its own forces, with the current capabilities is unable to quickly create that start-up foundation from which it would be possible confidently to move on to full economic independence. This question was discussed recently at a meeting of the leaders of the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan. For this reason, we all favor a stage-by-stage process, although here we do not intend to be merely consumers.

Lastly, we are alarmed by the fact that in public opinion, in the mass mind, the image of the enemy is being shaped effectively from the communists. Having started with Stalin, it has now reached Lenin. In parallel, they are endeavoring to discredit those upon whose initiative perestroika was started. At the center of the blow is the personality of the General Secretary. How should all of this be understood? The answer, in my view, should be one. The person who has challenged all of us for perestroika and who has united us—the radicals, conservatives and representatives of various platforms—is precisely Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. In the most critical moment in the life of Tajikistan, in the February days, when the question was being settled of not only the authority of our party and the state of the republic, I

telephoned Comrade Gorbachev and received advice: only political consensus, only a direct talk with the people, and only the rebirth and continuation of a respectful dialogue with the people.

In conclusion. Yes, as long as we can distinguish wisdom from demagoguery, loyalty from hypocrisy, principledness from stubbornness, as long as we keep our party from splitting, and strengthen its political, organizational and international unity and moral principle, as long as our ideals are attractive for the young people, we in fact will remain the vanguard political force of society. Let this goal, hope and certainty bring us strength and determination to work for the good of the people. Thank you.

Niyazov Addresses Turkmen CP Central Committee 24th Congress

*90US1011A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 12 May 90 pp 2-5*

[Excerpts from an address by S. A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee: "Report of the Turkmen CP Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Turkmen Communist Party"]

[Excerpts] Esteemed delegates and guests!

The timeframe on which the Turkmen CP Central Committee is reporting relates entirely to the period following the April (1985) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, to years of strenuous activity by the republic's party organization in carrying out the policy of perestroika, renewal and reform, and democratization and glasnost within society.

But for us, as for the country as a whole, realization of the ideas of perestroika is accompanied by many complications. Problems that are difficult to resolve and that have been accumulating for decades have been uncovered in the sphere of the economy, in social and interethnic relations, and in the intellectual area.

Negative tendencies have been aggravated by tensions on the consumer market, by an increase in criminality, and by a decline in labor and production discipline. Various destructive forces have been permitted to manifest themselves, as well. Stopping short of nothing, they are conducting a direct, open attack on the party, on socialism.

Under these conditions, the past report-back election [otchetno-vyborny] campaign within the republic's party organizations was confronted with the task of critically analyzing the state of affairs within the party and society and of discussing a program for finding a way out of the crisis. The draft platform for the 28th Party Congress, proposed by the CPSU Central Committee, became the basis for consolidating the CPSU in order to carry out a policy of decisive renewal in all our activities and of strengthening the party as the political vanguard of society within the new conditions.

For the party organizations, the report-back election campaign, in which about 90 percent of party members took part, made it possible to better understand the processes that are taking place, to work out basic political approaches to their resolution, and to determine main priorities for their activities.

Taking into account the discussions that took place within the republic's party organizations, delegates to this congress will be called upon to analyze thoroughly and evaluate what has been done by the Turkmen Communist Party and to reach a new level of understanding of the tasks that have been posed. Communists and all the working people of the republic await from us precise political assessments both of the present day and, particularly, of yesterday.

But, placing our hopes in the future, it is not out of place to look back, to recall where we started from. Only in this way will we be able to understand more completely what, specifically, did not "work out," where we made mistakes, and how we should avoid similar ones in the future. [passage omitted]

The processes that are now taking place within the Turkmen CP, and within the republic as a whole, unquestionably confirm that, in the process of consolidating ourselves, we must continue to quickly resolve the problems that have accumulated, through our deeds to raise the authority of the party.

Administrative methods and petty guardianship of primary party organizations by the party committees are being overcome, albeit slowly, and practical assistance to elected party activists is growing. The level of responsibility is increasing, which to no small degree has been facilitated by the reporting of party committees and bureaus, and also of party leaders, to their own organizations. Such changes are most evident in the primary party organizations of the cities of Bezmei and Krasnovodsk and in Oktyabrskiy, Charshanginskiy, Sakar-Chaginskiy and certain other rayons.

Open, public methods of nominating candidates for leadership posts and the election of leadership cadres on the basis of alternate candidates have been established and have become widespread in the operating practices of party committees and soviets. The Turkmen CP Central Committee secretary for agricultural questions, the chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, and the first deputy chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet were chosen in this way. This practice is now becoming statutory within party organizations.

While fundamentally changing, a rather stable situation within the Turkmen CP has made it possible not only to preserve unity, but also in some ways to strengthen the positions of the political vanguard. We can assert that, on the whole, party workers believe in the party, see it as a source of strength with the help of which there is a real possibility of accomplishing a restructuring of our entire social and political life. It would seem that precisely this circumstance has helped in large measure to give great

dynamism and practical direction to the processes of perestroika within the republic.

The processes of adjustment that have been made to the economic mechanism have begun to produce results. The new methods of economic activity based on the principles of full economic accountability and self-financing have proven themselves. Positive structural shifts have been noted in the economy. The effectiveness of social production is rising. I will not cite a lot of figures confirming this. These have been provided to you in the materials relating to the Turkmen CP Central Committee report. Therefore, I will mention only certain of them.

National income has increased by almost 22 percent, which is more than 5 percent more than the five-year plan goal. At the same time, it is very important that four-fifths of this was directed to the consumption fund, to the social sphere.

Material production has developed mainly on the basis of intensive factors, on account of increasing the productivity of social labor. Since the beginning of the five-year plan, this has grown by 13.8 percent instead of the 8.3 percent set as a target. A tendency has been noted toward a sharp slow-down in rates of reduction in capital-output ratio. The volume of industrial production increased beyond established targets; its growth rates exceeded the level achieved during the preceding five-year plan by a factor of 1.5.

Growth in gross agricultural production amounted to almost 18 percent and was achieved basically on account of an increase in labor productivity. Gross profitability of agricultural production grew by 10 percent and amounted to 36 percent.

On the whole, average annual rates of growth of agricultural production grew almost two-fold in comparison with the Eleventh Five-Year Plan.

To a certain degree, we were successful in energizing development in the social sphere. Targets for the introduction of housing, schools and preschool institutions, clubs and houses of culture, and other projects designated for cultural and everyday services purposes were overfulfilled. In four years, more than 70,000 families have acquired new homes.

The share of capital investments for the solution of social problems increased overall during 1989 to 32 percent as against 23 percent in 1985. As a result of this, we opened 1.4-fold more housing, 2-fold more schools and preschool institutions, almost 3-fold more polyclinics, and more than 6-fold more hospitals, clubs and homes of culture.

Increased attention has been given to implementing a complex program for development and production of goods and services. It should be noted that rates of growth of production in "Group B", which produces goods for the population, exceeded rates of growth of

output in "Group A" by more than two-fold, as against a five-year plan target of 1.1-fold. This is evidence of the accelerated development of sectors working directly for the needs of people. But we know that today this will not solve the problem; Communists within the government still need to work for an increase in the output of "Group B" products.

Noticeable changes have taken place in the intellectual life of the republic. On the basis of the decisions of the February (1988) CPSU Central Committee plenum and the eleventh plenum of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, purposeful work is being carried out in all areas of the education, instruction, and professional preparation of young people.

Work has been intensified somewhat with regard to the ideological indoctrination of cadres; good popular traditions and customs have begun to be revived. The practice of making broad use of mass political measures—such ones, for example, as the republic Council of Elders—has justified itself. The mass information media have started to work in a more interesting way. Public education and in public health have begun to restructure, albeit slowly.

New forms of organization of scientific activity have appeared, among which the organic inclusion of scientific organizations within the system of cost accounting relationships has important significance.

Movement is taking place in the development of a national language and culture.

Measures aimed at rehabilitation of persons who were unjustly repressed during the 1930's, the 1940's, and the beginning of the 1950's are a crucial matter that has played no small role in restoring health to the moral and political climate within the republic. Today, we can report to the Congress delegates that no petition from relatives of or from people close to those who suffered has gone without attention. Moreover, an absolute majority of the cases have been examined on the initiative of a commission of the Turkmen CP Central Committee that was especially created for this purpose. At the present time, the Procuracy and Supreme court have rehabilitated more than 6,000 people charged as criminals. The Turkmen CP Central Committee Bureau, taking into account the lack of foundation for the accusations that were made and the full rehabilitation of those involved, has restored or reconfirmed the party membership of 135 Communists. Unfortunately, for many this was posthumously. Let us lay to rest the memory of the heroes that fell during the years of repression and do everything to ensure that such fanaticism is not permitted either in the country or in the republic.

There has been a reexamination of attitudes toward cultural values that fell under prohibition, labeled as "ideologically harmful." The people are being given back all their creative heritage, including the forbidden poetry

of Makhtumkuli and the heroic epic "Korkut-ata," at one time denied them and today published in a mass editions. [passage omitted]

The February (1990) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the draft pre-Congress platform passed at it require that we reexamine our attitude toward the transformations that have initiated, that we achieve new rates in their realization, that we direct the activities of each party organization toward the benefit of man, toward creating worthy working and living conditions for him. It is understood that the solution of these problems is organically tied to restoring health to the social sphere, the economy, to providing guarantees of social justice, to observing the legal rights and freedoms of citizens, the individual's possibilities for all around development and intellectual flourishing.

What needs to be done to achieve a fundamental breakthrough in this, so that the decisions of the party are fulfilled fully and really, so that every Communist will become an active participant in perestroyka?

How to transform each party committee into a center of attraction for people having their own interests and concerns?

How to accelerate the mastery of political methods of leadership?

By what path to carry out a reform of party life, to make it truly democratic and attractive?

Today we must give an answer to these and many other questions. The Communists of the republic have entrusted us, the delegates to the 24th Congress of the Turkmen Communist Party, to determine a program of action for the achievement of fundamental shifts in all areas of the republic's life. From our Congress the people of Turkmenistan await effective solutions that must make it possible to seriously move forward, to achieve perceptible results.

Part Two

Comrades!

As the last report-back election campaign showed, the most important problem disturbing Communists and all of the republic's workers today is the development and mastery of new forms and methods of political influence on the economy.

It has to be acknowledged that a part of our party and soviet cadres, when reporting on economic indicators, gloss over and sometimes even distort the state of affairs and say nothing about the problems of man. But people today are insistently demanding that measures be taken to stabilize living standards and satisfy social needs.

In the Turkmen SSR, the average monthly income of practically a third of the inhabitants amounts to less than 75 rubles. Meanwhile, according to family budget and price data, in 1988 the minimum living wage level

amounted to an average of 90 rubles per person. During the past two or three years, prices have not only "jumped," but shortages have developed of many goods, including goods in immediate demand. As a result of inflation, there has been a decline in the living standards of a group of people who are poorly provided for—the pensioners, students, workers in culture and medical workers—who, even without this, have the lowest incomes. Along with this, people perceive no incentives to work better, historically non-labor incomes are slowly being eliminated, and the quality of social services is becoming worse.

The problem of food supply remains unresolved.

Despite the fact that average annual production of agricultural products grew by almost 30 percent during the past four years as compared with the comparable period of the last five-year plan, this problem remains, as before, critical.

Calculated per capita, the production of food products has proceeded and is proceeding at far below the rates that are needed to improve supplies to the population. The increase in meat, for example, has amounted to only two kilograms per inhabitant of the republic, of milk—to 9 kilograms, and of eggs—to 10 units. At the same time, the monetary incomes of the republic's inhabitants have gone up by 28.5 percent during this period, and the population has grown by 11 percent.

All this has led to the situation that many food products are imported into the republic. Is there justification for the fact, for example, that we import canned and stewed fruits and vegetables, mayonnaise and various seasonings, flour, chicken, and sausage products. Indeed, we can produce all this locally, moreover not only to meet the needs of the domestic market but also for export beyond the borders of the republic. The Central Committee has repeatedly issued instructions to the Communist directors of the Council of Ministers and to republic's state agroindustrial committee [Gosagroprom], but unfortunately matters have gone no further than general discussions. Now these questions will be introduced on 21 May for examination by a session of the republic Supreme Soviet. The government and comrade Kh. A. Akhmedov must show the peoples' deputies ways to real resolution of the problem of providing the population with food products.

It is also necessary to note that goals set for the production of non-food products also are consistently underfulfilled. During the past year alone, commodity production output fell at one out of every six enterprises in Chardzhou and Mary oblasts, at one out of every three in the city of Ashkhabad, at one out of four in the city of Bezmei, and at one out of two in Tedzhenskiy Rayon. For these reasons, every year there is a shortfall of almost 60 million rubles worth of products that reach the market.

Things are even more alarming in the sphere of services. In comparison with average all-union indicators, each

inhabitant of the republic is provided with 1.5-fold fewer services. As formerly, there is a great difference in the level of available services between the republic's oblast centers and rayons, which reaches 1.5- to 2-fold.

The urgency of the housing problem is not diminishing. On the average for the country, about 16 square meters of living and useful area are available per capita; with us, there are 11. But even this indicator varies greatly. Approximately 140,000 persons are now living in communal apartments, dormitories, in dilapidated housing. Lines for apartments are not getting any shorter and in Mary and Tashauz oblasts and the city of Ashkhabad they are even becoming longer. The quality of construction of state public housing apartments does not stand up to criticism. Only two thirds of apartment houses are equipped with central heating and plumbing, and only a few more have running water. Only a fifth of the apartments are supplied with hot water. The situation is even worse in the countryside. To the problems enumerated can be added a low level of gas and energy supply.

I would like to speak about this in particular. Not all directors are approaching solution of this problem with necessary understanding and responsibility. Raising the level of gas supply is in truth a nationwide problem. If we do not succeed in solving it, we will lose our authority in the eyes of the people. In the final analysis, this is a question of confidence in the party.

The recently passed law "On general principles of local self-government and local economy in the USSR" obliges all councils of people's deputies, as organs of governmental authority, to solve, without delay, all problems and develop the services sphere in local areas. So far, the work of Communists serving as directors of oblast executive committees—comrades Achilov, Yalkabov, and Rashidov—and of a number of Communists directing city executive committees is unsatisfactory with regard to solution of social problems. Comrades! An extremely tense situation is developing in connection with employment. At the present time, more than 10 percent of the able-bodied population remain outside the sphere of social production, despite the fact that 11,300 working places have been created during the past four years. This problem has particularly strongly affected our women. They account for more than 80 percent of the unemployed. The situation is aggravated by a lack of possibilities for their participation in the activities of organizations outside the home without damage to their families. Thus, for the republic as a whole, preschool institutions are available to not more than 40 percent of the children, and in rural areas—this is only 15 percent. More than 41,000 children are in need of accommodation in kindergartens and nurseries. Also strongly felt are existing distortions in the development of the industrial and social infrastructure at the sites of large industrial associations, which predetermine social and economic policies in these localities. To all this it should be added that the situation is complicated by the predicted long-term lag of the development of the cultural and consumer services infrastructure and of medical services

behind the extent and rate of population increase that have developed within the republic. For example, for the republic as a whole, there are only 8 municipal and consumer services enterprises for every 10,000 rural residents. The population has available 1.3- and 1.7-fold fewer hospital beds and polyclinics than the established norms, respectively.

Complex "Labor," "Housing," and other programs were developed by the government at the beginning of the five-year plan. But neither the government nor the commissions of the Central Committee (comrade V. N. Rebrik) have established oversight of their fulfillment and, as a result, many measures have remained on paper only. These cases need to be corrected. The thought is that the newly elected Central Committee will concern itself with monitoring the solution of these and other social questions.

We also cannot ignore the question of land use within the republic. Despite measures being undertaken, there has been practically no reduction in the area of lands affected by high and medium levels of salination and this area presently equals 626,000 hectares, or 47 percent of all irrigated land. Here the work of the republic's State Agroindustrial Committee (former chaired by Yu. K. Mogilevets and now by D. Babakuliyev) has fallen short in many ways. Up until now, adequate measures have not been taken to improve the operating procedures of the Ozerniy and Deryalykskiy collectors, the overflow disposal of drainage waters into the Amur Darya, and the melioration condition of lands in the Ashkhabad group of rayons. Questions of raising the quality of land improvement construction are being resolved slowly. The condition of existing melioration systems and irrigation canals, the system of irrigation, and matters connected with the introduction of progressive watering methods have not improved.

All this together contributes to further heating and salination of the soil and a worsening of the ecological situation.

The negative influence which various kinds of harmful production are having on the environment, the many instances of violations of technical standards, and the large areas of agricultural land on which various chemicals are being utilized is a cause of deep concern. Particularly strongly "distinguished" in this connection are the Bezmein cement and the Chardzhou chemical plants, the Cheleken technical carbon plant, and the economic enterprises of the agroindustrial complex and of the TSSR State Construction Committee (Gosstroy). In this connection, the passivity of the positions taken by the Turkmen State Committee for Environmental Protection (comrade Chorekliyev) are a cause of wonder. The republic's chief environmental protection organ should advance an acceptable program for the solution of problems of restoring health to the ecological situation.

It goes without saying that these and other shortcomings in the social area are creating definite tensions. A large number of problems have become closely intertwined and have entered into the area of political problems. Precisely therefore, these questions, as a rule, have become an urgent agenda item in discussions of the present reports and the elections of party committees.

What has open discussion showed in this regard?

First of all, the presence of so many problems in the social sphere testifies to the weakness of the political line being conducted by the Central Committee, by me as the First Secretary of the Central Committee, and by commission directors (comrades Nesterenko, Durdyev, Rebrik, and Sakhatmuradov). It would be unjust to assert that no attempts have been made to move forward. But, frequently, efforts have turned out to be disproportionate to results. One of the reasons is that everything has been done timidly, unsurely, seemingly very cautiously, which may relate, in particular, to a poor mastery of political methods of work. How has the practice of party management of the economy been organized up until now? Rather simply. If there is a failure to carry out an assignment, we submit a query to the bureau and try to catch a departed train; we begin to prescribe measures for the situation of the moment. Thus, analysis has showed that during the reporting period, the Central Committee Bureau alone passed 40 resolutions regarding questions of economic activity which, of course, improved something but did not guarantee the main thing—full, fundamental solution of the problems confronting our national economy. But the economy is a force of the sort that can stifle, can reduce to naught any matter at all, if it is based on noncomplex, inconsistent decisions. The adherence of the Central Committee and, of course, of many party committees to administrative methods of economic management has fettered people's initiative, and this absence of initiative and principle has preserved an attitude of dependence.

But perhaps the main reason is the inertia and conservatism of our government. For too long, it has attempted to preserve the old economic mechanism. The dogmatism and devotion to "gross" achievements that stem from this have been a serious and dangerous force that acts as a brake on the dynamics of life and thought. Recently, the composition of the government of the republic suffered fundamental changes. We hope that the members of the Central Committee—the newly designated chairman of the Council of Ministers, Kh. Akhmedov, his first deputy, comrade A. Ch. Charyyev, and the chairman of Gosplan, Comrade M. Razhapov, will do everything possible in order to overcome these shortcomings. But, at the same time, a necessity arises to raise the elementary personal responsibility of the cadres for the matters they are assigned. Thus, plenums the Central Committee Bureau have repeatedly issued personal instructions to Central Committee member and deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, comrade B. Annayev with regard to correcting the situation that has developed concerning goods and services. However,

the characterization that has been given of the state of affairs on the consumer market provides a rather clear picture to the work he has been done.

We cannot delay with regard to any areas of the republic's sociopolitical and socioeconomic life. What M.S. Gorbachev said at a meeting with delegates to the 21st Congress of the Komsomol relates fully to us: A real interregnum has developed in our economy—the command system no longer works, but a new one, one based on the use of economic levers, on incentives, on the interest of people in the results of their work, and on uncovering an individual's entire creative potential, still has not asserted itself. Every step forward has become shorter and shorter, has given us more and more difficulty. That supply of strength which we succeeded in creating has begun gradually to be reduced.

Why have increases in industrial and construction output declined in comparison with the average level achieved during 1986-1988? Failures to deliver products on the basis of concluded agreements have considerably increased: while in 1988 their volume came to something around 23 million rubles, then during the past year this figure had increased more than two-fold. The state of contract discipline has particularly worsened at enterprises in Chardzhoy oblast, the city of Ashkhabad, Gostroy, and the TSSR Ministry of Local Industry,

Labor discipline is declining. In industry, for example, during the past year alone, losses of working time increased by almost 9 percent and labor turnover grew 1.5-fold.

To these accustomed facts, many others have begun to be added. In the activities of labor collectives and their directors, the view has taken hold that the most important thing in economic reform, in the transition to economic methods of management—is to remove all limitations on the growth of earnings. In their affairs, practically all enterprises and organizations, and of course cooperatives, are taking advantage of this, which has sharply complicated financial dealings in the republic.

Can the situation really be considered normal when a large portion of the profits of enterprises in light industry are formed by increasing the production of products with classifications of "N" and "D", which by no means always guarantees improvement in their quality?

Thus, this factor accounts for a fifth of the profits of knitting enterprises and at a majority of sewing factories—for 14 percent. This leads to removal from production of commodities that enjoy popular demand but are not profitable to the producer. Such examples can also be found in other sectors.

The imperfections and sometimes contradictions of the new economic mechanism lead to a situation where, at the basic level of the enterprises and organizations, the plans set for the latter are being fulfilled and overfulfilled but, at the same time, the overall state of the economy is

not improving. There has been an increase in nonproduction losses, which during the past year alone have exceeded 150 million rubles. The financial situation of the republic is slow in improving. At the beginning of this year, the shortage of internal working funds came to about 300 million rubles and the budget deficit in 1990 amounted to 180 million rubles. In other words, processes are taking place in the national economy which are clearly contradictory both to economic laws and to good sense.

The Bureau and Secretariat of the Central Committee, and I personally, are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for all these economic anomalies. And, first of all, for the loyalty we have demonstrated and our failure to be sufficiently demanding. But the most serious deficiency, both ours and that of all party organs, lies in the fact that the primary party organizations have still not become the principle element of perestroika. Just take the organizations of the republic ministries and departments. Many of them not only have not been able to take the lead in perestroika but, by their inaction, are even acting as a brake on it.

What has been said applies in full measure to the primary party organization of the Ministry of Light Industry, which has slipped into a position of dependence and has not been able to create within the collective a situation of open and businesslike discussion of the burning problems of the day. It is having practically no influence on questions relating to improvement of the management activities of the ministry apparatus. The reports made by Communists at meetings are formal and do not contain a thorough analysis of the state of affairs and, instead of a principled assessment of how the requirements of the CPSU Rules being carried out, instead of official responsibility, and, as a rule, instead of high final results, there are frequently attempts to absolve negligent economic managers and administrators of responsibility.

We can no longer content ourselves with such a situation. The problems which now face us are much more complex than many realize. We are already on the threshold of new decisive tests related with the reform of price formation, to changes in attitudes toward property, and to other economic actions.

So, is there a way out of the situation that has been created? Yes, there is. Its formula, earlier laid out in the pre-election platform of the Turkmen CP, is still timely with small additions and is seen in the following way today: the transition to self-management and self-financing of all the republic's primary production units, enterprises, and organizations within the framework of the Soviet federation, the creation of a new all-union agreement, the structural restructuring of the economy and a transition to market relationships, demonopolization of regional production, economic accountability, and production and technological discipline. And, as a basis, a competent, qualified political guarantee of the realization of the formula being carried out. Proceeding

from this formula, among the fundamental problems which confront the new make-up of the Central Committee and all party organizations within the republic, the first and most important point is the economic independence of the republic, as envisaged in the law "On the basic economic relationships of the USSR, the union, and the autonomous republics." It is a complicated problem, and a difficult one, from the entire circle of tasks that arise in connection with this, to identify one or several having said that this is the main one. Therefore, those problems which we are will now be talking about will be arranged according to their urgency.

First of all, there is the necessity of strengthening, without delay, the financial condition of the republic. There is only one path here—to increase the efficiency of the national economy, the level of profitability, and to eliminate unprofitable enterprises. This can be achieved only through material interest of the workers in the results of their work, through a variety of forms of ownership, and through reform of prices and of the credit and financial system.

Therefore, Communists who are working in the government, in the ministries and departments and in soviet and economic organs on the local level, must devote their main attention to this question and must boldly resolve the economic, financial, and organizational questions connected with it. Everyone must understand that, under conditions of a market economy, we will have to live only within our means. Calculations show that, in order to live well, it will be necessary to raise the share of profits that goes into the formation of the republic's national income to 20-15 percent, and this now amounts to approximately 15 percent.

There can be no self-reliance without increasing the production of goods that the people vitally need. Therefore, it is our view that the Communists in the TSSR Council of Ministers, the TSSR Gosplan, the ministries and departments, and at enterprises must now radically and quickly restructure their work. We must make clear to our comrades that we have entered into an entirely new phase of economic interrelationships with other republics, regions, and enterprises. The main thing will be strict observance of contract obligations. It is necessary right now to work out a mechanism that ensures equivalency in the exchange of output and to strictly observe this in our economic interrelations with other union republics and other organs.

The role and significance of the agroindustrial complex are growing sharply. Without a fundamental breakthrough in this direction it is unrealistic to count on completely satisfying the needs of the population for agricultural products, or those of industry for raw materials.

Fundamental support should be given to further intensification of social production, to improvement of its structure, to the introduction of scientifically founded systems of running the economy, to broad application of

the newest technologies, and to shifting all of agricultural production to an industrial basis. The principle of rational utilization of land must be placed at the center of planned approaches, of increasing its fertility and of carrying out measures aimed at revitalizing our lands and the ecological situation as a whole.

A further increase in the effectiveness of agriculture must involve having a multiplicity of different organizational forms. An important place here belongs to the development of the intra-farm lease (vnutrikhozyaystvennaya аренда) at kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and also to individual farms and cooperatives of lessees.

At the present time, about 95,000 subunits are operating under lease and family-contract arrangements at farms within the republic, but real work in this direction is only beginning.

It is no secret that one of the main sources of funds earned in the republic is the sale of cotton fiber. But far from all Communists understand this. One frequently must listen to talk about the cotton-grower's monoculture and the harm it causes. At Central Committee plenums it has been repeatedly necessary to explain the groundlessness of such accusations. Cotton is our wealth, and it will be cultivated within the republic. However, it is planned to stabilize its production at the level of 1,300,000 tons. The state order for the republic should be not more than one million tons. The farms should have the remainder at their own disposal for the solution of social problems.

This will create good prerequisites for improving the structure of agricultural production and for more effective solution of the food problem. For self-sufficiency, it is necessary during the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan to achieve a 2-fold increase in the present level of grain production, a 1.5-fold increase in vegetable and melon and gourd production, a 1.5-fold increase in the production of meat and eggs, and a 2-fold increase in the production of milk.

In order to meet these goals, the food sectors must concern themselves more purposefully with such important questions as strengthening the material and technical base, improving supply, and perfecting state procurement, direct ties, and a mutually beneficial system of prices. It is necessary to increase sharply the production of agricultural products and to create small shops for processing fruit and vegetables, cattle, and fowl, and turning out finished products directly at the places where the output is produced. This will produce a large economic effect and will reduce loss of resources. It is also necessary to intensify attention given to problems of improving the quality of the food products that are being produced, to expand their variety and to ensure thorough processing of raw materials and the use of waste-free technologies.

Finally, we also need to exercise good management in the handling of cotton fiber. Most importantly, it is necessary to strictly maintain the level of the state order and to

ensure that this does not exceed one million tons. And to use all the rest for commodity exchange and for the conclusion of trade deals with foreign countries. This is a colossal reserve for developing our countryside.

It is possible and necessary to increase considerably the contribution of the private sector to solution of the food problem. The way to do this is further integration of personal farms and social production. The subsidiary farms of industrial enterprises, organizations, and institutions as well as collective home and market gardening should receive accelerated development.

One of the main directions of the new agrarian policy is all-round development of the social sphere in the countryside.

Further, we must more intensively defend the interests of the republic against departmental debauchery within our territory; must not let our gas, our petroleum, and our cotton go for a song. It is necessary to move here from words to concrete laws, regulations, actions by the government and economic organs. And the way here has already been determined. It is necessary to destroy departmental dictatorship from below—through the creation of unions, associations and concerns for the production of goods needed by the people.

The new economic policy and the solution of social problems cannot be realized, even if we do have the resources and means, without restructuring the investment process, considerably strengthening the construction industry's internal base, increasing the production of construction materials, and raising the effectiveness of capital investments. Today, within the republic, every second construction project involves an overrun of norms set for construction time, as a result of which "noncompleted's" have doubled during the last four years, have passed the two billion ruble mark, and have equalled the annual volume of capital investments. Think about this figure. Indeed, this is literally money buried in the ground. Unfortunately, it is necessary to affirm that nothing has changed with the arrival of comrade M. Dzhumakuliev in the sector as its top director. Neither Communist managers nor the party organizations with Gosplan, Gosstroy, and Goskomvodselstroy are taking concrete measures. It is also necessary to say that the shift of construction organizations to direct subordination to the Council of Ministers still has not provided perceptible results. As formerly, plans are not being fulfilled, production capacities are growing extremely slowly, and construction efficiency is not increasing.

We must to seek new, nontraditional methods of solving the problems that have arisen. Take, for example, housing construction. In order to realize the well-known decision of the party concerning provision of an apartment or home to every family by the year 2000, it will be necessary to overfulfill the quotas of the "Housing-92" program almost twofold. Why not, in this situation, think about ways to afford people an opportunity to

purchase apartments and to redo them to suit their own tastes? To build any kind of private homes, dachas, garden houses that meet their own tastes and requirements? There are now one-and-a-half billion rubles lying around in savings accounts. It is not difficult to imagine how much of this money could have been removed from these accounts if the opportunity had been presented to solve what is the most important problem for every family. This would considerably lighten the burden of the state, which every year spends very large amounts on the construction of housing. Such an approach should also be taken to the solution of other problems, particularly implementation of the republic Supreme Soviet resolution with regard to providing all population centers with natural gas, drinking water, and electric power.

And last. We should proceed decisively to the establishment within the republic of external economic organs with the right of licensing and setting quotas for export-import operations and which have real authority in coordinating the activities of enterprises and in creating reliable protection against the sale of our wealth for next to nothing.

As you know, the republic is to change over partially to operation under market conditions as early as 1991; I consider it possible to accomplish this only on the basis of a thoroughly worked out complex plan of practical actions.

Therefore, we should take into account that a change in the system of administration and economic management within the republic will not provide instant results.

Not only well-founded work is required, but also patience. Under these conditions, the Turkmen SSR should set the example of a weighed approach to restructuring its system of territorial administration on the basis of balanced coordination of the interests of the region with the interests of the entire country.

It is primarily the Communists that work in the republic's Council of Ministers, Gosplan, and ministries and departments who must be imbued with this. It is precisely from them that we today are expecting initiative and persistence in seeing that the republic government, every organ of state and economic administration, and all enterprises and organizations, before the end of this year, work out and implement a plan of work aimed at transition to the new economic conditions. We cannot permit a worsening of the work of the national economy and a drop in the existing standard of living to occur as a result of the changeover to new methods of economic management. This would serve to discredit all our ideas.

The second point in our formula is the structure of industry. This is not even a question of today, but of yesterday. Changing the profile of production units that are not needed and constructing new ones needed by the republic. Coming out in a united front against the dictates of the departments. These are our tasks. Not the

departments, but we, our economic and social interests, should determine what we should build and what we should rebuild.

And that which is happening?

For a long time we have been racking our brains on account of a surplus of labor resources while we have an extremely rich raw material base. Instead of processing our own resources locally we have sent them to regions and republics that have an appreciable deficit of labor resources. Is the really good economic management? These questions require a state approach and a state decision on the level of the USSR Supreme Soviet, of our corps of deputies in it. In accordance with the decisions of our congress, they should intensify their activities in this direction.

The final point is the transition within the economy to regulated market relationships. This conceals great difficulties and an enormous amount of work. And first of all because the transition to market relationships is attended by a series of economic and social consequences. Even if all anti-inflationary regulators are put into operation, prices for the output of industrial processing sectors, agricultural products, food and everyday consumer goods will increase. By means of indexing earnings and compensating for increased retail prices, the population can be refunded about half the amount of the increased cost, and a little less on account of an increase in wages. However, as you understand, it will be impossible to cover everything. Problems of employment will be exacerbated and further stratification of the population in terms of living standard will occur. Nonetheless, we must proceed with all this.

Whether we like it or not, the objective situation is such that it is impossible to create a high-efficiency economy and find a way out of the economic crisis we are now going through without wide use of market mechanisms. Moreover, the concept proposed by the government for a transition to a regulated market economy is entirely consistent with the choice that has been made to move toward a humane, democratic socialism. On the way to a regulated market economy we will have to pass through a number of stages, having thoroughly thought through all the consequences of steps being taken in this direction and having worked out a reliable mechanism for the social protection of the population, particularly its less well-to-do strata.

I think that I have the right in the name of our congress to demand from the government of the republic, and the same of all Communists, the approval of swift measures, which are, however, thought through, down to the smallest detail. If we are not successful within the shortest period of time in simultaneously creating balance within the national economy, financially reviving the economy, eliminating losses and poor economic management, setting up an anti-inflationary mechanism, and putting all types of property into effect, then we will not succeed in giving the economy a dynamic impulse

and in passing through the transition period with minimal difficulties. Besides this, we should seriously think through the system of management both of this entire program and of its separate components. For this we need to draw appropriate conclusions from the failures that have been permitted to occur in recent time and to concern ourselves with more thorough working out of each practical step.

We also will not be able to solve the problems that face us without bringing together all the forces that are interested in the success of perestroika. This is not formalistic consolidation. Through broad consultations with labor collectives, representatives of various strata of the population, trade unions and other social organizations, and scholars, it is additionally necessary to get fresh ideas that will help finally to formulate this most important of programs while taking account of the special characteristics of the republic.

And, indeed, to a large degree, this is now a problem of the party organizations, which must get this process going, which must create an interested environment within the republic. The entire party aktiv, every Communist must begin to work, not in a formalistic way but responsibly to the highest degree.

We need to acquire patience, to persistently master the new situation, to study the market and to teach this to people, to explain to them the essence of the measures that are being taken. If we resolve these problems, we will also be able to overcome the tendency for alienation of the workers from the means of production and for a decline in responsibility for the results of one's work. Then socialism's formula that "he who does not work, does not eat" will also begin to work.

Such, in very general outline, are the foundations of our present economic and social policies, which are aimed at stabilizing and improving living standards within the republic. Jointly with the scholars, we are preparing a program for increasing the effectiveness of the national economy. All of us have had occasion to get together with various people and we have not met a single one who, in the name of the well-being of the population of Turkmenistan, did not agree to do without something, to limit his own requirements. And this is the moral fiber and creative force that will succeed in surmounting all barriers on the path to economic independence. The people must not despair, and for this we all must answer.

Part Three

Comrades! [passage omitted]

The Central Committee and all party organizations must also exercise oversight regarding questions of harmonizing interethnic relations. One of the most important of these questions, upon which many painful phenomena in interethnic relations are focused, is the questions of language. When responding to it, it is necessary to emphasize once again that assignment of the status of a state language to the Turkmen language is the sovereign

right of the republic and that, by availing ourselves of it, we are establishing a basis for preserving the language of our people and for its harmonious and active development. At the same time, we should not permit it to become a dictate, an infringement on the right of using other languages within the republic. This is a fundamental position which, we believe, party organizations should defend.

It cannot be said that we have run into great difficulties in the work to harmonize interethnic relations. No, the interethnic basis of the population of Turkmenistan is healthy and strong and, indeed, this "worries" some people too much. Certain elements with extremist views are speculating on the painful phenomena that have come to us as an inheritance of the times of stagnation and are trying to play upon the Turkish people's feelings of national self-awareness, to insinuate openly nationalistic ideas.

Therefore we should continue in the future to approach the development of practical steps to carry out the decisions of the September (1989) Plenum and the Pre-Congress Platform of the CPSU Central Committee with great thought and circumspection, considering public opinion from all sides. This is very important and extremely necessary for the preservation of a favorable, calm moral atmosphere within the republic.

Crime is one of the most dangerous manifestations borne by deformations in the intellectual life, consumerism, and society's moral decay, particularly organized crime. And if anyone thinks that the representatives of this gang do not harbor their own plans for destabilization of the situation, for destroying the processes of perestroika, then they are deeply disillusioned.

The flood of letters, telegrams, and oral appeals demanding that the situation within the republic be improved is constantly growing. This problem also was not avoided by an absolute majority of the participants in the report-back election meetings and conferences.

The Central Committee is seriously concerned by the fact that, because of the unsatisfactory work of the republic's law-enforcement organs, the criminal world is sometimes emerging in concert with corrupt elements, that it is joining with certain management cadres. A firm barrier against such negative manifestations also has not been provided by appropriate commissions and departments of the Central Committee (comrades S. M. Nesterenko and G. K. Podalinskiy) and of party and soviet organs, within whose activities a noticeable decline has been seen recently with regard to carrying out the decisions of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee.

As a result of the ineffectiveness of preventive measures and an attachment to obsolete forms and methods of combatting crime, crime-solving indicators have worsened. During the past year, almost half of all crimes remained unsolved. An extremely bad situation has developed in the city of Ashkhabad, where only a third of

them have been solved. An analogous situation exists in the cities of Bezmeim and Nebit-Dag.

Meanwhile, many of our party, soviet, and administrative organs and their directors are frequently not on top of the situation, are permitting serious mistakes, and are sometimes even totally helpless. No active measures to eliminate these shortcomings have been taken by the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs, procuracy organs, courts of justice, or, personally, by comrades V. A. Grinin, B. M. Vasilyuk, N. M. Yusupov, and Kh. Atayev.

The political department of the MVD, which is headed by Turkmen CP Central Committee member, comrade B. Dovletov, merits serious criticism. The party political apparatus is not having the influence it should on restructuring all the operative and official activities of internal affairs organs and is not making a principled assessment of incidents of legal violations by coworkers, of abuses, and other shortcomings. Thus, while 364 party members were subjected to administrative punishment during 1989, only one out of four was disciplined by the party.

As a result, as formerly, there are more than a few morally unscrupulous and professionally unsuitable workers within law-enforcement organs and incidents when crimes are officially covered up and when citizens are detained and arrested illegally have not disappeared.

The state of affairs with regard to crime cannot but disturb us. This is the major "bottleneck" in the republic. In order somehow to justify this situation, the directors of law-enforcement organs are trying to convince us that the reasons for increasing criminality are objective, that it results from perestroika, and that this is characteristic of the country as a whole. We cannot agree with such conclusions. To look around at other regions, especially in this question, is harmful and fallacious. We must ourselves answer for our own mistakes, not seek justification.

The battle against crime demands that complex, effective measures be taken and that all our forces be united. Therefore, we must in fact ensure a fundamental improvement in the work, a rise in the standards and professionalism of law-enforcement workers, a strengthening of their ties with the population, with social organizations, and the recruitment of highly professional, competent cadres from among Communists, Komsomol members, and the best representatives of the labor collectives. We should continue to work to overcome a splintering in the work of law-enforcement organs, to increase activities to prevent violations of the law, to strengthen official discipline, and to imbue militia and procuracy workers with a deep understanding of the fact that they are called upon to defend the legal interests of the working people.

We should not ignore even isolated incidents when anti-Army sentiments are manifested among young people.

The position of the Turkmen CP on this question must be precise and uncompromising. While calling for a guarantee of the country's defense on the level of reasonable sufficiency and recognizing in this connection a need for fundamental restructuring within the army, it seems expedient to declare decisively, in the name of this congress, the nonacceptability of discrediting its role within socialist society. It is necessary to take timely steps to increase the prestige of service in the Army, to strengthen sponsorship [shefskie] relationships with military units and subunits, and to make broader use of the potentials of these for the patriotic, civic education of young people and to prepare them for service within the armed forces of the USSR.

It is necessary to demonstrate more concrete concern about the living and everyday conditions of military personnel, army and navy veterans, and internationalist troops, to facilitate their social protection, to safeguard the heroic traditions of the people, and to use all ideological means to instill a sense of military duty in the young generation,

Part Four

Comrade Delegates!

Reform of the political system, as the most important component of perestroika, raises anew questions about the place and role of the Communist Party and about its methods of operation and moves to the forefront the task of reforming the party itself.

The search for paths of renewal is being conducted in the most varied directions. Widespread discussion is giving birth to many constructive proposals.

The CPSU Central Committee proposed an expansive program of democratic transformations in its draft Platform for the 28th Congress and in the draft Party Rules.

At the same time, discussion has also showed the presence of forces that would like to use the difficulties being experienced by the party for their own selfish ends. Pseudo-radicals, representing a so-called "democratic" platform, instead of a normal, natural process of comparing various points of view and developing a program of action for the CPSU on this basis, have taken the path of organizing factions, a path of splitting the CPSU.

This is a dangerous and irresponsible game. This is cheap politics, the satisfaction of group and personal ambitions. Here we have the interests of Communists, boldness in perestroika, democratization of party life, concern for national characteristics, etc. being used as a screen, as a tactical maneuver calculated for credulous people. Their goal is to cause a split in our united political party, to erode its ideological sources. We should not build illusions. This is a form of struggle for power. And if these forces obtain it, it cannot not be excluded that they will reproduce, in essence, classical authoritarian structures, only with the reverse sign. Properly speaking, even now the ruling nucleus of all

possible kinds of "platforms" is influencing the initiative of Communists, is producing slogans and declarations, and is mobilizing people for actions having a purely outward effect.

In this connection, it clearly would be correct for this congress to declare in the name of the republic's Communists its support for the positions of the CPSU Central Committee, as set forth in the open letter "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis," and for the need to sever relations with those who deny the ideological, theoretical, and organizational principles of our party, who share separatist sentiments, and who call in doubt the socialist choice of the Soviet people.

What can we use to counter demagoguery of this kind? Only solidarity of party ranks, a responsibility toward the people, a precise political program, and purposeful ideological and educational work. It is clearly written and stated in the preelection platform of the Turkmen Communist Party that we stand for the indissoluble brotherhood of the Soviet republics and for renewed federation and that we are for the broad autonomy of the Turkmen CP, within a united CPSU, in solving the most important questions relating to the vital activities of the republic's Communists. Now, it is a matter of realizing the program of action that has been advanced.

An ideological and organizational reformation of the party is logically tied to a change in Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and a repudiation by the party of its monopoly on leadership of the country. This circumstance confronts the CPSU with the necessity of demonstrating its right to remain the ruling party by means of political competition with other social forces and organizations. If it does not succeed in getting ahead of the processes that are taking place within society, if it lags behind perestroika, then, as the draft Platform justly notes, it risks being pushed to the sidelines of political life. And, without fail, the Communist Party of Turkmenistan must take this into consideration.

In distinction from certain other regions and republics, no matter what they say, no matter how they criticize us, there is no other real force here that is capable of ensuring stable development of the republic. The Turkmen CP enjoys rather high authority the confidence of the population. Many examples can be cited in support of this. A constructive dialogue with the broadest masses of the workers, with social organizations, and the scientific and creative intelligentsia, which has only recently come into being, has made it possible to pass good, well-considered laws on elections, protection and defense of national interests, and the dignity of citizens, and to advocate realistic, constructive approaches to many urgent questions. It is possible to accomplish anything if work is based on intelligence and responsibility. I am certain that the republic's Communist Party will in the future as well pursue a broad dialogue and will consider all aspects of public opinion in order to draw all the healthy forces of the republic into practical work for

the good of the people. In these conditions, the establishment of various kinds of organizations for the sake of fashion or falsely understood prestige is not only not expedient, but is even dangerous. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that may be established not only on ideological, but also tribal, regional, and religious grounds. And this threatens destabilization of conditions, the rise of conflict situations. All this is not to the people's benefit and even now many, completely justified fears are being expressed in this regard.

It should, however, be acknowledged that, if people develop a need for new political structures, then it would be, at least, irresponsible to place administrative barriers in the way of naturally developing processes. In this connection, it seems timely and justified, in the name of our congress, to initiate a legislative action calling for a review of Article 6 and other articles of the republic's constitution that are connected with it. This will confirm in the most convincing way that the Turkmen CP has no need for juridical reinforcement of its position. Our authority is not a legacy, but a goal, achievement of which has demanded and continues to demand the daily, laborious efforts of all the republic's Communists. And in the new situation we are prepared by our actions to defend and strengthen out political authority. We are prepared for a dialogue, for collaboration with any forces and groups that stand for the socialist option, for the continued flourishing of Soviet Turkmenistan, for internationalism, and for strengthening the fraternal friendship of the peoples of the USSR.

Well, and so that people continue in the future to recognize the vitality and vanguard role of the Communist Party within the social life of the republic, all of us need to think seriously about how to accelerate the process of seeking out new approaches in organizational, political, and ideological-education work and in creating a reliable mechanism for actually enlisting all workers in the solution of state and social matters.

We are not speaking of this for the first time. However, the practical realization of new directives is occurring extremely slowly and is obviously lagging behind the tempo of the rapid politization of the masses. Both within the Central Committee and on the local level, we have not succeeded completely in overcoming conservative sentiments. Moreover, a replacement of the administrative command style by a style of slogans and formalism has been noted. This was particularly evident at the Chardzhoy city and the Tashauzskiy and Kirovskiy rayon party conferences, when words that were correct in form concealed the essence of the situation and when problem-free reports distracted those present from the solution of pressing problems.

Our main shortcoming continues to be substitution for soviet and economic organs to the detriment of party and, in particular, of its ideological work. [passage omitted]

Of course, there are no ready made schemes for the new interrelationships between party, soviet, and economic organs; these are being worked out in practice. Complicated and ambiguous processes are taking place today within the soviets of people's deputies. The new corps of deputies is full of initiative and decisiveness. However, they are often running up against contradictions between the powers they have acquired and how these powers are exercised in reality. Sometimes there is excessive haste and ill-considered steps are allowed to be taken. Unfortunately, in these conditions, party organs are not always equal to their task. Some of them have taken an unhealthy view of the new situation and are not facilitating the creation of necessary conditions for effective and fruitful work by the people's representatives. This is all the more surprising as an absolute majority of first secretaries of party committees are chairmen of soviets.

Time does not go backwards. The slogan "All Power to the Soviets" has seized the consciousness of the masses and is dictated by the very course of perestroika. The entirety of state power should be concentrated within the soviets of people's deputies. The most important task of the party committees now is to help ensure that this happens as quickly as possible. And, first of all, they must reject earlier stereotypes of "leadership" of the soviets and acknowledge their real authority. The party committees must respect and acknowledge the organizational independence of the soviets, their right to decide independently all questions of the economic and the social and cultural life of their territories, without exception. And if a majority of the deputies have entrusted the first secretaries of the party committees to head the soviets, then it is necessary to justify this trust, to work persistently and purposefully to revive the Leninist essence of popular rule. We have no other way to carry out the party line than through Communist delegates. This is legitimate and natural.

The main thing is that, in the future as well, the soviets include as many Communists as possible who possess the necessary knowledge and authority and who have a concern for people's interests. And it is necessary to win the trust and support of the voters in open and honest combat.

What has been said does not however mean that we should reorganize the Turkmen Communist Party as a parliamentary type of party. The strength and authority of the new type of Leninist party lies in working within the masses, in leading them.

Political reform also involves a review of the types of interrelationships between the party and social organizations. Without interfering in their internal affairs and respecting their organizational independence, party organizations should conduct their policy through the Communists who work in these organizations. [passage omitted]

Comrades! Changes in our mutual relationships with soviet and economic organs and with social organizations dictate a need to review the existing practice of cadre work. A good deal of criticism has been expressed recently with regard to shortcomings in this regard. Often, those doing the criticizing go to the point of complete absurdity, to a total rejection of the system, structure, and apparatus of administration.

We categorically disagree with those who tie destruction of the administrative command system to a refusal by the party to implement a purposeful and consistent personnel policy.

Policy is conducted through people—this is a fundamental principle of Leninism. There is no political structure that is in a position to realize its goals through the mechanism of power without having a cadres policy. And if the party and the soviets of peoples deputies do not take this upon their own shoulders, other forces will certainly do so. In their own interests, of course. Consequently, we need to talk not about removing personnel levers from the political arsenal of the party, but about their application in full accordance with the policy of perestroika and renewal of society.

A good deal of work is already being carried out in this direction, as you know. During the reporting period, the status of this has been discussed repeatedly at plenums and sessions of the Bureau and commissions of the Central Committee. Sufficiently precise recommendations have been developed. At the same time, I believe that we must take decisive steps in the direction of decentralizing cadres work by means of delegating a significant part of our authority in the solution of personnel questions to lower-standing party committees.

Particularly in recent times, the Turkmen CP Central Committee has been criticized for taking a nomenklatura approach and for giving insufficient consideration to the views of primary party organizations.

This criticism is justified. We need to create a system for public, open organization of a reserve, for preparing cadres in party schools and courses and other kinds of study and practical training. And then to recommend fully prepared, authoritative people for election. The original meaning must be returned to concept of the nomenklaltura, that is, as a list, an enumeration of the positions that lie within the sphere of interest of party committees.

Renewal of party life requires more radical measures today than formerly for democratization of intraparty relations and overcoming the alienation of the basic mass of party members from elected organs.

In the interests of reestablishing the true authority of the party masses, the principle of democratic centralism must be reformed in a decisive way. At a certain stage in history, as is known, this was replaced by bureaucratic

centralism and the primary party organizations and party members lost any real possibility of influencing the content of party activities.

Discussing the draft pre-Congress platform of the CPSU Central Committee, many Communists supported the need to revive the Leninist understanding of the principle of democratic centralism, to ensure in practice full freedom of discussion up until decisions are reached and then unity of action with regard to their implementation. Such an approach is maintained in the draft of the new CPSU Rules. It is a matter now of making these democratic principles a reality.

It is necessary to think seriously about broadening the independence of all party units and about the development of social principles within party work.

The entire structure of elective organs and of the party apparatus should correspond to the new quality of party work, to the transition to political methods of leadership and of conducting ideological and organizational work.

Abolition in 1988 of sectoral departments within party committees played a positive role. However, we cannot consider the task completely fulfilled.

Now, during the period of preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress, there is an opportunity to take the next step. In this connection, it seems justified, even during our congress, to reach a decision concerning a basic change in the organizational structure of the committees of the Turkmen Communist Party.

What kind of revised structure are we considering for the party apparatus? Within the Turkmen CP Central Committee, for example, it would be possible, as formerly, to establish permanent commissions, consisting of CP Central Committee members and headed by secretaries and members of the Turkmen CP Central Committee Bureau, to deal with ideological and party construction and cadre work, for questions of social and economic development, for food problems and the social restructuring of the countryside, for legal questions, and for party control. Moreover, it is expedient to excuse a part of the members elected to the commissions from their basic work and to establish groups of consultants under each commission, consisting of highly qualified workers, and, in this way, to abolish all Central Committee departments, leaving only business managers to assist the commissions and the Central Committee. A Party Control Commission, numbering 7-9 members, could be formed at a plenum from the members of the Central committee. Such an approach to formation of the Party Control Commission will, in the name of the Central Committee, give it the status and authority it needs to examine the personal affairs of Communists and other questions of strengthening party discipline.

The structure of city and rayon party committees might contain two or three commissions concerned with the main directions of party work and headed by secretaries of the party committees, and also a group of party

organizers called upon to provide constant assistance to the party organizations assigned to them and to commissions of the party committee.

We think that the proposed reorganization of the apparatus of the party committees will correspond in large degree to the party's changing work methods and will make it possible to do away with the excessive centralization and multi-step structure of the apparatus, to reject the continuing tendency toward excessive sectoral involvement, and to reduce the number of staff workers by 30-40 percent.

The primary party organizations should stand at the center of all party work. Everything that is directed toward increasing their independence and level of activity in carrying out the policies of the party within their own collectives is deserving of support.

At the present time, the republic party organization includes 5117 primary party organizations, 4022 party organizations in shops, and 2075 party groups. However, far from all of them are taking aggressive positions and have defined their participation in perestroika.

It is especially worrisome that certain Communists have turned to powder under conditions of pluralism of opinions and are taking a waiting position. This has been made evident in the meetings of a number of party organizations. The report of the party bureau at the Askhabad glass combine contained an expression of unconcealed fear of the processes that have developed—and no specific measures for future work.

It is now extremely clear that we will not be able to energize the activities of Communists if we do not support maximum expansion of the rights of party organizations, if they themselves do not participate in the most direct way in the development of basic decisions and in the formation of a cadre corps. It is expedient for the primary party organizations to have their own specific program of actions. As is stated in the draft of the new CPSU Rules, they must also be given full freedom in resolving questions of the acceptance of members into the party and the exclusion of them from its ranks, in choosing an organizational structure, in establishing procedures and schedules for holding party meetings, and in utilizing a portion of [party] dues for their own needs. This will be timely and just.

At the same time, an expansion of the rights of primary organizations must not entail a reduction in the discipline of Communists. The authority of the party masses presupposes only a rejection of dictates "from above," and not of internal discipline. The carrying out of jointly approved decisions must be mandatory.

Ideological and organizational renewal of the party must be accompanied by qualitative changes in its ranks.

As of the situation on 1 May 1990, the republic party organization numbered 115,117 CPSU members and candidate members. During the time that has passed

since the 23rd Congress, their number has increased by almost 5000 persons, or by 5 percent. Workers and collective farmers occupy a solid leading place among the new additions to the party. They comprise 70 percent of those accepted. Almost three-quarters of them are working in the sphere of material production.

We have cited these statistics in order to emphasize that, on the whole, formation of the membership of the republic party organization, augmentation of its ranks, is proceeding normally, without any kind of serious deviations. The Central Committee has been constantly analyzing the alignment of forces, has pointed party organs toward increasing their influence in decisive sectors, has demanded timely changes in the structure of party organizations in accordance with conditions and an increase in the responsibility of each Communist for recommendations to those entering the party, and has succeeded in seeing to it that the period of candidate membership plays an effective role in the ideological tempering of young Communists.

We have constantly pointed the primary party organizations toward increasing their responsibility for quality in the augmentation of CPSU ranks. In the future as well, matters must be so arranged as to totally avoid incidents when unprepared people, and sometimes even simply casual ones, obtain party cards. This is a difficult but entirely achievable task.

It will be successfully resolved by those party committees and primary party organizations where selection into the party is carried on creatively and with principle and where the moral, professional, and political qualities of acceptees are studied carefully. Such an approach is characteristic of many party organizations in the Sakar-Chaginskiy, Deynauskiy, Ilyalinskiy, and Kunya-Urgenchskiy rayons and in the cities of Nebit-Dag and Bezmein.

But it would be naive to suppose that we have not been touched by certain alarming tendencies that the party organizations will have to deal with when forming their memberships.

The slow solution of accumulated problems in the economic and social sphere and a large flow of not always justified criticism of the party are producing a temporizing attitude in some people. Sometimes, a lack of desire to enter the ranks of the CPSU is the result of an insufficiently active stance on the part of certain party organizations, of their adherence to a measured life, of a lag in the tempo of perestroika behind the overall rhythm of our lives. A fear of posing questions broadly and sharply, a disinclination to criticize leaders, and other similar phenomena are weakening the attraction of people toward party organizations, toward the party in general. I think that precisely this can explain the decline in the flow of cadre workers into the party.

In connection with the proposed transfer of the right of acceptance completely into the purview of the primary party organizations, we consider it necessary to draw the

attention of party committees and organizations to this key question of party construction, to discuss it at meetings of commissions for questions of organizational party and personnel work, and possibly also at plenums of the party committees. We can not let this work proceed in a haphazard way. It is necessary to keep it within our range of view and to provide specific, practical assistance to the "primaries."

In a word, we will have to do an enormous amount of work within a very short span of time. In doing it, it is very important not to loose the main thread, not to become lost in small details.

I am convinced that the creation of guarantees for solution of all the tasks facing the Turkmen Communist Party, their development and formulation within the Resolution of this congress, will contribute to revival of the republic party organization and to an increase in its role within the life of the republic.

Comrade Delegates!

It is difficult in one address, even in a report of this kind, to illuminate the entire circle of problems and questions that are of concern to the republic's Communists today. But there can be no doubt that the delegates will make an exacting and strict assessment of everything that has been done by the Central Committee, that it will introduce constructive proposals, and that it will define measures for improving its activities.

In concluding this report, I think that it is not superfluous to emphasize once again that today, as never before, in order to achieve maximum results, approaches to solution of the tasks that confront us require courage and realism, a refusal to be satisfied with what has been achieved, and an ability to see what is most important.

The party organization and cadres of the republic have sufficient experience and political will to do this and to cope with the difficulties which have fallen to our lot, with existing shortcomings. The vanguard of more than 115,000 Turkmen Communists is moving confidently toward the 28th Party Congress, ready to solve the new problems of perestroika.

Niyazov on Turkmen Reforms, Support for Federation

*90US1201B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 8 Jul 90 p 1*

[Speech by S.A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee and chairman of the Turkmen Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Respected comrades, respected supporters and opponents! We are all the children of our times. This wise thought most accurately, in my view, reflects the sources to which the current state of society and the party ascends with all the ensuing consequences. We have just set out on the path toward civilized political

democracy while life has moved ahead, and this fact cannot help but be recognized, regardless of what platform we defend.

We are still learning political consolidation. But in dreaming about tomorrow's culture, and in condemning its absence in the recent past, we, the politicians, must soberly and realistically accept the present which demands not only repentance and the weighing of forces but concrete action. Action directed at controlling the powerful current of life which has broken free from out under the ruins of the totalitarian system and as an ungoverned flood poured across the country. Today, we report with pride to the congress that in Turkmenia, political and economic reform, glasnost and democratization, the main components of perestroika, are being carried out relatively quietly. Possibly because the Turkmen have lived and do live under harsh climatic conditions where a mouthful of water is prized like a piece of gold. For this reason, they have learned to value all that is good and reasonable. Having instinctively felt that very mouthful of water in perestroika, we did not cover its spring with stones but rather patiently and with dignity set to clearing out its still shallow channel. And while the photo of the dying young man published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and which shattered public opinion says a great deal and primarily about the terrible social ulcers bequeathed to us by both distant and recent history, let it have nothing to say to you about our people. We have no intention of driving this illness inwards. We have set out to cure it, and we have done so energetically. Let us not forget that traditional morality and a feeling of our own dignity lie at the basis of the culture of each people. To understand the evolution of the people, and to be able to provide not an ivory-tower but rather a popular assessment of what is happening—this was seen by us, the republic communists, as our calling. And the people trusted us and followed us. And from now on it is not for us to choose our future. It is for the people to choose. Another party will appear which perhaps better than us will serve their interests, and the people will prefer it. So, the struggle for power which they wish to humiliate us for is a struggle which we will wage on behalf and upon the command of the people. And these are not loud words. This is a principle which has been placed by life itself at the basis of party activities. And let those who now have looked at the party at best in anger but, having paid it proper respect for courageous recognition of its errors and for the first bold steps in renewal, join with the party with the energy required at street demonstrations.

We favor such consolidation.

A few words about the understanding of the polemics which developed at the congress. We will not escape from our Slavish past, from our captivity, if we do not link the struggle for democracy with the acquiring of a political culture, and if we do not rid our disputes of political extremism. The opposing of positions in the form that it has taken in society and here at the congress

has gained real outlines. There is, in my view, that force which has arisen out of our old habits and has impeded perestroika in the party, regardless of the presence of objective prerequisites for this. Certainly, it cannot be said that our arguments are based on fundamental social values. We all favor a humanistic evolution of society and a renewed concept of socialism. And there is our implacability against the dogma of methodology but which we all to a greater or lesser degree are afflicted, and at the same time precisely according to the methodology, according to Lenin, we must distinguish the possible from the actual. Has not this misunderstanding given rise to a nonhistorical approach to Lenin himself and to our history? At present, during the years of perestroika quite often obstacles and extremes arise, both of a rightist and leftist sort. It is impossible to understand what is occurring without the dialectic.

In this context the draft program statement of our congress, with all its natural shortcomings, is the most creative document embodying the new trends of development and reflecting the reformist course of the CPSU.

Yes, our society urgently needs peace, civil concord, but this cannot be attained if we do not explain to society how and in what manner we should act, how to live under the new conditions of the market and the political and economic freedom granted to all the republics. The role of the party in this process of educating the masses will become objective and necessary. For, in subordinating its tactics to a diversified approach in the development of the republics and the peoples, the party should remember both the strategy and the communist future.

We are frequently asked the questions: Why all the same in your republic are there peace and concord, is there not something unnatural in this, something which does not keep within the confines of perestroika? I feel that to a certain degree the advantage of our situation lies in the fact in these stormy times for the nation, when here and there centers of tension began to arise, we followed our own path, we did not borrow anyone's experience in perestroika, we focused all attention on social needs, we were in no rush to introduce unofficial language, and we worked out a program corresponding to the interests of all the republic's inhabitants, regardless of their nationality. The Turkmen language which had become the official one also assumed its proper place in the system of values. But the main thing is that we constantly patiently explained to the people that it was better to have such uniqueness leading to peace than the imitating of fashion which threatened conflict. Thus, I feel, we anticipated the idea of independent development and to some degree created the grounds for progress.

I consciously have not spoken of our needs and problems. There are perhaps no more or no less of them than in any other republic. It is not worth your time to list all of those misfortunes and problems which we have suffered from the difficulties in the economy, or from the

state squandering of our very rich resources. So much has already been said on this question.

But also let us be objective here: life moves forward and we will gain nothing by marking time, making the old mistakes and determining their measure of assessment and punishment. The almost 4 million population of Turkmenia presently produces on a per capita basis a little less than 400 kg of cotton, 20 million m³ of gas, as well as oil, Astrakhan wool, vegetables, melon crops and chemical products but remains in one of the last places in its social development.

We do not complain and we do not beseech, but consider it our right that out of all the combinations of social activities we can choose the one which most corresponds to our real capabilities. This is why we not only favor a regulated market but also a regulated transition to it.

We are in favor of a renewed federation and in favor of determining the choice of the forms of state organization neither by some pat scheme but rather by the realities of life. We favor an independent Communist Party which, having freed itself from the control of the center, will be able to direct the process of the republic's development considering its specific features.

In a word, we are in favor of having the path to order and prosperity in each republic run both reasonably and dependently. This is the only path for now to peace and concord and not the undermining of the principles of socialism.

As for the place of our republic in the nation, it took it long ago and remembering that the fatherland is an historical concept, we do not intend to either abandon this place or rupture the age-old ties. And this is not because of a slogany internationalism but out of considerations of common sense which today suggests to us that in the unity of the nation and in the unity of the party lie the guarantee for the way out of the crisis and the emergence onto a new level of democracy and humanism.

Thank you for your attention.

Merits of Ukrainian Sovereignty Discussed

90UN2534A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 12 July 90 p 4

[Interview with O. S. Yemelyanov, economist, corresponding member of the AN Ukrainian SSR, people's deputy, and vice-chairman Ukrainian Gosplan; by M. Khotsky, UKRINFORM correspondent: "Sovereignty: Separation or Integration?"]

[Text] Today stormy debates have heated up on all levels of community life around the concept of "sovereignty"—from the high tribunes of people's deputy congresses and party forums to the arguments in "smoking rooms" and the dinner table. The main thought often boils down to the issue of the republic's separation, independence, and even its self-isolation. A correspondent from UKRINFORM

asked a well known economist to share his thoughts on this matter, a corresponding member of the AN [Academy of Sciences] Ukrainian SSR, a people's deputy, the vice-chairman of Ukrainian Gosplan, O. S. Yemelyanov.

[Yemelyanov] Sovereignty, independence, autonomy are all necessary for us to have to such an extent that we sometimes in discussions avoid evaluating these concepts with respect to the standard meanings found in dictionaries and encyclopedias—states Oleksandr Serhiyovych. The fact of the matter is that we have become so disgusted with the dictates of the union departments, which have caused so many disasters in Ukraine, that many see things thus: all the union relations have to be cut. I would say this: by universal standards such an approach is the only right measure to take. But we, specialists and professionals, nonetheless are obligated to proceed by the realities of today and the realities of whatever means can grant us economic sovereignty and independence.

[Correspondent] This question is now being discussed widely and profoundly at the sessions of the Higher Council of the republic...

[Yemelyanov] Yes. Along with that I would like to note that discussion is generally proceeding on an emotional and often populist level. And if one were to leave aside all the bright points, then the conversation would in essence turn on two questions: whether to leave the framework of the Union or not to leave it? Yet, perhaps, it can be put better after the acceptance of our own new Ukrainian, and sovereign constitution? In many speeches, especially in those of the opposing representatives, one can hear theses that the issue of leaving or not leaving the Union, so to speak, does not simply concern independence, but that these are just words. Yet nonetheless there is still a thought behind them about the fact of leaving or not leaving. I personally think that this is the essential issue. Everything else is secondary to it. If we are an independent nation, then, naturally, questions will arise about our own army, and just now about citizenship, our money and so on. Many colleagues-deputies have doubts: can one guarantee a genuine type of sovereignty, not leaving the Soviet Union, but having diplomatic ties with it? But such doubts by speakers are very often presented as affirmations implying that in order to attain sovereignty it is impossible to do so without one's own, as they say, attributes of nationhood. My thoughts concerning this are as follows.

First of all, a sovereign nation can exist in any kind of union. So then the matter does not lie in the fact of whether or not the republic exists within the union, but in the fact of whether the union is usurping the republic's sovereign rights, or whether the union is not trying to impose its own political system, economic strategy and so on. Perhaps a state does not obtain sovereignty when an independent nation, having its own laws, declares and confers onto them authority; when on the territory of this nation only its own and simply its own laws are in force, or those laws of the union, which the people of the

nation recognizes as its own, that is, ratifies. Isn't it a sovereign nation when it does not give anyone anything and in which no one has by law the right to take anything away? So the issue is stated thus: we do not need any little presents from the union. We should precisely envision what the costs are, what kind of rights are surrendered to the union by the republic, for what length of time, and mainly for what. That is, in the republic we are shaping our national riches and are fully in command of them, allocating certain funds and resources for concrete goals. We need to know exactly for what and how much we are giving, and how this is being used for our welfare. Can it be that in such a situation there are some kind of doubts about the sovereignty of Ukraine?

Second of all. Why do we need a unification? A lot of large problems and programs already exist, which can only be solved in the framework of one, mighty union, for example, the question of ability to defend ourselves, strategic armament, and so on. Naturally, with time such a necessity, perhaps, will fall away, but today to not take it into account is inadmissible. Despite the certain warming up of international relations, the ability to defend ourselves should be supported with a reasonable degree of provisions. There exist also global problems, like the cosmos, the creation of new technologies, the use and strengthening of scientific potential, which sometimes also do not have a regional character. There are also a number of questions, which can be more effectively resolved in a single complex under the coordination of the aegis of the union. If we were to allocate funds to them carefully and control their use, could this diminish the force of our laws and sovereignty? I think not.

Or let us take the problem of our coal industry, which was sharply put forth at the sessions. It was not created yesterday. For decades the branch was commanded by a union ministry. One must speak directly: they commanded in a barbaric fashion, exploiting veins in a predatorial way. And today a situation has taken shape that work in the mines—hard, enervating, has become neglected in the social planning. The coal miners are poorly provided for in terms of housing; their living areas are in a terrible condition; they are poorly supplied with goods. In this branch practically no social infrastructure has been developed. And so the patience of the people has snapped. They think that the leaders of the country are unable to resolve their problems and for this reason put forth political demands. This is understandable. But one must understand something else. No administration, no leaders can solve today the problems which have been exacerbated for decades. And it is not appropriate to simply relate this to the matter of sovereignty for the republic.

Do we need to put the coal industry under the republic's control? Undoubtedly. But our sovereign nation—the Ukraine should put forth demands, in order for the union government to give back to the coal workers all the debts or only those which have been subjected to regulation in the well known 608th resolution. It is necessary

now to fight to attain precisely this, which is precisely what our republic government is doing. Otherwise, the problems will remain. And sovereign Ukraine will have to resolve these problems at the expense of other branches of the national economy. And realistically such a possibility is very limited.

[Correspondent] I know—our element is economics. Explain, please, in more detail the concept of sovereignty from this point of view.

[Yemelyanov] Leaving the framework of the union for many seems to be a panacea to all of our problems. Many think and say: we, they imply, are such a wealthy nation, that we can quickly gain a worthy place in the world market and guarantee people exactly the level of life, which the developed nations of Europe have. But one must distinctly envision that the state of our industrial-economic potential is such that we cannot compete on an international market. And not only because of the low quality of our goods. We are incapable of being competitive because of the limits of the product's value. Analysis shows that in one of our karbovanets of goods of industrial production there is only 10 kopecks of profit. This karbovanets constitutes the basis for the income of our people, companies, the budget of the republic, and regions. But in the countries with a market economy each individual's expenditure amounts to 30-40 percent of a profit. If we were to go onto the world market, then in the price game, larger business enterprises, associations, and firms would swallow us up in a moment. And so then we would really be able to turn into a colony.

Our product is able to compete, for now, on the USSR market, where other republics' industrial potential is in the same pitiful situation as ours. Many talk about the fact that one can leave the union, but still preserve the trading ties with it. I think this is an illusion. Why would Russia in such an instance trade with us in oil, lumber, wool, when these goods are very desirable on the world market, and the prices are higher than ours on the domestic market? And other countries can provide meat and butter and metal of a higher quality than we can. It is another matter that the economic relations in the framework of the union should not be made the way they are being made now. They should be mutually accommodating, agreed upon by both sides.

The question about having our own money is being raised often, about our own financial, emission system, about our own national bank. I will say immediately: an independent bank is needed—one subject only to the Higher Council of Ukraine. Credit and emission should be regulated exclusively only by the council. As regards our own money, here there is an issue. Many deputies, playing on people's emotions, state that what kind of state is it that does not have its own money? Let us think what is at work here. Having our own monetary system means above all a closed economy, a defense of the consumer market. If one is to talk about the latter, then possibly, such money is needed. But there will surely be not only money, but those same ration cards, goods by

passports. We simply close up our inner trade only in order to prevent outsiders from transporting out from us what we really need. I will immediately make an admonition: this must be done. But by what means? To introduce our own karbovanets? I am not sure of the result. It's all the same, like the ration cards and checks... I think that such an approach is more suitable for the district councils. To the point, some of them are already using it various forms.

There is another point which I would like to describe. The statement itself about the next introduction of new money will immediately lead to social collisions, will give rise to a so-called agitated kind of demand. The population will try to make naive preparations, sweeping everything out of the stores which is left there. In just the same fashion all the people coming in from other regions will act the same way. That is, to consider that such a policy will have gains is a very problematical issue today.

And at the same time I would like to emphasize: I am for our own currency. But only of this sort. Convertible. It is necessary that our karbovanets have full currency; that it is introduced in a parallel manner with the existing karbovanets and gradually with its phasing out of use. Approaches to such a decision have already been observed. I think that they will soon be given for review to the Higher Council.

[Correspondent] Oleksandr Serhiyovych, can you say something in more detail about the union treaty, about which so much is being talked about at the session?..

[Yemelyanov] ...And which many opponents from the "People's Council" regard as an attempt to preserve everything as it was, which is what they talk about from all the tribunes to the people. One must fight to attain, and this is the main thing, a treaty of the sort which organizes us. And just in this direction, it is worth working. In the treaty first of all we must take the power away from the union ministries and departments in the administration of our national economy, the branches and the business enterprises.

And one more question: what should be first—a new constitution for Ukraine or a union treaty? Logically, it is understandable—a constitution. And if we have the chance in the next session to quickly review and pass it, then, this, you should regard as, a great success. If there really is no such possibility, then the treaty, it must be clearly said, that the republic reserves a right to introduce into it changes in accordance with the new constitution. And then the fear that the treaty will again lead back to the old ways, will be removed.

Here it is appropriate to state something about the thesis of some opponents, as regards the "leaders from the command-administrative system, from the old past." They say, that they, it is implied, with all their strength are trying to preserve the dictates from the center, from Moscow. But this is absurd. So any kind of retrograde person, any kind of leader, and in this number also one from the old regime, wants to be fully empowered. This

is an axiom. Then why struggle, so that a leader from Moscow would remain above him? There is no logic here. I would not want to be understood or construed, to make it seem as if I am supporting the retrograde people. We do not need them. As we do not need a lot old structures of administration. But one need not use an allogical argument against those with different views.

[Correspondent] Speaking at the 28th Congress of the CPSU, a candidate among the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and a member of the Presidential Council, Ye. M. Prymakov characterized the sovereignty of the republic as the right to only use its own natural resources, to control and direct the funds in its budget collected from business enterprises on its territories, to create favorable conditions for business, and to carry out the ecologic protection of its population. What is your thought about this?

[Yemelyanov] I would say that such a definition is incomplete. It retains a danger for allowing token sovereignty to continue. Only a republic, only its Higher Council should designate its own economic strategy, to program its realization in accordance to its political system. The development of the national economy, the strengthening of the scientific-technical potential, the resolution of the entire economic complex's task should be fully subject to the prerogatives of people of Ukraine.

[Correspondent] Doesn't it seem to you that sovereignty, independence, autonomy in the economy should be appropriately granted to only the manufacturers of consumer production—business enterprises, firms, unions, associations... So then only by virtue of the conditions of creative freedom are initiatives, business enterprises, social-economic risks possible?

[Yemelyanov] The fact of the matter is that independent companies should not turn into antagonists against the independent councils. So they have various interests. A company will strive to give to the council in terms of taxes, customs tax, fines, and other forms of payment as small an amount as possible. But the council will always strive to get the most it can. I think that many branches of activity, especially in the social sphere, should be completely transferred over to the hands of the district organs of administration. And the use of the funds and resources should be independent, on the basis of economic accountability. This is not a simple issue. It demands a system of legal acts, the first of which is foreseen in today's session.

[Correspondent] Thus, time, judiciousness, and patience are needed, and urgently undertaken work with the realization that its goal in the final analysis is correct and one can attain the goal only by taking the path of building a lawful nation. Isn't this so?

[Yemelyanov] Time, naturally, is needed. But one must realize also the fact that we do not have it. That is, we are on the verge of a transition of having market relations. In word—everyone is for it. Indeed, they act differently. The main and very important problem here—to unify, to

remake into a twofold task the problem of providing complete freedom for business enterprises and social protection for the population. Let us say directly: the world has yet to solve such a problem in one stroke. That is why today it is very necessary to create such a mechanism for regulating the market, which would guarantee the population the minimal stabilization of their buying power from their monetary income. Academics, the state planning committee, and the government of the republic are working on this now. The permanent commission of the Higher Council of Ukraine is also beginning to work on this.

Ukrainian CP Resolution on CPSU Platform

90UN2463A Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
28 Jun 90 p 2

[Ukrainian CP Resolution on CPSU Platform: "On the CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform for the 28th Party Congress: 'Toward Human, Democratic Socialism': 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Resolution"]

[Text] Having examined the results of discussions of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform "Toward Human, Democratic Socialism" in Republic Party organizations, workers collectives, and in the mass media, the 28th Ukrainian Party Congress notes that this program document is needed by the Party first of all to determine ways to resolve the country's very acute political, socio-economic, and intellectual development problems and the milestones of further renewal in all spheres of life.

During discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform in the Republic, over 61,000 comments and proposals have been expressed toward it which reflect the diversity of ideas, views, and moods that exist in the social consciousness. All of them have been summarized and sent to the CPSU Central Committee.

Opinions have been expressed about the fact that the Party program document must raise the theoretical level of generalizations and conclusions and provide a precise definition of the current state of our society, the nature of processes that are occurring, the essence of human, democratic socialism, and its ties with the communist perspective. They require a more sound development of the issue about the ways to extract the country and the Party from the crisis and specific features of CPSU work under conditions of a multi-party system. We need to define fundamental positions with regard to the Party's social base, its ideology, and the principles of construction and activity.

The Congress is advocating that all businesslike proposals of communists, including proposals about alternative drafts and including the Democratic and Marxist platforms, be considered during further development of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform.

The Congress considers that the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform can be adopted only after its radical

reform while taking into account the comments and proposals that were introduced during the course of pre-congress discussions. The Platform must become the basis for consolidation of the CPSU and the fundamental basis for its further activities until the new Party Program has been developed.

The Congress tasks 28th CPSU Congress delegates from the Ukrainian Communist Party to decisively defend the Party's ideological and organizational unity, to combat attempts to split it from within, and to strive to rally Party ranks on a fundamental basis.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has informed the CPSU Central Committee about the proposals and comments on the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform that have been expressed by congress delegates.

Ukrainian CP Appeal on Party Crisis

90UN2463B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
29 Jun 90 p 1

[Ukrainian Communist Party Appeal: "28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress Appeal to Republic Communists"]

[Text] Comrades!

The difficult situation that the Party and society find themselves in and alarm about the fate of perestroika compel us, 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress delegates, to appeal to all Republic communists with these words.

We all see that the errors and miscalculations of the past that have been permitted even in recent years have brought the country to a critical limit. Life itself has posed an urgent task—to halt the further growth of negative processes. Our Party is the real force that can and must do this. But it must overcome its internal difficulties and consolidate all of society's healthy forces on its platform to do this. A number of decisions that are important for the Ukrainian Communist Party and for our entire Republic have already been made during the first stage of our Congress. Positions on other fundamental issues will be determined during the second stage. But they will all become a reality and will become filled with life under one decisive condition—if we all manifest the readiness, will, and decisiveness to implement them and if we close ranks.

We must see the danger threatening us. This is the growth of political inertia, civic passiveness, and indifference among Party members. They are intensification of ideological blackmail, decline of discipline and responsibility, manifestation of confusion during the unpredictable and unusual development of events, and erosion of political positions. Our political opponents and those who uncritically perceive the ideas thrown up by them are pushing us toward discord and disengagement of efforts, creation of factional structures, and loss

of mutual understanding among communists and Party comradeship. The logical conclusion of these phenomena and trends, if we do not give them a timely and decisive rebuff, can become the death of the Party as an organized political force.

We need to clearly realize that the weakening and split of the Party—is a blow against perestroika and the hopes of people for a better life. This is a deepening of socio-political destabilization and a threat of social upheavals.

Our strength is in unity and firm conscious discipline.

In today's critical situation for the Party, in conditions of unfounded criticism of the Party from the right and from the left, and the increase of the wave of anticommunism, we must not only stand in defense of the Party and decisively defend our ideals and values but also urgently begin practical work.

Let us counter rally passions and endless and fruitless chatter during which valuable time is being lost with lively and real action. We can prove that the Communist Party is a truly powerful political force that is itself capable of objectively and effectively working and raising people to this same work [level] only through personal example in work, high activity and organization, and unity of opinions and actions.

The primary right of all communists and our only privilege in this is the guarantee of the growth of the Party's prestige among the broad popular masses.

Resolution on Ukrainian Communist Party

90UN2463C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
28 Jun 90 pp 1,2

[28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress Resolution: "28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress Resolution: 'On the Political Situation and the Primary Directions of Ukrainian Communist Party Activities at the Current Stage. Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Report'"]

[Text] The 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress notes that our Party is conducting work to renew intra-Party and public life on democratic principles while carrying out the policy of perestroika that was elaborated by the April (1985) 27th CPSU Congress Plenum and the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

During the reporting period, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee directed its activities toward support of new forms of political, economic, and intellectual life that have arisen during the course of difficult and complicated perestroika processes. Reform of the Republic's political system has been carried out. A search has been conducted for new administrative and management methods within the framework of economic reform. Humanitarian and universal intellectual values are evolving. The [Ukrainian] cultural heritage is being revived and is being returned to the people in its full measure and versatility and the Ukrainian language

is being affirmed. Greater attention is being paid to the development of all ethnic groups who reside in the Republic. A position has been determined on issues of interethnic relations and the Ukraine's achievement of real state sovereignty as part of a renewed USSR. The life of Republic Party organizations is being democratized.

At the same time, the congress considers that the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and its Politburo and Secretariat were frequently late in analyzing processes that were occurring, rethinking its activities, and bringing them in compliance with changes in the situation. They did not always anticipate the development of events and they did much intuitively and without forecasting the consequences. Personnel errors were permitted. Communist leaders reduced demands for work results for the sectors assigned to them and they hastily enacted the center's instructions, which were ill-considered in a number of cases. Party committees sometimes had to work without precise political milestones. At the same time the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee did not have enough initiative or persistence in formulating fundamental issues of Republic development before the CPSU Central Committee and union organs and its influence on the development of Party-wide policy was inadequate. The measures carried out were ineffective in a number of cases.

The shortcomings and miscalculations that were tolerated made it impossible to prevent critical phenomena from becoming exacerbated. Halfway reforms in the economy made people's lives even more difficult. Substantial changes did not occur in providing them with housing, food, consumer goods, and medical services. The absence of a precise concept for the transition to a market economy is being perceived with alarm. The population is oppressed by the ecological situation and this has been brought to the limit by the aftereffects of the Chernobyl AES accident.

Social and political tension has intensified primarily in the Donbass and in a number of western region oblasts. Interethnic relations and interreligious intolerance have worsened. The Ukrainian Republican Party and the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth are increasingly frankly manifesting themselves as anti-socialist and separatist forces. People feel unprotected and alarm is increasing over the fate of the Republic, the country, and the socialist order. Crime is increasing.

Negative trends are also being manifested in the Ukrainian Communist Party. All-Union Party Conference demands for democratization of Party life are being slowly carried out. Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee [secretaries], and many oblast, city, and rayon committee secretaries could not enlist election organ members to work aggressively, paid inadequate attention to improving staff operations, and rarely visited locally, especially where a tense situation had developed that alienated them from the Party masses. The gap that has arisen between leading organizations and higher Party committees is slowly being eliminated and rank

and file Party members' mistrust of its ruling organs is increasing. The passiveness of some communists and a number of Party committees is growing and Party discipline is weakening. Departures from the CPSU are increasing. Elimination moods and attempts to divide it into factions are threatening Party unity.

The worsening of contradictions and the practical transition to a multi-party system have caused a sense of uncertainty and confusion among some Party committees. This was graphically manifested in individual oblasts during USSR People's Deputy, Ukrainian People's Deputy, and local Soviet elections.

Ideological activity is lagging behind the processes that are occurring in society. The Party has found itself theoretically disarmed during this difficult period. The ideas of de-ideologization are spreading and Marxist-Leninist teaching is being subjected to open attacks. Many Party committees have turned out to be unprepared for an open dialogue with the people under conditions of polarization of opinions and political views and attacks on the CPSU.

Mutual relations between Party committees and the mass media are slowly changing but attempts to rule the press through orders and commands still persist. On the other hand, the editors of some newspapers and magazines, also including Party publications and television and radio programs, do not withstand the tests of freedom of information and permit a biased one-sidedness in the coverage of both past and today's problems.

Party organizations and communists working in state organs, science and cultural enlightenment institutions, and educational institutions have weakly influenced the progress of middle and upper school reform and the development of science and culture.

New forms and methods of political influence on the resolution of economic and social tasks are being inadequately introduced under conditions of the delimitation of functions between Party committees and government and economic organs. The absence of the required legal, material, and financial base is interfering with assertion of the Soviets real authority. Communist deputies' aggressive positions and consolidating roles are not being felt everywhere.

Effective forms of Party influence in trade unions, the Komsomol, and women's, veterans, and other public organizations through communists working in them have not been found. Centrifugal trends are being increasingly manifested in the trade union movement. An acute polarization of views on the organization's future and its ideological foundations are characteristic of the Ukrainian Komsomol and moods of estrangement from the Party are perceptible here.

The Central Committee and its Politburo did not always in time or skillfully direct Party committees toward proper activities under conditions of the existence of

various political parties and politicized associations and movements. The dialogue and search for reasonable compromises with them are being inadequately conducted. An ineffective rebuff is being given to attacks on Marxist-Leninist theory, socialism, and the CPSU.

Having discussed the Central Committee Report "On the Political Situation and Primary Directions of Ukrainian Communist Party Activities at the Current Stage," the congress recognizes the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's political line as mainly correct and the practical work for its implementation as inadequate.

While confirming the appropriateness of the policy toward perestroika and loyalty to the ideas of the October Revolution and socialism and while advocating creative development of Marxism-Leninism, the congress makes it incumbent upon the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, leading Party organizations, and all communists to direct their efforts toward resolution of the tasks of renewing society on the values of socialism, and discovery of its democratic and humanitarian nature and creative potential.

The Congress declares that the primary goal of Republic Communist Party policy and practical activity is the benefit of the people of the Ukraine and its national rebirth, affirmation of the Ukrainian SSR's real state sovereignty within the USSR based on the new Union Treaty, dynamic development of the economy, the social and intellectual sphere, and creation of appropriate living and working conditions for people of all nationalities residing in the Republic.

The congress confirms that the Ukrainian Communist Party will defend its right to political leadership through practical activity while gaining the people's trust and while conducting its policy through communists who work in organs of state power, public organizations, and also workers collectives.

The Ukrainian Communist Party sees its urgent tasks as leading the Republic out of the crisis situation, stopping the decline of the workers standard of living, removing political tension in society, improving social feelings, and insuring the personal security of each person.

The congress proceeds from the premise that the Ukrainian Communist Party will actually become the advance guard if it can consolidate all progressive forces, rally the people around its future and current tasks, and lead them.

Under conditions of a multi-party system and political competition, Republic Party organizations and communists must more aggressively participate in the democratic process, nominate and defend their own candidates in USSR and Ukrainian SSR people's deputies and local Soviet elections, more persistently conduct their policy in organs of state power, gain the people's trust through practical work in workers collectives, at their

residence locations, and in mass democratic organizations. The congress opposes elimination of Party organizations in industry, in educational, scientific, and state institutions, the Armed Forces, law enforcement organs, and in other collectives.

The congress considers the increase of Party organization responsibility for the Republic's political, socio-economic, and intellectual development will promote consolidation of the Ukrainian Communist Party's independent status and as a Party that, while adhering to the CPSU Program and Charter, is autonomous in all of its activities and organization of internal life which it is building on the foundation of its own program and normative documents while considering the specific features of development and contemporary life of the Ukrainian people.

The congress considers the primary direction of Party renewal to be profound democratization of intra-Party life, confirmation of the leadership of the Party masses, and provision of the capability for each communist to really influence the development and implementation of Party policy and formation and work of Party election organs of all levels. Leading Party organizations must return to a central place in the Party. All Party committees must structure their activities while proceeding first of all from the interests of this primary Party element.

The congress imparts key significance in personnel work to initiative, search, recommendation, and defense of competent people with high political and moral qualities, and to consideration of the opinion of leading Party organizations, workers collective and other democratic mechanisms.

The congress stresses that we must not permit shrinkage of the Ukrainian Communist Party's social base under conditions of a multi-party system when the most varied political forces are attempting to penetrate into the working-class and peasant environment and this is confirmed among the intelligentsia. Pay greater attention to admitting workers, peasants, scientists and engineers, artists, teachers, students and others categories into the Party.

While sharing the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's concern with regard to attempts to split the Party into factions or according to national signs, the congress appeals to communists to whom perestroika's goals are dear to consolidate themselves on a fundamental basis and to decisively break off with those who reject the socialist choice and attempt to undermine the Party's ideological and organizational foundations. We must renew the Leninist understanding of democratic centralism as the underlying principle of building the Party and the Party's activities, as the guarantee of comprehensive deployment of intra-Party democracy and consolidation of Party discipline, and the conscious unity of communists.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee must continue work to renew and improve Party structures and democratization of relations between Party committees of various levels. While confirming the capability to create soviets of leading Party organization secretaries, Party clubs, and other horizontal structures as forms of work, the congress considers attempts to replace them with Party election organs, Party raykoms and gorkoms in particular, to be illegitimate. The processes of perestroyka require absolute subordination of the Party staff to election organs, and further improvement of its structure and activities. The staff must carry out primarily theoretical-analytical, prediction-sociological, and consultative services of Party election organ activities.

Under conditions of a multi-party system, the issue of supporting the Ukrainian Communist Party's influence in trade unions, workers and peasant movements, in the Komsomol, women's, veterans, and other mass public organizations and associations sharply arises as never before. It is extremely important to prevent their split or reorientation on other political forces. The Ukrainian LKSM [Komsomol] (MDS) [Molodezhza Demokraticheskii Sotsializm—Youth for Democratic Socialism] that is our Party's closest ideological partner requires special attention and assistance. We must structure our relations with it based on comradely mutual assistance, cooperation, and deep trust. The congress considers it advisable to create a commission for work with youth from among Central Committee members and to task it with development of youth policy.

The congress advocates mutual understanding and rational compromises with other political parties and politicized public associations within the framework of the democratic process, cooperation in the solution of urgent problems of Republic development, and is against intra-Party internecine strife. However, Party organizations must decisively unmask those who stand on anti-socialist positions and sow ethnic and religious enmity. There cannot be concessions at the expense of the people's interests.

The 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress considers one of the Central Committee's urgent tasks to be development of a new concept of ideological work that corresponds to new political realities and goals of perestroyka.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will rely on creative Marxism-Leninism that has been cleansed of Stalinist and other distortions and frozen dogma in the development of its policy and practical activities, on the democratic and humanitarian traditions of the Ukrainian people, and on the achievements of all native and world progressive social thought.

The duty of Party organizations is to instill faith in socialism and the communist ideal in people. This requires intensification of the Party's theoretical activities and comprehension of the Ukraine's socialist path

and the contemporary state of society. While unconditionally condemning Stalinist crimes performed in the name of the Party, the congress decisively rejects attempts to defame the Great October Revolution, our people's socialist choice, the history of the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party, and the name and teaching's of V.I. Lenin.

All ideological work must be concentrated on clarifying the Party's course toward perestroyka, protection of socialist values, and the people's political, moral, and intellectual education, ecological culture, new thinking, and historical memory. Under conditions of a multi-party system, we must more conclusively and convincingly propagandize our ideas and values and demonstrate their attractiveness. Conviction, dialogue, tolerance toward other opinions, and a joint search for truth based on universal values must become the main thing in our associations with people.

The congress proposes that the Ukrainian Communist Party and Party obkoms complete a fundamental restructuring of the political education system and train or retrain Party and ideological personnel in the shortest possible time period so that it meets the tasks of a renewed Party in a renewed society. Support the initiative of Party committees to reorganize political education clubs in socio-political centers.

[The congress] considers it advisable to reorganize Kiev and Odessa Higher Party Schools into educational institutions to train highly skilled personnel for Party, government, and public organizations and the Institute of Party History under the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee into the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Political Research.

While supporting the line toward openness [otkrytost] and glasnost, the congress considers it extremely important to insure unity and precise coordination of the activities of Party committees and their publications in the consolidation of all healthy forces in the CPSU Platform and to conduct a line toward integration of party publications editorial collectives with Party committees.

While expanding the rights of editorial collectives, we must simultaneously increase the responsibility of communists who work in them for the conduct of the Party political line, for objectivity, deliberateness, and constructiveness in coverage of the processes of public life.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and Party committees will complete work in the near future to consolidate the Party press, improve its structure, and resolve the issue on the advisability of separate publication of Party committee and Soviet of people's deputies newspapers.

The congress regards the first steps toward confirmation of the Ukrainian SSR's real sovereignty and formation of legal Ukrainian statehood as just the beginning of work

in this direction, advocates acceleration of the development of a new Union Treaty, and creation of a legal foundation and reliable mechanism for protection of the Republic's interests. While advocating radical renewal of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR's state sovereignty, and immediate cessation of the arbitrariness of union departments on its territory, we decisively reject any appeals for the Republic's secession from the USSR and attempts to place in doubt the Ukrainian SSR's territorial integrity.

The congress supports the fundamental line for approval of total power of Soviets of people's deputies as expressers of the will of the Ukrainian people and the foundation of its Soviet statehood. While rejecting the tutelage of Soviets, Party committees must increase the consolidating role of communist deputies.

It is important to strengthen the constitutional regime and insure the supremacy of the law in all spheres of public life, increase the legal protection of the individual, and strengthen the guarantees of his rights and freedoms.

Party committees and leading Party organizations must promote consolidation of law and order and discipline, intensify the struggle with crime, and increase the responsibility of communists who work in law enforcement organs. We must pay special attention to uprooting deformations in mass law consciousness, overcome legal nihilism, and improve legal education and the population's general legal compulsory education.

Deepening the content of military-patriotic and international education of young people, improvement of material lifestyle conditions of Great Patriotic War veterans, former warrior internationalists, and families of deceased servicemen must be a matter of constant concern. It is also important henceforth to expand ties with military units, especially with those returning from the countries of Eastern Europe, and to assist in creating proper service and living conditions for their personnel. The congress condemns activities that are directed at undermining the prestige of the Armed Forces of the USSR, imposing the idea of establishing national armed formations, and young people's refusal of military service beyond the borders of the Republic.

The congress supports the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee policy that is directed at preserving the Ukrainian people's national originality, state protection of its language, insurance of freedom of development of the languages and cultures of other peoples residing in the Republic, the revival of popular traditions, historical memory, and advocates deepening the processes of harmonizing interethnic relations.

Party committees must see the danger and oppose manifestations of national narrow-mindedness and arrogance, chauvinism, nationalism, Zionism, anti-Semitism, and separatism.

While regarding Ukrainian culture as the intellectual foundation of state sovereignty, the congress attaches

paramount significance to its renewal and comprehensive development. The duty of Party organizations is to aggressively promote democratization, humanization of culture, consolidate its material base, insure freedom of creativity, and support talents as a national treasure in every possible way. The utilization of commercial approaches in culture must not run counter to its moral mission.

The congress proceeds from the premise that the intellectual renewal of the Ukraine and its economic and social progress are impossible without radical changes in the sphere of public education based on the fundamentally new concept that corresponds to the contemporary needs of society's development.

It is important to turn public opinion in favor of the priority of education, science, public health, and culture and an increase in the share of national income allocated to the development of these branches. Democratization of the education process must be utilized to increase the quality of teaching and worker education. We need to increase the prestige of the teacher, professor, doctor, and artist and create the necessary living and working conditions for them.

The congress advocates conducting a series of measures for protection of man's health, introduction of a healthy life style, strengthen the material and technical base and improve the supply of medicine to the population, and assign a preference for medical services to children, mothers, veterans, and the disabled.

In the solution of cultural and enlightenment development problems, the congress counts on mutual assistance and cooperation of the people's intelligentsia, creative unions, and communist leaders who work in government and economic organs.

The congress considers the paramount tasks to be increasing state support of the development of republic science, first of all basic research and integration its economic, industrial, and VUZ sectors, further democratization of scientific life, and granting autonomy to higher educational institutions.

While regarding the economy as the foundation of sociopolitical stability, the congress places the following at the center of the Ukrainian Communist Party's socioeconomic policy:

- assertion of the Ukraine's economic sovereignty and fundamental renewal of relations with the USSR and the union republics on mutually beneficial bases;
- priority guarantee of people's social protection under a scientifically sound transition to a regulated market and granting equal opportunities for the existence and development of various forms of property and management;
- acceleration of structural perestroika of the Republic economy, leading it out of the crisis, and turning it

toward man; urgent resolution of acute social problems, first of all saturating the consumer market with goods, scientifically intensive items in particular, using the broad retooling of enterprises, including conversion of the defense industry, to do this;

- mobilization of all capabilities for a sharp increase of housing construction volumes and significant improvement of people's cultural and everyday life living conditions; and,
- revival of the Ukrainian countryside and the peasantry itself, guarantee of agriculture's priority development and of the entire agroindustrial complex and resolution of the food problem on this basis.

The congress considers fundamental improvement of the environment to be one of the most important tasks. Communists in government and economic organs must strive for development and realization of ecologically sound concepts, development of the national economy, unconditional accomplishment of tasks provided for by the state environmental protection program, and rational utilization of natural resources for the period until 2005. We must monitor fulfillment of programs for the elimination of the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and its total withdrawal from operation in the shortest possible time period.

In the area of international activities, the congress approves the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's steps toward including the Republic in international political, trade and economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation and considers further work in this direction that meets the fundamental interests of the Ukrainian people to be necessary.

The congress confirms the aspiration and readiness of Ukrainian communists for cooperation with communist, worker, socialist, social democrat, national democrat, and other parties of foreign countries who advocate peace, democracy, and social progress.

The 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress appeals to all Republic communists, party and social organizations, Soviets of people's deputies, to workers, kolkhozniks, veterans, young people, women, and to all the Ukrainian people to consolidate themselves on the perestroika platform and to insure stability in society. We will ensure real renewal of all our lives through joint conscientious work and conscious and honest accomplishment of our civic duty.

Ukrainian Council of Ministers Chairman on Governmental Concerns

90UN2489A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAYINY in Russian
5 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with V.A. Masol, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, by a republic television

correspondent on 1 July, 1990: "To Lead the Economy out of a Crisis, One Needs to Improve the People's Living Standards"]

[Text] The chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, V. A. Masol, was interviewed by a correspondent from the republic television. The conversation took place 1 July before the chairman's departure for the 28th Congress of the CPSU.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Andreyevich! We congratulate you on being elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. The first question: What direction will the formation of a new cabinet take; what are the difficulties involved? And do you assume that among the ministers, and perhaps even among your deputies there will be non-party people or representatives from other parties?

[Masol] First of all, I want to thank you for your congratulations. I would like to say that we have been working on setting up the government for only approximately two days. Actually, for now the government only has a chairman, but there is still an old administration in office fulfilling its obligations of confirming a new administration. There were a lot of proposals being examined concerning the make-up of the new government, its structure, and I should say, that it has changed considerably. The new structure is designed for the transition period, for as long as the republic and the country as a whole have not completely changed over to a system of market relations; at that point we will begin to work on economic laws. As to your second question, I have answered it in such a fashion: above all, I think the government should have the most competent people, irrespective of what party they belong to today or whether they have no party affiliation at all. But this should be a person, who can work for the welfare of our people, in order to increase the volume of industrial production and in order to make life better for our people.

[Correspondent] Are there in any event difficulties in setting up the administration?

[Masol] Today I cannot tell you, since we are discussing all the proposals. My former predecessors in the position of chairmen are also introducing proposals. Academics are interested in this matter. The difficulties, I think lie ahead, when we will introduce for discussion in parliament a new make-up for the government and new proposals for educating the ministries and departments. I can say that the number of them will be considerably diminished.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Andreyevich! You know better than anyone else how many social programs were decreed in the past in the republic. What is their fate? Have they been carried out or not? Should we pass others? People are especially interested in whatever is related to the Chernobyl tragedy.

[Masol] There really were a lot of social programs passed. And though we surpassed our target plans, as established by the twelfth five year plan, I am not satisfied with the pace of work. The fact of the matter is that today questions of the social development of our population need more attention. I think that the most important tasks for the new administration will be to review the social programs, specifically, to increase the rate of construction of housing.

As regards Chernobyl, the following should be said: I think that today the most important goal is deciding the problem of relocating [people] from out of the polluted zone. By resolution of the union government it is stipulated to finish this work by the end of 1992. Today our specialists are working at working out programs, which would stipulate the relocation of these people to be completed in 1991. I dare say that this is the most important task that will enable us to eliminate social tension.

For now we have even resolved several other issues. Already in May, I was in the Brusilovsky district of Zhitomir Oblast and promised to write off the debts of those collective farms, which today are taking in relocated people. Such a resolution was accepted, and the debts were written off. In addition to this, we accepted a resolution that provides for the granting of free housing in village areas constructed for relocated people from the Chernobyl zone. Yesterday I also signed a resolution providing for free treatment with medicine in medical centers for the population living in this zone.

But I should also once again say that the most important issue, to my understanding, is completing the process of relocating people, who have suffered as a result of the disaster during 1991—a year earlier than stipulated. In order to meet this purpose, we will use the material resources in our republic to supplement the general union [measures taken for relocating people].

[Correspondent] In regards to Donbas. Here there is a new wave of social tension arising, and to a considerable degree this is related to the fact that a well known resolution is being carried out by the Council of Ministers of the USSR in an inadequate fashion. In relation to this, what is the position of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR—are you waiting for the natural development of events to unfold, or are you trying to apply any kind of steps that will anticipate events in order to ease the tension?

[Masol] Actually, resolution number 608 of the Council of Ministers of the USSR is currently being carried out very slowly. Those proposals which were made to the union government, from the point of the view of the social development of the mines, of the entire Donetsk area—in terms of building housing, improving conditions in the social sphere—they are still not accepted today. That is why I regard it as an important step for the new government to create a committee, which would

coordinate and control implementing the noted resolution. The most important issue, which should be decided on by the new government—is increasing the rate of building housing. That is why we see it as important this year to finish construction of the home-construction enterprises in Donetsk and Mariupol, and thus provide more housing for both the miners and the metallurgists.

In addition to this, the committee, which we intend to create, will coordinate the work of the entire mining industry in our republic.

[Correspondent] This is the problem of the day. It seems, the first wave of panic related to the time in which we will have a market economy has already passed. Right now, to be blunt, there is simply nothing to buy. And what is next? What is the Council of Ministers of the Ukraine planning to do in relation to this problem?

[Masol] Above all I want to express my satisfaction in the fact that we won a small scale victory today. Despite the fact that the union government wanted to introduce retail prices for bread at the beginning of July, this as you see, is not working out. The shift over to market relations, to my understanding, cannot be accomplished by either a decree, or by means of command-administrative methods. That is why we should prepare ourselves. For the union government did not say the main thing: that in the shift over to a market economy, without appropriate preparations, the living conditions of the population may fall drastically. We are opposing this. As soon as we are ready, we will work out the needed legislative acts; when these acts will be discussed, they will be altered in accordance to [financial] estimates; only after that can we shift over to market relations. A mechanism providing social security should be worked out for our population with the rise of various prices. In the republic approximately 25 percent of the population are pensioners, who would be the first to feel the burden of expenses in a market economy.

[Correspondent] In a few minutes you are leaving for Moscow for the 28th Congress of the Party. Are you prepared to uphold exactly this position?

[Masol] Yes, I am prepared to uphold it. I spoke about it, by the way, also at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, and at the session of the Higher Council of USSR, when I spoke about this issue. The biggest mistakes and the mistakes, I would say, of comrade Abalkin's team are the hasty resolutions, which are being passed on economic questions. If you were to make a brief analysis of the past five years, then you will understand that the majority of these resolutions have been changed today.

[Correspondent] At the end of our conversation what would you like to tell the television viewers of the Ukraine, addressing them now in a direct manner?

[Masol] Above all I want to thank all the television viewers, who supported me in the struggle to continue my work in the capacity as a Chairman of the Council of

Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. I would like to say that the most important issue lies not in what kind of organized forms of administration of the people's ownership there will be, but rather in the issue of whether we will be able to insure a larger volume of production by industries, providing goods for the people's needs. Because without this, we cannot substantially raise the standard of living of our population.

I am counting on the support of the people of the Ukraine and will do everything in order to lead it out of the crisis of our economy, improving the prosperity of the people.

Ukrainian Independence Day Proclaimed

90UN2481A Kiev *LITERATURNA UKRAYINA*
in Ukrainian No 29, 19 June 90 p 1

[I. Plyushch, first vice-president to the chief of the Higher Council of the Ukrainian SSR: "The Resolution of the Higher Council of the Ukrainian SSR Concerning the Independence Day Proclamation of Ukraine"]

[Text] Considering the will of the Ukrainian people and their eternal aspiration to independence,

- confirming the historical weight of the resolution of the Declaration about the national sovereignty of Ukraine on July 16, 1990,
- the Higher Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has resolved to:
- to regard the 16th of July as a Day on which the sovereignty of Ukraine was proclaimed and to annually celebrate it as a state, nation-wide holiday of Ukraine.

Congress of Ukrainianists Scheduled

90UN2519B Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
10 Jul 90 p 4

[Report by UKRINFORM correspondent: "Ukraininists of the World Are Gathering in Kiev"]

[Text] The first international congress of Ukrainianists will be held in our republic at the end of August and the beginning of September. Preparations for this important event were discussed at a meeting of the organizing committee in Kiev on 5 July. M.A. Orlik, chairman of the committee and deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and representatives of ministries and departments, scientific establishments and public organizations noted in their speeches that a great deal has been done for the successful conduct of the world forum for scholars. At the same time they spoke of the need to resolve certain urgent organizational matters.

Following the meeting UKRINFORM correspondents asked V.M. Rusanovskiy, academician of the Ukrainian

SSR Academy of Sciences and president of the International Association of Ukrainianists (MAU), who is also deputy chairman of the organizing committee, to tell about the impending event.

"The congress," he said, "is being organized by the MAU—with a great deal of support from the republic government, the Republic Association of Ukrainianologists and public organizations, of course. The idea of holding the congress received fervent support universally. Naturally, we have had meetings with foreign Ukrainianist scholars in the past: during international congresses of Slavists, as part of Soviet-American scientific collaboration and at international symposiums on problems of the Ukrainian language, literature and culture. This will be the first such extensive undertaking, however, with reports on the linguistics, literature, history, philosophy, archeology and political science, as well as the study of contemporary developments in the life both of our republic and the Ukrainian diaspora and relations between Ukrainians abroad and the Ukraine."

V.M. Rusanovskiy went on to say that 23 nations will be represented at the congress. There will be large delegations from the USA, Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the FRG and Italy. The Asian nations will be represented by Japan and China. All of this attests to a growing interest in the Ukraine, in the history and culture of our people.

When asked what results could be expected from the congress, the scholar replied:

"We plan to publish a book on the results of the congress, which will contain unique information, particularly on Ukrainian history. This information will help us to compile a five-volume history of the Ukrainian culture."

Removal of Lenin, Marx Statues Protested

90UN2519A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 1 Aug 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "And Once Again About Monuments"]

[Text] The Postfaktum news agency has disseminated the following reports from its correspondents in Lvov Oblast.

Chervonograd: By decision of a session of the city soviet monuments to Vladimir Lenin and Karl Marx are to be removed from the city before 6 August. Removal of the statues is set for 1 August.

The Lvov Oblast procuracy submitted a protest to the oblast soviet against the destruction of the architectural monuments. Mikhail Goryn, deputy chairman of the oblast soviet spoke out in the oblast newspaper *ZA VILNU UKRAINU* in support of the decision taken by the Chervonograd city soviet.

A delegation of Communists from Chervonograd has come to Kiev. It has requested that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet assess the events in Chervonograd. This request has not yet been considered at the session. At a

press conference held by representatives of the Chernonograd Communists, T. Mamontova, secretary of the gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, assessed the city soviet's decision as illegal. Mamontova reported that an ad hoc committee is collecting signatures to protect the monuments and that the Communists are prepared to picket the memorials on 1 August.

Lvov: The 125th anniversary of the birth of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptitskiy, who headed the Eastern Rite Catholic Church in the western part of the Ukraine for 45 years (until 1945), is being commemorated here. During World War II Sheptitskiy collaborated with the occupying German authorities, gave his blessing to the establishment of the Galichina SS Division within the Wehrmacht and supported the organization of Ukrainian nationalists and its paramilitary formation, the Ukrainian Rebel Army. Sheptitskiy died in 1945.

An exhibit of documents and photographs relating to Sheptitskiy's activities has been opened at the Lvov State Archive. Workers at the Museum of the History of Religion are readying an exhibit of personal items of the deceased hierarchy, which will serve as the foundation for the permanent exposition at the Sheptitskiy Museum.

Ukrainian Decrees on Chernobyl Compensation

90UN2295A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 19 June 90 p 3

[Report by the Information Section of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR; no date given: "Compensation is extending to include more people who suffered from the Chernobyl Disaster"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR has accepted a resolution concerning the implementation [of new measures] in July of this year in the districts and populated areas in Kiev, Zhitomir, Chernigov, Rovno Oblasts, which have been polluted with radiation, where it is impossible to manufacture unpolluted products, and where the citizens are receiving monetary assistance in the range from 15 to 30 karbovanets per month for each member of their family; it has been decreed to implement a differentiated pay scale by means of increased tariff rates (salaries) for all the workers at companies, offices, and organizations; this rate varies according to the level of radioactive pollution of the soil in the following doses: from 5 to 10 curies per square kilometer—30 percent [increase]; from 10 to 15—50 percent; from 15 to 30—75 percent; 30 and more curies per square kilometer—100 percent.

Along the same lines, additional payments are to be added to pensions and for helping out citizens.

This measure is being implemented with the aim of creating conditions that will insure that there is a balanced diet in terms of vitamins and other food stuffs in the rations that are being provisioned to the population

in those areas that are having food stuffs transported to them, like fruits and vegetables at market and cooperative prices.

Payment for work and payment of all forms of pensions and compensation for the unemployed and invalids from childhood, who live in populated areas as marked out by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR from January 31, 1990 [in resolution] No. 56, where the level of radioactive pollution of the soil is less than 5 curies per square kilometer, [such payment] is being carried out according to previously established methods.

The appropriate ministries and departments of the Ukrainian SSR together with interested regional executive committees have been delegated to give the Council of Ministers of the republic by July 1990 an account of the districts and the populated areas, where differentiated pay scales have been introduced by means of increasing tariff rates (with pay rates comparable to those of official posts); and to the extent to which the level of radiation in these populated areas changes—to introduce well-founded propositions concerning a change in the rate of pay that accords to the changing norms.

By another government resolution, the extent to which compensation is being given out has been expanded to include specialists, who suffered radiation exposure as a result of the disaster at the Chernobyl AES. This was done with the aim of insuring the stability of the cadres in specified areas.

Taking into consideration the need for having specialist among the cadres, the task has been delegated to the appropriate ministries and departments of the Ukrainian SSR of introducing competition-free and comprehensive measures for preparing separate detachments of republic graduates from schools, and also other people from districts, which have been polluted with radiation.

A proposition by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Culture of the Ukrainian SSR has been adopted that concerns the policy of admission to medical institutes, institutes of culture and cultural-educational schools of the republic for the period extending to 1995 in Kiev, Zhitomir, Rovno, and Chernigov Oblasts.

It has been established that the graduates of higher and other special educational institutions and professional technical schools will not be assigned to work at populated areas, whose inhabitants are being subjected to resettling.

The ministries and departments of the Ukrainian SSR are obligated to assign young specialists—graduates of higher and other special educational institutions to work in the populated areas with a level of radiation from 15 curies and more per square kilometer for a one year term rather than a 3 year term, as has been dictated by the law. Young specialists and graduates of PTU [professional-technical schools], will not be sent to such areas, who

have in their families infants, pregnant women, or individuals, who according to medical records are not recommended to live in radioactively polluted territories.

The executive committees of the city councils of people's deputies, firms, offices, and organizations are being recommended to grant well organized housing sites to individuals, who have come to work on a permanent or temporary basis in the populated areas, as confirmed by the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the Ukrprofrady [Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions] as of December 14, 1989 [in resolution] No. 315 and in the successive additions made to this resolution. The chiefs of institutions and organizations of health protection, education, and culture of the people are being given the right to implement with the help of specialists, who have worked in the populated areas of more than 15 curies per square kilometer for no less than a year, and also with specialists from other areas, who have the experience of having done practical work for no less than 3 years, to make contracts for terms of work to be done in the populated areas of zones of constant control; these contracts will offer extra payments to the base pay of specialists with a higher education in the range of 150 karbovanets per month, and for those workers with less special education—100 karbovanets.

It is established that the graduates of higher and other special educational institutions, professional-technical schools, who work in the populated areas designated as zones of constant control with a level of radiation of 15 and more curies per square kilometer for no less than 3 years and who have expressed a desire to resettle to these areas, work will be given to such graduates in their trade, and a right to preferential consideration for access to the building-construction cooperatives, and also their [housing] registration will be insured allowing them to live in any given populated area without regard to the size of the living quarters, in the dwelling place of their forefathers—in all the populated areas of the republic, except for the city of Kiev and resort areas.

Lvov Obkom, Soviet Chairman on Political, Economic Issues

90UN2360A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 27, June 90 pp 8-9

[Interview with Vyacheslav Sekretaryuk, first secretary of the Lvov obkom of the Ukraine Communist Party; and Vyacheslav Chernovil, chairman of the Lvov oblast Soviet, by SOYUZ staff correspondent Nikolay Baklanov: "The Opposition, Now in Power"]

[Text] 1. How would you explain the results of the recent elections in the Lvov oblast, resulting in the now-former opposition taking power?

2. Please discuss the first decisions of the Lvov oblast Soviet, which have evoked various reactions both inside and outside the Ukraine.

3. How do you interpret the concept of "sovereignty of the Ukraine" and what methods do you intend to use to achieve this strategic goal?

4. Your attitude towards a market economy? Where do you believe the way out of the country's economic crisis must be sought?

5. Is the formation possible of an independent Galician republic not belonging to the Union?

6. Your attitude towards a multiparty system and pluralism of opinions, and how is it realized in practice? What must be done to establish constructive cooperation between the deputies of the Lvov oblast Soviet and the oblast organization of the Ukraine Communist Party, which continues to exercise substantial influence in this area?

Vyacheslav Sekretaryuk, first secretary of the Lvov obkom of the Ukraine Communist Party, elected to this job just over two months ago, with some 27 years experience in Komsomol, Soviet and Party organs of the oblast: "We are opposed to replacing the monopoly of one party with the dictate of any other political forces."

1. The advantage was on the side of our political opponents, who did not carry the burden of unfulfilled promises, of mistakes committed by the previous oblast Soviet.

The election results were also affected by serious miscalculations of the Party obkom and its bureaus in defining the strategy and tactics of political work.

The Party committees announced the need to consolidate all healthy social-political forces, but were unable to implement this in practice.

There are also several other reasons for the electoral defeat, including the totally unsatisfactory participation of primary Party organizations in the campaign struggle.

As far as describing the current oblast Soviet, there is hardly anyone who can "weigh" all its political components—the situation is constantly changing.

The rather high intellectual and educational level of the deputies should be noted, which must have a positive impact on the consideration of problems. But one gets the feeling that the deputies still lack realism and economic and managerial experience.

2. The first organizational sessions of the newly elected local Soviets of People's Deputies began to be conducted in April 1990. Some of them adopted decisions contradicting current laws. For example, the oblast Soviet adopted a decision which invalidated within the oblast all decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and lower Party organs affecting economic, governmental and cultural matters. This decision defined, outside of the USSR Constitution, certain activities of oblast Party agencies regarding the governmental, economic or cultural development of the oblast. The decision on the

decree on power states that the Soviet considers "inappropriate the membership in any political party of chairmen of Soviets and chairmen of the executive committees." It has also been proposed that this provision be extended to employees of law enforcement and court agencies, and the procurator's office.

In violation of the law, the oblast Soviet session recognized national symbols in the oblast: the blue-yellow flag, the trident and the national hymn "Shche ne vmerla Ukraina", even though these questions lie within the competence of the republic's higher organs of power.

An unlawful decision was also taken to transfer the newspaper "VILNA UKRAINA", the property of the CPSU Central Committee, to the oblast Soviet, and the Saint Yura cathedral to the Greek Catholics. These decisions have been overturned by the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSP Supreme Soviet; the legality of the others will also be reviewed.

The first session of the oblast Soviet opened its work with insulting attacks on V.I. Lenin, with ultimatums to remove his bust from the meeting hall. After lengthy debates, the bust was draped with a blue-yellow cloth "as a compromise."

The first sessions of the oblast, rayon and city Soviets and People's Deputies replaced many employees of Soviet organs; this affected primarily Party members possessing the needed training, experience and authority. No criticisms were made of their work. According to incomplete data, in this short period over 100 workers of Soviet organs were replaced, including 49 electoral workers. In Nikolaev, the Communist Nikolay Petrovich Geraiymyak, with 25 years teaching experience, was replaced as head of the rayon department of public education by I. Pakholiyuk, who had worked for only one year as a teacher and for two as a laboratory assistant in a technical school, even though the law required at least five years experience for this job. A tendentious mistrust of Communists was displayed: towards the head of the public health department of the oblast ispolkom A. Ladnyi, the head of the city department of public education V. Gladunskiy, and the head of the Zaliznichny rayon department of public education L. Matrosova.

3. Concepts of sovereignty reflect the state of our society. Now, especially considering the situation of Lithuania, it enables not only emotional, but also sober, sensible evaluations.

I support the following approach: I understand the sovereignty of the Ukraine above all as actual political and economic freedom, as the republic's independence in a restored integral federation of similar free and independent states.

This urgently needs a new, democratic national treaty assuring the Ukraine's complete economic independence. It would clearly define the competence and authority of each member of the federation, and create a mechanism for accession to and secession from the

USSR. I believe there must absolutely be a guarantee of the priority of republic laws over union ones, of the right of republics to define themselves the procedure for the effect of union laws in their own territory. Eventually, there could be a legal definition of the principle of state sovereignty: in federative relations, the supremacy of union laws; within republics, of republic laws.

I believe it beyond question that the land, natural resources and basic means of production located in the Ukraine must belong to the people of the republic, without excluding the possibility for the republic's own banking and financial-credit system, and other elements of sovereignty. But all these complicated questions must be resolved not at meetings, but by profound scientific analysis, legal regulation, and serious calculations and forecasts. On the righteous path towards sovereignty we must retain our common sense and economic realism.

4. I think that in the current circumstances the answer to your second question is largely contained in the contents of the first. There is today no more effective way out of the economic crisis than the transition to a market in combination with flexible government regulation. Most of society today recognizes the need for a transition to a market economy. As regards my attitude towards a market, I understand perfectly well that introduction of market relations will be accompanied by a rise in prices, the appearance of unemployment and a social stratification of the population.

All this will occur in conditions of a social and economic crisis and an unstable political situation. The transition to a regulated market opens up real possibilities for the creation of an efficient economy, capable of providing the solution to the problems that have accumulated in our country.

My position conforms fully with the opinion of the oblast Communists expressed at the 23rd Party Conference held just recently.

The Party conference supported the decision adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine in connection with the union government's introduction of the concept of a transition to a regulated market economy, and with the raising of state retail prices, as defending the people's vital interests. At the same time, the delegates consider it unacceptable that prices be raised at the cost of a reduction in the people's standard of living.

Based on this, we favor a balanced, comprehensively tested approach to the introduction of market relations. There must first of all be a thorough social evaluation of the instrument of reforms from the standpoint of the interests of the majority of the population, and especially of the poorer layers; in other words, people's social protection must be guaranteed. Of decisive importance are overcoming the monopolistic status of producer firms, the equal development of various forms of property, balancing the supply of goods with the money supply, and introducing anti-inflation control mechanisms. Overall, this is a huge task.

And in this regard I cannot overlook the statements of the oblast and certain city and rayon Soviets prohibiting the interference of the obkom, gorkom and raykoms of the Party and of primary Party organizations in solving social and economic problems. I believe such a position by the Soviets is not constructive, especially since the oblast's social and economic situation is deteriorating. The reality is that deformations in the economy can become worse if joint measures are not taken to stabilize it.

5. I believe that fears appearing in connection with the question of "Galician autonomy" are exaggerated. I'm not talking about the complete senselessness and economic suicide of such an action. Perhaps of greater importance is the Ukrainian people's centuries-old longing for reunification, for the creation of a single, strong, sovereign Ukraine. And here is this Galician Republic... I think the authors of even such a superficially attractive idea will not be understood in either Galicia or all of the Ukraine. That's in the best case. In the worst, they will be vilified and stoned.

The entire history of our region demonstrates convincingly that at the first opportunity Ukrainians have passionately sought the bosom of their own mother: the Ukraine. For example, that's how it was in 1919, when the young, barely established ZUNR [Western Ukrainian National Republic] and UNR [Ukrainian National Republic] took matters into their hands and concluded the act of *zluca* (reunification). But history judged otherwise. And only twenty years later were the Western Ukrainian lands decisively reunified with the Ukraine within the USSR. This glorious page in our history has been darkened by Stalinist repression, but there occurred that towards which people divided by borders for centuries had moved.

No, it's impossible to erase all that; the people themselves won't allow it. But maximum expansion of local, including regional, self-management—why not? That is our policy, our course. The Lvov oblast Party organization was the first in the republic to work out the idea of local self-management, and has done a great deal in this direction. We consider such an approach to be an element in ensuring the same sovereignty of the republic; in particular, dismantling the administrative-command system, the dictate of both union and republic government agencies. I'm not sure whether it is necessary to use direct analogies from the distant past to assert self-management (using the federalist principle of building the Ukraine by lands: say, the same Galicia, Tavria, Podolye, Bukovina, etc.), to destroy the existing structure, but the idea itself of local, regional self-management is fruitful, of course. I think the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR will also support it.

There is something else that causes concern: the growing stress, in both meetings and at certain sessions of local Soviets, on exclusiveness, almost the divinely chosen nature of new power and of our region: the "Island of

Freedom" which all other regions of the republic, especially those in the east, should seek to emulate. Whoever does not seek to reach the same level is a reactionary, a Party bureaucrat and the like. At the least, this is unethical with respect to one's own brothers. We are all simply deficient here in general and political culture.

6. Some consider a multiparty system to be an inseparable element and elementary condition for the development of democracy and pluralism; they almost go so far as to call for stimulating the creation of new parties.

The exact opposite opinion is also widespread, that the conditions don't exist here for multiple parties.

I think that the truth lies in the middle. Life itself will decide how many parties we need, and what kind. There is no sense in artificially pushing the creation of new parties or raising barriers in their path.

But this does not mean that the process should develop spontaneously. The absence of a law on parties today opens up opportunities for the legal activity of political organizations whose programs contradict our social and political system and the constitution.

As regards pluralism of opinions, it was visibly evident in the work of the 23rd oblast Party conference. There were unusual speeches, constructive proposals, alternative resolutions.

The Party obkom declared its intention to cooperate with the newly elected Soviets immediately after the elections, and offered its assistance. This position is supported by the majority of Communists. According to a sociological poll of the oblast Party conference delegates, constructive coordination with the Soviets is first among a series of measures aimed at raising the Party's influence on public life.

In the present situation we clearly represent the principles of cooperation with the Soviets: mutual trust, concrete mutual aid, and the desire to solve urgent social and economic problems, develop the national cultural renaissance and clean up the ecological situation. Their solutions, aimed at improving the economic situation and ensuring peace and order, all deserve support. For example, the Party raykoms and primary Party organizations of the oblast collective farms are conducting concrete political work today to implement the decisions of the session of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies on the additional allocation of land plots for the rural populace.

We shall continue in the future to firmly speak out against attempts to replace the monopoly on power by one party with the dictate of any other political forces. Our path is consolidation, reasonable compromises, and agreement for the interests of the people, of social peace and quiet.

Vyacheslav Chernovil, chairman of the Lvov oblast Soviet, former political prisoner with over 15 years in camps and exile, laureate of the International Journalist's Prize,

member of the "Pen Club," and until recently a stoker: "We do not use the same methods formerly used to deal with us."

1. I believe the victory of the opposition—now the former opposition—in the spring elections to the Lvov oblast Soviet to be completely natural. It is explained by the thirst for renewal which has seized the entire Soviet Union, including the Ukraine. There is also one other reason: the mistrust of the policies of the CPSU in past decades.

Of course, in the elections the Party bureaucracy tried to use "methods of force," it interfered with the registration of candidates for deputy in order to prevent representatives of the democratic bloc and to elect its own people. It was hard for them to do this here in the western region: the bulk of the population supported the representatives of the opposition. They were successful in some of the eastern oblasts. We thus have today a parliament which does not represent the actual distribution of political forces in the Ukraine.

As to the Lvov oblast, by the end of the elections about 80 percent of the deputy mandates were won by representatives of the democratic bloc. But this is now a very relative number because we don't divide the Soviet into "democratic" and "nondemocratic" wings. And this is not because we have "crushed" someone. I usually chair oblast Soviet sessions and am careful to ensure that our opponents get the floor; I even frequently ask that they be allowed to the microphone out of turn. This is because our supporters repeat each other, and it's important for us to also hear other opinions. Sometimes it's a sober opinion, which we take into consideration.

With regard to the new composition of deputies to the Lvov oblast Soviet, it should be noted that it includes a number of Communists. People are leaving the Party in our oblast without any pressure, and I sometimes learn to my surprise that one of the deputy chairmen of our Soviet's executive committee is no longer a Communist, although he was quite recently... But those Communists who are in the oblast Soviet do not in any way have their rights restricted. Accusations to this effect often voiced against us by Party functionaries are totally groundless. In refuting them, I have frequently noted that we are not firing any Communists who previously worked in various levels of Soviets. It's just that some jobs in the Soviet are elective. It's perfectly natural that mostly new people have been elected to them. Representatives of the old bureaucracy, whose professional capabilities were unsatisfactory or hidden for some reason, had to leave. I think that is understandable: a new power comes in, and it changes the bureaucracy. By the way, the deputies in the Soviet include only about 20 percent Communists, while the bureaucracy which approved the Soviet has 65 percent. That's an example for you of "persecution" of Communists.

2. Obviously, you're referring to the legal status of national symbols, the transfer of several cathedrals to the

Greek Catholic church, the fact that we covered Lenin's bust in our session hall... By the way, a proposal was made to remove it completely, but I felt that such an action during the session would be an insult to the Communists. On the other hand, we felt it necessary to de-ideologize the hall. This seems to me to be fully logical; after all, the Communists are in a minority in the Soviet. So we decided to drape Lenin's bust. And after the session we replaced it with Shevchenko's bust.

As regards the religious problem, I should note that we inherited it from the preceding authorities, who did not register not only Greek Catholic or Uniate religious communities, but also sometimes those of the Russian orthodox church as well. How have we tried to undo this tight knot? We have allowed local Soviets to register these communities, which does not contradict the Law on Local Self-Management and conforms to the law now under preparation which has already gone through the first reading in the national parliament. As to the transfer of churches, this is being done according to the results of secret voting among local residents. Where there are two churches, one is given to the Russian Orthodox, the other to the Catholics.

The fuss about symbols is also being artificially blown up. The colors of blue and yellow and the golden trident, representing national symbols, are very popular in the Ukraine, especially the Western Ukraine. We have decided to use them without removing Stalinist symbols, which are considered those of the state. I think this is a compromise decision that will satisfy the people and not violate laws in effect.

If we talk seriously about what dissatisfied the higher authorities and Party bureaucrats in the republic, it was our recommendation that the posts of chairmen of the Soviets and secretaries of corresponding Party committees not be combined. I stress that this was a recommendation, not a mandatory decision. It was laid out in our decree on power and the recommendation was made that it be implemented prior to the actual establishment of political pluralism and a multiparty system.

In this document, we insisted that Party organizations of any parties not interfere in the functions of the Soviets, did not replace economic or administrative bodies. Despite our decision, quite recently, for example, we read in the paper SHAKHTAR CHERVONOGRADA that the local Communist party gorkom examined the question of appointing the head of the city's police and approved a candidate. I think this is completely absurd. Even we do not approve people for police jobs: this right was wrongfully taken from us by a decree of the former head of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet Valentina Shevchenko. But the Party gorkom, as we see, undertakes to approve for us the head of the police without any hesitation. A perfect example of interference in matters that are not its business.

I should note that our oblast police chief, who according to the decree is subordinate only to the Ukraine minister

of internal affairs, nonetheless asks the deputies to approve him for this job. And that's understandable; after all, he has to work with us, and our trust is very important to him.

The Party bureaucrats are also dissatisfied that in some of the oblast's enterprises they have refused to support Party committees, in contrast to the old times, and some of them have decided to eliminate them completely. But this is the business of work collectives.

Our only mandatory decision was the requirement that judges suspend their membership in any party while occupying their position. This, by the way, was warmly welcomed by judges, who will now find it easier to resist the notorious "telephone" law.

We are accused of supposedly violating the law. But that's not true; we are balancing on its edge, always trying to go a little bit forwards. We decided to increase land allocations and divided 30,000 hectares among the peasants. This was a very popular decision, but for the time being it must be a half-way one: we could not transfer this land to the peasants' ownership because the appropriate law does not exist.

I also cannot fail to mention another example of even excessive respect for the law which we are displaying. I have already mentioned a certain number of bureaucrats who are out of place in the new Soviet. By law, after not being elected they should return where they came from, usually to Party organs. But these bodies do not always have jobs available, so we ourselves find work for them.

3. I am a radical, being a long-time and consistent advocate of independence for the Ukrainian state. It must be democratic, open to the East and the West, with its own politics, economy and friendly ties which no one can rip apart. In short, I am for the political and economic sovereignty of the Ukraine, which is now actually being filled with a different content.

I am convinced that a state such as the present Soviet Union is condemned to collapse, although perhaps not completely. This is a logical historical outcome. After all, the Russian empire, as we know, was created with the help of fictitious voluntary "accessions" and "joining." What kind of "voluntary" can we talk about when even at the beginning of the 19th century the Russian empire was called the "big suitcase of stolen goods"?

I think there will now be an even greater weakening of the old, forcibly imposed ties within the Union. At the same time, over the long run there will be a strengthening of natural, mutually beneficial ties based on equal relations among friendly sovereign states, which the present republics must turn into.

4. I am in favor of a market economy, but am against its "regulation" by the government, since this is of a colonial nature. After all, the market of the Ukraine, poor as it may be, is more saturated today than in other regions,

and if retail prices are made uncontrolled while wholesale prices are controlled, this would mean everything would be taken from us to the center of the country. This would be a very clever form of exploitation of the republics, and especially the Ukraine. We don't need such a market. But I repeat that our salvation lies in a market economy.

Of course, the necessary conditions for it must be created. This means the economic independence of regions and republics; perhaps our own currency; elimination of ministries and agencies, which are weights on the feet of the market; transition to horizontal links; and establishment of normal economic relations between enterprises. But it is dangerous to do all this without adequately preparing for a market, since it would make the poor hungry and can create social tension, an explosion leading to collapse.

5. This idea became popular after a Ternopol newspaper carried an article by some Komsomol official who had no relation whatsoever to the democratic bloc. None of us took it seriously, but then suddenly rumors started going around about supposed plans to create an independent Galician republic. Obviously, this was to someone's advantage, in order to then be able to accuse us of separatism, to declare that we are threatening the territorial integrity of the republic, as, by the way, was done in the corresponding statement of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee, Council of Ministers and Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

I must say with full responsibility that the "Galician republic" is someone's totally stupid invention. It's a different question that I myself support the idea (which, by the way, not everyone in the democratic bloc shares by far) of a federative structure of the future Ukrainian state, with more self-management of regions such as the Donbass, Pridneprov', Tavria, Galicia, etc.

6. I think my attitude towards a multiparty system is understandable, although I myself do not belong to any one party. I was formerly one of the initiators in the creation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, on whose basis the Ukrainian Republican Party was recently founded. I have now left it, in particular because I believe in the recommendation we adopted in the decree on power which I mentioned earlier. I think it would be a good idea during the present transitional period if all Soviet chairmen did not belong to parties.

As far as cooperating with the oblast organization of the Ukrainian Communist Party, so far it's hard for us to find a common language. The Communist Party has not learned how to be in the opposition, so it continues interfering in the decisions of Soviet power and braking them. This has been particularly evident in the press. The directors of the Ukrainian Communist Party obkom should have calmly divided the newspapers with the Soviet power, especially since it is possible to do this, but instead we are offered unequal, discriminatory conditions, under

which the obkom will have journals with a circulation of 450,000, and we are to be forced to accept 100,000.

On the other hand, we do not have an open confrontation with the Party and its representatives in the oblast. But cooperation today is not very possible. Let the Party obkom get used to its position as a public organization engaged in ideological work, and then we can talk about joint constructive activity, as for example with "Rukh" and other parties.

In short, we are not using against the Communists the methods which they once used to deal with us. When I

returned from prison and went to the Party obkom, they told me there were no job openings for journalists in the entire oblast, although there were in Lvov itself. They wouldn't even give me a job as a proof-reader or a supervisor in some museum. I had to become a stoker... Now some of those people who would not give me work are to some extent my subordinates, but I do not intend to take revenge on them, or on other Communists, or on my investigators, whose faces I don't even remember. After all, we want to build in the Ukraine a democratic society, living in a fully independent, sovereign state, and this lofty goal demands a corresponding nobility of actions.

Inter-Ethnic Violence Reported in Tuva

90UN2291A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by L. Shabalin (Kyzyl): "What Is Going On in Tuva"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] Rumors that the ethnic truce between the native and Russian-speaking populations had been broken in the Tuva ASSR crossed the Siberian border today, but Tuva's party and soviet organs did their best to assure central newspaper reporters that nothing terrible is going on: Big deal! A few teenagers waved their fists. Is it worth letting the whole country know about this?... The events of recent months, however, have shown that the situation in Tuva is far from normal.

Group crimes have been committed recently in the villages of Khovu-Aksy, Elegeste, and Sosnovka in Tandinskiy Rayon and Ilyinka in Kaa-Khemskiy Rayon. Young Tuvins and Russians fought a gang war, for example, after a dance in a local club in Khovu-Aksy in the middle of May. Seven people were injured, and militiaman G. Saaya sustained a knife wound. The fight was punctuated by the shattering of windows and windshields.

The conflict was extinguished, vigorous explanatory work with the population was conducted, and the guilty parties were prosecuted, but the roots of the conflict lie deeper.

"It is no longer any secret that certain people in Tuva are trying to convince youth that the concept of 'internationalism' is obsolete and that we must protect the 'purity' of our own nationality and care only about its interests," Honored Teacher of the RSFSR I. Dostay said.

There are 69 nationalities in Tuva, but the total population numbers just over 300,000, with natives accounting for two-thirds of the total. In rural regions the Russian-speaking population is dwindling, and this is being accompanied by the mass migration of the young people of Tuva from rural committees to the cities. So many young men and women are not working that it would be difficult to even count them, although there are thousands of job vacancies in Tuva's organizations and enterprises.

The population of Khovu-Aksy, where the young people were fighting, is suffering from emotional stress. People are resigning from their jobs. More than 1,500 people left the area just in the last 2 months, but the Tuvakobalt Combine needs around 200 skilled workers and engineers. There is a shortage of 50 tunnelers just in the mine, but fewer than 20 local inhabitants want to learn this profession. The acute shortage of drivers has given rise to transportation problems.

There are probably two main reasons that people are leaving: the instability of work in the combine, which means poor wages, and the constant rumors of threats against the Russian-speaking population. Not all of the rumors are true, but there have been some unfortunate

incidents. In Elegeste, for example, people are setting fires and vandalizing property at night: Windows have been broken in 15 homes. One of the three homes which were set on fire burned to the ground. Handwritten leaflets advising the Russians to leave before 15 June were distributed in the same village. In fact, more than 40 families have already left the village.

Many people here say that all of these outrages were provoked by an organized group which benefits greatly from the inter-ethnic strife and is encouraging young people to commit unlawful actions. I would not take the liberty of confirming this belief, but there are many suspicious signs of this. Republic KGB personnel recently caught up with the person who had arranged for the printing and distribution of the leaflets in Elegeste....

Here is another example. A group of young Tuvins were throwing rocks at eight Russian boys in the village of Ilyinka in Kaa-Khemskiy Rayon. Rocks were thrown through the windows and doors of residential buildings and the post office, and shots were fired. Paradoxically, however, the perpetrators were never apprehended.

"Stirring up emotions and ethnic feelings could lead to even greater tragedies unless strict measures are taken. I think we have to admit that republic administrative agencies have lost the initiative in this area. This is a big mistake," said investigator S. Mongush from the Internal Affairs Department of the Kyzyl gorispolkom.

The instability of the situation is being compounded by the general rise in the republic crime rate. It doubled in Kyzyl just in the last 4 years. Here is an indicative detail: 1,000 of the 2,700 registered crimes in 1989 were not solved, but around 700 of the 1,200 registered in the first 6 months of this year have not been solved.

The recent special session of the Kyzyl city soviet took immediate steps to restore order. A decision was made to review the composition of volunteer people's guards, to supply the members of these squads with special equipment, and to form an additional company of the postal patrol service with funds from the local budget and enterprise contributions. Something like a "curfew" was instituted for minors: They are not allowed in public places or on the streets after 2300 hours unless they are accompanied by an adult.

A public rally was recently held in Kyzyl. There were posters demanding the resignation of the party obkom, government leaders, and the heads of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs. The demonstrators were Russians, Tuvins, Khakases, and Ukrainians. Their worries are understandable. They are hearing too many distress signals from different locations. Someone is apparently benefiting from the mass exodus of other nationalities from Tuva. The republic government is a Soviet regime,

and it was obviously too late in taking measures to restore order and in solving socioeconomic problems. Further delays will be extremely dangerous.

From the editors: When this article was already in the pressroom, we received a report from the capital of Tuva,

saying that the special session of the republic Supreme Soviet to discuss the current situation had come to an end. The deputies planned several serious measures to combat crime and vandalism and alleviate the tension in the population.

IAEA Director Blix Details Chernobyl Investigation Plan

90WN0144A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jun 90
First Edition p 5

[Interview with IAEA Director Hans Blix by V. Gubarev and I. Melnikov under the rubric "Chernobyl and the Planet": "The Truth and Nothing But the Truth"]

[Text] The most prominent scientists on the planet accepted the Soviet Government's proposal for conducting a comprehensive investigation in areas affected by the Chernobyl accident. A total of 100 scientists from Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, England, the USA and the USSR, as well as from international organizations—the UN's CES, FAO, WHO and IAEA—are visiting the Ukraine, Belorussia and the RSFSR. They are beginning an expert assessment of the radiological effects on people's health and the environment and evaluating the effectiveness of protective measures. This is the first such project in world science.

Date of birth: 29 July 1957.

Place of birth: Vienna.

"Mother": the scientific and technological revolution.

"Father": international cooperation.

It is significant that when the International Atomic Energy Agency was established, its main mission was defined as follows: to work toward the rapid, extensive and safe use of atomic energy for maintaining peace and the health and well-being of mankind.

The IAEA has the status of an intergovernmental organization. It is directed by a general conference of all member states, the number of which exceeded 100 long ago. The agency has its own budget financed by with contributions by participating nations. Although autonomous, the agency, which a staff of more than 1,000, is a part of the UN system and is accountable to the UN General Assembly.

The high-speed elevator, now filling with passengers speaking diverse languages, now discharging them, took us to the 29th and top floor of the Vienna International Center. IAEA Director Hans Blix met us at the threshold of his spacious office. Enormous windows opened up onto a picturesque panorama of the Danube with its islands and of the Viennese woods, spread out on the edge of which were the Grinzig Quarters, a cherished place for those who love to sit in the shade of chestnut trees with a small glass of new wine.

It was clear to us without being told, however, that Professor Blix could only dream just then of a carefree rest beneath the crowns of the centuries-old Grinzig chestnuts. The burden of important, usually urgent and difficult problems never leaves this heavyset and slow-moving Scandinavian for a minute. And perhaps the most important of them today is the Chernobyl disaster.

[Gubarev, Melnikov] Every report from the disaster area cannot fail to disturb us Soviet people. How much information is the IAEA receiving?

[Blix] I shall begin with something which might appear to have nothing directly to do with the function of the IAEA. I must mention that large group of journalists, who are not scientific specialists, a fact demonstrated in their articles. We frequently see articles published in the USSR and in other countries discussing events which are not linked to and cannot be linked to radiation. Photographs of some calves with six legs, for example. And it is not known whether or not this actually occurred because of the effects of radiation, for such calves are possible also in Australia and in Argentina.

The mass media in the most diverse nations are capable of publishing information representing the truth, half-truths or untruths. As a rule, scientists and technicians have no special training in expressing their thoughts precisely and with flawless style. The press seizes upon imprecisely formulated statements or information. And since journalists sometimes want the situation to appear more dramatic than it is and want people to snap up the newspapers and listen to the radio constantly, this paves the way for unsubstantiated, to put it mildly, sensational stories or "exposes."

[Gubarev, Melnikov] The purpose of our visit is to tell the PRAVDA readers about the expert assessment which will be made in Belorussia, the Ukraine and the RSFSR. We understand that the IAEA is the main participant in this project. Has there been anything of its kind in the agency's history?

[Blix] The Soviet Union put forth the idea of such an expert assessment. It first came up in May of last year. A request then came from the World Health Organization. Last summer three experts from WHO spend a week at Chernobyl and submitted a report. We asked whether our assistance or our participation were needed. The answer was affirmative. The scenario which we are now to follow gradually took shape during the discussion. While we were prepared to begin the project, we found that some [organizations] such as the IAEA did not want to work on it. This is why WHO and a number of other international organizations became involved. Unfortunately, we are familiar with the conventional thinking that the IAEA is made up of pronuclear people. This gave rise to the suggestion that other international organizations be included in the project.

From the very beginning, when we began planning things for the Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia, we wanted to clarify not what was of interest to your official authorities but what was of concern to the people affected by the accident themselves.

The international preparatory commission was assigned the job of determining the radiological aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, assessing its effects upon the health of people and the environment and evaluating measures to protect against the radiological effects of the accident

upon the life and health of the people and on agriculture. We set up an international committee, which included the best scientific forces on the planet familiar with such problems. The project was headed by Japanese Professor Shigematsu, director of a radiology research institute. There were also other experts in medicine and radiology. We sent a large team of experts to Kiev, Gomel, Minsk and several villages in the region. Our "envoys" went there to talk with local doctors, members of various organizations and ordinary people. All of this taken together will make it possible to obtain a clear concept of what questions are troubling the people and which they want answered. We decided to take radiation measurements and analyze them in our laboratories back in Vienna. We do not intend to duplicate and cannot duplicate the measurements taken back then by Soviet specialists. We do not suspect the Soviet authorities of any kind of falsification, of course. Our measurements are only one component of the work. We would not want people to say in the future that the IAEA fully accepted and did not verify the official information.

Then, last spring and summer, we sent a group of doctors to areas affected by the accident to visit hospitals, agricultural enterprises and so forth. We had to establish contacts with Soviet colleagues at our level in order to draw our own conclusions on the radiation effects upon the health of the people. We had to distinguish between possible effects of radiation and other illnesses not related to Chernobyl.

We cannot and will not draw conclusions until this expert appraisal is completed. We have discovered, however, that some of the data which we already have do not coincide with that for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We have discovered certain symptoms of psychological stress. It exists, after all. We have also noticed certain changes in the diet, which will be studied by specific groups of experts.

We are sending around 100 experts in all to the areas affected by the accident. In answer to your question, I can say that this is indeed the first such undertaking of its scale. The IAEA has never before undertaken anything like it. It is actually not even included in our budget. Typically, the experts we have gathered from various states are performing their work in the USSR without pay. The Soviet side is paying for the material and technical part of it.

I believe that we will have the first results this fall, in October or November. We hope to conduct an open conference in Kiev and Minsk, at which we will be able to discuss with local authorities and representatives of medical institutions and various organizations all of the issues which are evoking debate even among the scientists.

The radiologists, for example, believe that any increase in the radiation level poses an additional risk for people. This is true when the radiation level is very high. We have learned this from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We do

not know the effects of low levels of radiation, however. If we in fact adhere to this point of view, we shall discover, let us say, that the radiation level is significantly higher in Minsk than in New York, because it is higher above sea level.

I assume you know about the debate in the world about the figure of 35 bers [biological equivalent of roentgen effect]. Naturally, the scientists themselves can argue about what is a sufficiently low or high radiation level to which human beings may prudently be exposed. Do we need to move to the high mountains of Mexico, where the radiation level is higher? Is it reasonable to talk people into remaining in areas affected by Chernobyl radiation and not to evacuate? No one wants to leave his home parts, of course, but if the risk is great, it is preferable to abandon them. I am convinced that such questions should be discussed very honestly.

[Gubarev, Melnikov] We know that the IAEA has conducted an expert assessment of safety at nuclear power plants in France, the GDR, Sweden and the USSR. How do you assess the reaction to your findings in those nations and in ours?

[Blix] We have to distinguish between two different IAEA functions. We have the authority to inspect in matters of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. With respect to the safety of nuclear power plants, we do not have such authority. Our experts merely come and render their services by invitation. You are right when you say that we have visited many plants in the world. We have been in France, the USA and Japan several times. Groups of experts well familiar with the management and operation of the plants have been sent there. They ordinarily take 3 weeks and thoroughly check the processes involved in operating plants such as nuclear power plants. This does not involve technological expert appraisal or participation in the construction, however. The experts conclude their work by writing up reports and recommendations for improving the operation of the nuclear power plants and assuring their safety. I know that the experts are universally treated with trust and respect and their opinion is heeded, because their good training level is well known. And there is no shortage of requests for visits by the IAEA experts.

[Gubarev, Melnikov] There are people here who criticize the IAEA in connection with its expert assessment of the Gorkiy AEST [Nuclear Power and Heat Supply Plant]. Do they have the right to complain about the expert assessment of the plan for the Gorkiy Nuclear Power and Heat Supply Plant performed by the agency?

[Blix] There was no expert appraisal of the operational safety of the Gorkiy AEST, since the plant had not yet begun operating. This is a plant at which the experts also worked on questions pertaining to the construction and designing. We also do this when we receive a request. There have not been many such cases in the history of the IAEA, however. As an example, we were requested to make such an expert appraisal of the AES at Termelin in

Czechoslovakia to determine the degree of seismic danger and whether there was a danger in case of an earthquake. In general the agency tries to provide the services requested by various nations. As far as I know, there have been no reproaches or complaints about our experts.

[Gubarev, Melnikov] The IAEA is sometimes accused of "departmentalism," of having people with a vested interest working in it. Can they be objective?

[Blix] With respect to nuclear lobbyism, I am personally "pronuclear." The IAEA members include nations which are clearly antinuclear, however. Ireland and Denmark, for example, and even Austria, the country which hosts us. Our General Conference this year will be unable to adopt a unanimous decision recommending the use of nuclear energy. And if you look through or read my presentations, you will never find in them the statement that nuclear energy involves absolutely no risk. Like any other source, it is not risk-free in the area of energy production.

Why do I personally advocate the development of nuclear energy? Simply because it helps to keep the environment clean! It was not nuclear power engineering which resulted in major harm to the ecology in Europe, but mostly power engineering based on fossil fuels. The greenhouse effect is causing the greatest fear today, of course. We must reduce emissions of carbon dioxide by 60%. This could be achieved by reducing the burning of fossil fuels. The Greens maintain that this can be achieved by making more efficient use of solar and wind power and the energy of the biomass. I am totally in favor of using more energy from renewable sources. Economically this will not be enough, however. The only alternative to nuclear fuel are fossil fuels. Renewable sources of energy presently account for only 0.1%, and this is mainly not solar and not wind power but geothermal energy. Let us hope that the world is not still at this tenth of a percent by the year 2010.

[Gubarev, Melnikov] You once made a beautiful statement: "I am the 'greenest' of the 'greens.'" In connection with this, we would like to ask you the following: Do you remember our discussion of the Chernobyl accident in May 1986? Did you have an idea of its magnitude at that time? How has your assessment of that disaster changed today?

[Blix] At that time the amount of radiation in the air had been measured. Using those measurements, one could calculate the maximum number of people who would fall ill with cancer. I assume that there have been no changes in those calculations. We knew of the 30-kilometer zone but did not know how much time would be required for radioactive decontamination or for reducing the contamination. Nor did we know the level of radiation in other areas outside the 30-kilometer zone. In the Gomel area, for example. From information received from Sweden and other countries we learned what kind of rain was falling and where, and where the so-called "hot

spots" were. Neither we nor anyone else, I suggest, could have imagined that there would be such a drastic increase in the psychological effects of Chernobyl. I do not know whether much can be done in this respect. In my opinion, the main job of the independent expert commission is to determine the facts. I repeat: the facts! It is more than just a matter of dispassionate registration of the facts, however. We came up with the idea of distributing dosimeters in the villages, for example, and 4,000 were recently delivered. We try to provide the population with as much knowledge and specific information as possible on the occurrence. One should not forget, however, that this was the first accident of such magnitude, and it is doubtful that anyone could have predicted all of its consequences.

With respect to our missions, we at the IAEA will do our utmost to be honest in our expert assessments. Following the Chernobyl accident not enough was done precisely to give the facts to the people. The main goal which we are presently trying to achieve is therefore that of using the expert assessment to show that our conclusions are the truth and nothing but the truth. The people can believe that the best minds, honorable minds, have been assembled for the expert assessment. They will frankly announce what they have seen and learned.

When the Americans learned of the accident at the Three Mile Island AES, they doubted the objectivity of the published reports. This scepticism is repeated on a far greater scale in the Soviet society. I believe that most of your people can think for themselves, however. It is therefore useful to publish the facts.

[Gubarev, Melnikov] Do you believe that nuclear power engineering has already seen its most difficult times or is the peak of the difficulties in its development still ahead?

[Blix] I believe that the world will see a turnaround by 1995. There will be no new orders for nuclear enterprises in the next few years, of course. They will be built perhaps only in Japan, France and certain other nations. The situation will soon change, though.

I believe that the greenhouse effect and certain other problems will show us that the main choice is between nuclear energy and [fossil] fuels. People do not like either one. However, I suggest that we, as intelligent beings, will prefer the slight risk attendant to nuclear power engineering to the danger inherent in [fossil] fuel power engineering, which threatens the world of our children and the children of their children. I believe that they will turn to us and say: You nuclear power experts must further strengthen the safety of existing plants and close down those in whose safety you do not have complete confidence. Or else add equipment and gear at existing plants to bring them up to the modern level. Design new plants which are safer and more reliable. I also believe that the problem of waste safety will also be resolved by 1995.

From the editors: As in the past PRAVDA intends to conduct an honest and open discussion of all the issues

pertaining to the Chernobyl disaster. We would hope that when the independent commission completes its work, its participants will be able to address the parliaments of the USSR, Belorussia, the Ukraine and the RSFSR and report their findings.

Belorussian CP Official on Management of Chernobyl Cleanup

*90UN2285A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 19 Jun 90 pp 1,3*

[Interview with A.S. Kamay, second secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, deputy chairman of the KPB [Belorussian CP] Bureau and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Commission to Eliminate the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES, by BELTA correspondents Ya. Alekseychik and A. Kryzhanovskiy, under rubric "Special-Attention Zone": "Chernobyl: Tragedy, Pain, Search, Hopes"]

[Text] [Correspondents] Aleksey Stepanovich, at the session of Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, you made a proposal to require USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry to compensate for the material damages incurred by Belorussia as a result of the accident at the fourth unit of the Chernobyl AES, and in the event that that department refused to do so to appeal to the USSR Supreme Court. Judging by the reaction in the auditorium, that opinion was supported by the deputies. It has been met by the approval of public opinion in our republic. But hasn't there been a delay with this posing of the question?

[A. Kamay] Much has been said about the Chernobyl disaster. The echo of that misfortune will also be heard in the third millenium. Incidentally, in evaluations of this kind I cannot compete with the journalists, writers, and scientists, but as a person who possesses a rather large amount of information, I can clarify many things.

The losses of the republic's national wealth are so great that one can scarcely think of compensating for them completely. Because almost one-fifth of the territory of Belorussian SSR, where more than two million people live, was subjected to radioactive contamination.

The worst economic damage as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES was incurred by our agriculture. In the Belorussian SSR Gosagroprom system alone, the shortfall of output in 1986-1989 is estimated to be 2.355 billion rubles, and during the current year more than 960 million rubles. Almost 300,000 hectares of agricultural land were put out of circulation. The system of animal and vegetable husbandry that had been formed in the republic was disturbed, and it was necessary to carry out the urgent respecialization of agricultural production. The forced application of deep plowing on the fields led to the disturbing of the fertile stratum of the soil, the restoring of which requires many years. In Braginskiy Rayon, the standard peat bogs, which are the best in

Belorussia, were taken out of use. Considerable expenditures were required to carry out a series of decontamination operations to reclaim the agriculture. There arose a need for additional equipment and for its more rapid replacement.

But what about the structures intended for production and social-cultural purposes that remain in the appropriated zone, and the roads that have to be resurfaced? Their cost is tremendous. And how does one pay compensation for the impossibility of using a forest, a meadow, or a river?

I have mentioned only a few of the things that were brought to the Belorussian land by the Chernobyl atom that got out of control. But even this is completely sufficient to raise at the republic's Supreme Soviet the question of having USSR Atomic Power Engineering and Industry compensate the nation of Soviet Belorussia for the damages connected with the accident at the Chernobyl AES. I feel that it is necessary legislatively and at the level of USSR Supreme Soviet to determine precisely the total amount of those damages, so that it will not be necessary every year to prove at union agencies how much money the republic needs to eliminate the consequences of the disaster. Unfortunately, this has to be done even now, when our program has been approved. Therefore, I emphasize, it is necessary at the parliamentary level to establish the damages and to demand compensation for them. And also, why shouldn't that department—which, incidentally, has a rather large amount of currency—allocate part of it voluntarily to equip medical institutions, to purchase medicines, and to render other assistance to children and all the inhabitants of the rayons that suffered? But it seems that that ministry does not feel any moral responsibility for what happened. As for the deadlines for initiating legal action, I shall answer the question with another question: who in the republic, four or three years ago, knew what amount of money they should ask for in their suit? Because in order to know that it is necessary scientifically to evaluate the entire volume of losses, to have a program for compensating for the damages that were incurred. I think that debating today what the deadline is for raising the question means forgetting the main factor and being diverted to the side.

[Correspondents] Since the first days of the accident, Aleksey Stepanovich, you were where the misfortune had happened, with those who were combatting it. Alongside of the scientists, military, and the ministers, you participated repeatedly in the work of the operational group of the Politburo of CPSU Central Committee. And are we correct in thinking that you are ready to answer why many measures proved to be delayed?

[A. Kamay] First of all, I want to say this: I am convinced that the accident became the consequence of the irresponsibility and criminally negligent attitude taken by the administrators of the station, Minenergo, Minsredmash, and Gosatomenergondzor to questions of nuclear safety; the low demandingness toward the cadres

with regard to the observance of technological discipline and the procedure for operating the reactor units; the lagging behind in scientific research in a number of problems; and the unsatisfactory fulfillment of decisions by the party and government concerning the guaranteeing of the high reliability of the operation of the nuclear power plants.

I feel that the assertions made by the administrators of Minsredmash and USSR Academy of Sciences concerning the absolute reliability of the reactors that were operating at the nuclear power plants disoriented the cadres, and to a large extent contributed to the sloppiness and complacency of the ministries and departments and the Soviet agencies, and to the weakness of civil defense and radiation medicine, and led to a lack of measures to respond to emergency situations and a lack of highly effective methods and means of decontamination.

Then, when the misfortune occurred, that also decisively influenced the making of decisions.

Judge for yourself. Six days after the Chernobyl accident, the country's government issued an order concerning the evacuation of people from the 30-kilometer zone. Are we really supposed to believe that at that time USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Defense, and specialists did not know what quantity of radio nuclides had already been spewed into the air, what their percentages and structures were, what the wind pattern was and where it was likely that there would be fallout onto the ground and contamination of the territory, or what the consequences could be? I think that they was no way that they could have failed to know this. And if indeed they did not know it, then this is even worse. I am mentioning this because the area and perimeter of the zone were determined imprecisely. Subsequently, on the territory of Gomel Oblast alone, it was necessary in 1986 to carry out two additional evacuations of people.

[Correspondents] Do you have any serious claims against the scientists?

[A. Kamay] When you think over what you have lived through, what you have experienced, and when you evaluate the situation today, you can say that all of us have traveled the path from the minimal radiation knowledge dealing with civil defense to serious scientific approaches to radiological problems, but, most importantly, we have traveled the path from disorganized, frequently inconsistent governmental decisions and recommendations by scientists and specialists to the republic-level, and then union-level State Program, adopted by USSR Supreme Soviet, for eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

I think that now, four years later, we can objectively and without any prejudice consider how time-responsively and consistently the practical tasks of eliminating the

consequences of the accident were carried out during the first days and months after it occurred. This is how it happened.

By 27 April, on the territory of Braginskiy, Narovlyanskiy, and Khoynikskiy rayons, 62 civil-defense radiation and chemical observation stations were set up. By the end of 29 April, 654 of them were already operating on the territory of Gomel Oblast.

On the farms adjacent to the nuclear power station, agricultural field operations were discontinued. By the end of the day on 1 May, we evacuated children and pregnant women from 25 populated places and housed them in sanatoriums and dispensaries in Gomel Oblast.

On the territory of Gomel Oblast, in the three southern rayons, medical treatment was provided to 115,500 persons. But today it is completely obvious that the deadlines for carrying out those measures should have been more rigid, and the scope should have been many times greater. The republic's Minzdrav, although it did undertake energetic measures, proved to be unready for that emergency situation.

In conformity with the government's 2 May 1986 decree, the evacuation of the population began, and by the end of the day on 5 May it was practically completed in Gomel Oblast. The population in 50 populated places was evacuated from the 30-kilometer zone.

On 6-7 May children and pregnant women from all the populated places in Braginskiy, Khoynikskiy, and Narovlyanskiy rayons were evacuated and housed in pioneer camps, dispensaries, and sanatoriums in the oblast. Subsequently they were all sent to sanatoriums and rest homes in Minsk, Grodno, Brest, and Vitebsk oblasts.

The radiation situation was monitored by subdivisions of USSR Gosgidromet, USSR Academy of Sciences and Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Defense, Gosagroprom, and other departments. On the basis of their data, a determination was made in the country of the level of the maximum admissible load on people during the first year after the accident of no more than 10 rems. It was established that that indicator during the first year, with the existing nature of the contamination, corresponds to a radiation level of 5 milliroentgens an hour as of 10-11 May 1986. In conformity with this decision of the USSR and Belorussian SSR government, in Gomel Oblast from 3 June through 9 June the population was evacuated from 28 additional populated places in Braginskiy, Khoynikskiy, and Narovlyanskiy rayons.

The scientists continued to refine the radiation situation. First they determined the limits of the rigid monitoring levels, beyond which habitation is impossible. These are, first of all, such criteria as 0.1 curie per square kilometer for plutonium, and 3 curies per square kilometer for strontium. As a result, on the territory of Gomel Oblast,

in effect, two appropriated zones were formed. In September, the population was evacuated from 29 additional populated places.

During 1986 as a whole, in Gomel Oblast the inhabitants were evacuated from 107 populated places—a total of 24,700 persons.

In conformity with the dosimetric-monitoring data that was received at that time, by the 11 June 1986 decree of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers dealing with the finding of jobs and providing of housing and social and everyday services for the population of Gomel Oblast that had been evacuated from the zone of the Chernobyl AES, a list of farms and populated places where it was planned to build settlements for the evacuated population was prepared and submitted to Gosstroy. As for Mogilev Oblast, in 1986 the population was not evacuated, since those indicators for the radiation level there were lower. Construction of housing was not carried out in that oblast.

During 1986 and the first half of 1987, on the territory of Gomel Oblast, almost 10,000 apartments were built in 169 populated places; a large number of schools, children's preschool institutions, enterprises for public nutrition and trade, and institutions serving everyday and cultural needs were erected; and steps were taken to find jobs for the able-bodied population.

The fact that the evacuation zone was initially defined imprecisely is attested to by the following situation. After the refinement of the radiation situation and the carrying out of a large volume of work to decontaminate the area, 1612 inhabitants of 12 populated places in Braginskiy Rayon were re-evacuated to their previous places of residence. The criterion that we were guided by for the contaminated territories for the safe habitation by the public had been approved by the center.

During the years that have elapsed, more than 3.5 billion rubles were expended for the republic as a whole to eliminate the consequences of the accident. More than 12,000 homes and apartments, and hundreds of structures intended for cultural-everyday and municipal needs, were built for the evacuated population and the population being resettled. First-priority operations were carried out to improve the contaminated populated places and to decontaminate their territories, and to improve the medical, trade, everyday, and municipal services provided to the population that had suffered. A series of agrotechnical, agricultural-reclamation, and other measures were carried out.

Apparently, no one will deny that all this made it possible to reduce considerably the possible load upon people's organism. But that conclusion definitely does not give anyone any right to be complacent.

[Correspondents] You have touched upon the question of the operations to decontaminate the area. Different opinions, which are at times mutually exclusive, exist concerning the desirability of carrying them out...

[A. Kamay] Yes, I did encounter different points of view, and harsh criticism of these measures.

In Gomel Oblast, the decontamination operations began on 10 May 1986. They were carried out only in the three southern rayons. For 1986 as a whole, a total of 246 populated places were decontaminated; 31,750 homes, 125 schools, 94 children's preschool institutions, and 24,000 hectares of terrain were processed; and approximately 6 million cubic meters of dirt were removed and buried. Operations were carried out to decontaminate the roads, streets, and equipment.

In Mogilev Oblast in Krasnopol'skiy, Cherikovskiy, and Kostyukovichskiy rayons, in 1986 decontamination operations were carried out in 20 populated places, 1687 homes, 38 schools, and 20 children's preschool institutions, and approximately 300,000 cubic meters of dirt were removed and carried away. In Brest Oblast during the first year after the accident no decontamination operations were carried out.

With all the criticism of the decontamination operations, with all the shortcomings that occurred while they were being carried out (including the lack of a scientific base), it must nevertheless be admitted that the comprehensive decontamination, with the improvement of the populated places, made it possible to lower the level of contamination in the territory by one-third to one-half.

The decontamination operations are also being carried out at the present time. The operations to provide sanitation processing and amenities for the populated places will have to be carried out on the entire territory with a radioactive-contamination density of one or more curies per square kilometer.

[Correspondents] But let's return to science again. We have heard repeatedly that there were no scientific priorities in the republic. But it was specifically the Belorussian scientists who, earlier than the other ones, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to carry out radical measures. And the scientists themselves assert that practically from the very first days they informed the government about everything and proposed taking more radical steps.

[A. Kamay] Once again I would like to answer with a question: what scientific recommendation did the authorities fail to fulfill, particularly the authorities in Gomel Oblast? I'll give the answer: none.

The Belorussian scientists did have information, but it basically contained data concerning the refinement of the radiation situation in individual territories and populated places. There was no well-formed conception, and it must be noted that there isn't any to this day. Apparently for that reason today the practical workers who engage in eliminating the consequences of the accident are making claims primarily against fundamental science. Because the fact is that during all the four years after Chernobyl USSR Academy of Sciences did not make a statement concerning a single major question on

which the branch scientific subdivisions had made their conclusions and recommendations.

At the first stage of the elimination of the consequences of the accident, unfortunately, not even our own republic academy had any clear-cut evaluations of the situation or any recommendations. This, for example, is what was recommended in the 14 May 1986 memorandum of the Belorussian CP Central Committee that was signed by 12 scientists from Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences: "A first-priority task is the need for the complete medical-radiological study of a limited group of persons who were evacuated from the evacuation zone, by using SICH [human radiation counter] units that are at the disposal of the Institute of Biophysics, USSR Minzdrav and the Institute of Medical Radiology, USSR Minzdrav. It is necessary to establish scientifically substantiated time standards for the content of the basic radioactively dangerous isotopes in the soil, vegetation, water, and food products, and to monitor strictly their observance in places where people reside..." (Who is supposed to establish them? The departments?...) And it was not until 25 April 1989, above the signature of Academician V. P. Platonov, president of Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, that the decision of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences presidium's bureau on questions linked with the scientific research on the problems of eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident on the territory of Belorussian SSR was submitted. It was not until three years later that we received from Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences any meaningful considerations of the Chernobyl problem. A considerable contribution to this study was made by the Institute of Radiobiology and its director, Ye. F. Konoplya.

All the measures to protect people against radiation, and the evaluation of their effectiveness, are carried out today on the basis of data provided by scientific institutions and the radiation-monitoring system that was created by the republic's ministries and departments. At the present time research on problems of radiation is being carried out at 19 academic institutes of Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, 10 institutes of Belorussian SSR Minzdrav, and 9 institutes in the Belorussian SSR Gosagroprom system. Institutes that have been specially created are the Institute of Radiobiology, Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences; and the Institute of Radiation Medicine, with a clinic and dispensary subdivision, and branches in Gomel and Mogilev. The Belorussian Branch of the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Agricultural Radiology has been formed in Gomel.

However, unfortunately, until the present day no one—not USSR Academy of Sciences, or our republic academy, or Minzdrav, or Goskomgidromet, or the other departments—have worked out an integrated conception of the comprehensive medical-biological, social, psychological, and economic rehabilitation of the persons living on the contaminated territories. They have not yet succeeded in merging together the available data concerning the radiological situation, or in coordinating

their approaches to evaluating the degree of danger or the possibility of human habitation in each specific populated place. The republic has approximately 2700 such settlements. And our scientists' first-priority task is to prepare, in the shortest periods of time, radioecological data sheets for each populated place, with findings concerning the possibility of safe habitation, and also with a list of the necessary steps the fulfillment of which will assure the creation of such conditions.

[Correspondents] Aleksey Stepanovich, in July 1987 the operational group of the Politburo of CPSU Central Committee defined the status of the evacuation zone. Since that time the bureaus of the party's Gomel and Mogilev obkoms have expressed demands concerning the creation of a special-purpose state program for eliminating the consequences of the accident. But, all things considered, wasn't it possible even then to discern disorganization and contradictions among the many recommendations and problems on this score?

[A. Kamay] In general, yes. After the accident and the making of the decision to evacuate people from the 30-kilometer zone, when it was necessary to act in a precise and well-coordinated manner, in general everyone did indeed act in that manner, although with certain inevitable mistakes, but in a sufficiently responsible way. Rapidly, albeit with certain rough spots that were subsequently eliminated, settlements were erected for the persons who had been resettled. I am well aware of this. I myself was a direct participant in those many-faceted complicated events. It was not until later on, when the first emergency measures to save people had already been taken jointly by us and the republic agencies, that we saw the appearance of various state commissions, "well-wishers," and advisors from the interested union ministries and departments. There also appeared the theory that in the zone of permanent (rigid) monitoring, with 15-40 or more curies per square kilometer for cesium, resettlement was not desirable, and that it was allegedly possible to get by with the shipping in of pure food products, the decontamination of the populated places, and the organizing of paid vacations and medical treatment for the population, especially the children, outside the confines of the particular zone. I shall state frankly that such recommendations, supported by names and high titles that are well-known in the scientific world, exerted an influence not only upon our decisiveness, but also on all our actions. You might recall that during the first two years after the accident the country's government showed a large amount of concern for the situation that had developed. Gomel Oblast was visited by N. I. Ryzhkov, V. M. Chebrikov, V. P. Nikonov, V. I. Dolgikh, and V. S. Murakhovskiy, and was also visited frequently by deputy chairmen of USSR Council of Ministers. Many questions were resolved in a time-responsive manner, and the population met this understandingly. But later on, when a certain conception triumphed, people began listening less to us, and with less understanding. It became more difficult to knock on many office doors, and the sharp criticism there did not

receive the proper reaction. I want to emphasize that the events should be evaluated specifically in the context of the radiological evaluations of that time.

The Belorussian state program to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident was developed with a consideration of the new criteria for the safe life-support of the population residing on the contaminated territory, that take into consideration both the level of the radiation load on the population throughout their life, and the level of contamination of the territory with radio nuclides (15 or more curies per square kilometer). It is on the basis of these criteria that people are evacuated and a series of other socioeconomic and rehabilitation measures are carried out. Essentially speaking, this is a series of measures that include: raising the level of medical service and the improvement of the life of the population, primarily the children; the re-specialization and the bringing of the technology in the branches of the agroindustrial complex and the processing branches into conformity with the requirements dictated by the conditions for radioactive contamination, with the purpose of producing pure output; the providing of the population with pure food products; the organization at the required level of the scientific support of the problems that are linked with normal vital activity in the contaminated rayons; and many, many other things.

A large amount of work, a very large number of complicated and unique problems lie ahead of us. They can be divided into two groups. The first group is made up of the problems that should be resolved strictly within the established time limits. I am talking about the evacuation of the population from the zone where the radiation level is more than 40 curies per square kilometer for cesium and where the load on the organism can exceed calculated 35 rems during a 70-year lifetime, and the evacuation from the zone with 15-40 curies per square kilometer of women with small children, pregnant women, and, in general, persons with medical contraindications or those who wish to leave. The second group is made up of everything that has to be done to resolve the problem of the safe habitation by the population on the contaminated territory with one or more curies per square kilometer.

Enough has already been stated about the deadlines for resettlement, and I shall not repeat those statements. I shall note only that, as of today, 2996 families have been required to evacuate the zone. For the most part, they have been set up in the safe rayons of Gomel, Mogilev, and Minsk oblasts. The evacuees in the first stage will receive the remaining housing in clean zones of Gomel, Mogilev, and Brest oblasts, where 45 modern rural settlements are being built. This will make it possible to resolve the problem of evacuating the inhabitants from the zone with 40 or more curies per square kilometer not in 1991, as is stipulated by the program, but during the current year. At the same time, having recently visited Krasnopol'skiy and Kostyukovich'skiy rayons, I conclude

that the Bureau of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the republic's government must begin immediately to make a major improvement in all the work of building the housing. The delays and the irresponsibility in this matter are inadmissible.

Additional steps were taken to evacuate ahead of anyone else the families with children aged up to 14 years, pregnant women, and persons with medical contraindications from the populated places in the permanent-monitoring zone (15-40 curies per square kilometer). By a joint decision of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, and Belsovprof, it is planned to allocate in 1990 and the first quarter of 1991 as much as 20 percent of the housing area being activated in the republic, with the mandatory compensation of the capital investments to the local soviets and organizations in the next year. That will be an additional 7418 apartments and homes.

In order to accelerate the resolution of the problem, there has been a reduction in the volume of construction-and-installation operations at projects intended for production purposes. Assignments have been given to the construction ministries to construct, with the use of the economized funds, 1110 additional apartments for the families being resettled. It is also planned to erect this year, by using the in-house method, apartment houses with 2000 additional apartments for resettled individuals.

Computations indicate that the republic has the opportunity to fulfill all the assignments of the state program for resettling the former inhabitants of the 15-40 curies per square kilometer zone as early as 1992, that is, three years earlier. The most important thing is that we must work persistently and aggressively in this direction.

In addition to the resettlement problems, the questions of the social protection of people are no less critical. These problems include, first of all, problems of providing medical services to the population in the territories that have been contaminated by radio nuclides. They also include the shortage and the large turnover rate of medical personnel; the lack of the necessary medical equipment and medicines at many medical-prevention and treatment institutions; and the insufficient rate at which the former inhabitants of the rayons that have suffered, and especially children and adolescents, are being provided with trip tickets to sanatoriums and health resorts.

Unfortunately, because of the sluggishness of Belsovprof and the construction organizations, there have been no extended efforts to erect the recuperation base that was stipulated by the state program: sanatoriums with accommodations for 1500 parents and children; children's sanatoriums to accommodate 1000 children; and pioneer camps to accommodate 60,000 children.

When speaking about the fact the people of Chernobyl need the state's social protection, we must be completely aware of two factors. First, this can be provided only by

the purposeful, comprehensive policy of the country's government and the AUCCTU in the job of improving the health of the entire population of the rayons that suffered. Secondly, this requires a law governing the social protection of the people who suffered from the Chernobyl disaster.

From whatever direction we approach the problems of Chernobyl, we must have just one goal: to avoid every risk, and to do everything possible and necessary to preserve the health of the present and subsequent generations, to create safe conditions for human habitation.

But I cannot fail to mention also the fact that individual citizens, with the purpose of making their presence known, of somehow coming out into the forefront in the present sociopolitical situation, have begun spreading various kinds of conjectures and rumors. Unfortunately, the topic of Chernobyl is not always reflected effectively, with professional efficiency or consistency, in the mass media. There have been instances when, instead of a businesslike discussion about the real situation in the outlying areas and about the methods and means of resolving the problems, the preference is given to the emotions and no effort is made to rebuff the demagogues, political instigators, and speculators. It is necessary for all of us to work very aggressively to help every individual, and the entire population in the republic, to have a thorough understanding of the ecological and sociopsychological situation, and to help people to act correctly, guided by the scientific criteria and the specialists' recommendations. We must not allow the population's low level of radiation literacy to be used to incite mental and emotional tension in society.

[Correspondents] Aleksey Stepanovich, dozens of people have been expelled from the party, or have received reprimands with the formulation "as a result of the political immaturity and faint-heartedness demonstrated during the elimination of the consequences of the accident." Isn't it time to return to a review of these personal files?

[A. Kamay] The review of questions concerning expulsion from the party, as well as the questions concerning the restitution of persons to its ranks, must always be carried out in a completely individual manner. This is an immutable norm in party life. But let us deal with the specific instances that you have mentioned. In 1986 (after the accident) and in 1987, 19 persons were expelled from the party in Narovlyanskiy Rayon; 11 in Khoynikskiy Rayon; and one person in Braginskiy Rayon. During that time, respectively, 482, 719, and 833 Communists were removed from the rolls and left the confines of those rayons. In Mogilev Oblast during that period, 48 persons were expelled from the CPSU in Krasnopol'skiy Rayon; 29 in Kostyukovichskiy Rayon; and 3 in Slavgorodskiy Rayon; and, respectively, 121, 116, and 135 persons left those rayons. As you can see, there was no wholesale approach.

But in this regard I would like to consider the question that has been raised from a different point of view—the moral one. Is it befitting for a Communist, in a situation when others are saving people, to be faint-hearted about what motivations he is being guided by?

Every Communist who feels that the question of his membership in the party was incorrectly resolved has the opportunity to appeal to a party agency or to the 31st Belorussian CP Congress or the 28th CPSU Congress, requesting the re-examination of his personal file.

[Correspondents] Do you feel that a temporary commission to investigate the reasons for maintaining secrecy about the scope of the tragedy that occurred should be created under the Supreme Soviet?

[A. Kamay] I am in favor of giving complete publicity to everything that we knew and the standards and decisions that guided us. I see that a considerable number of cadres, scientists, and specialists who, by touch, began unselfishly to eliminate the consequences of the accident and to save people are today being subjected to the critical fire of persons who sat things out on the sidelines or of political instigators. With hindsight we have all become more intelligent, more efficient, more sober-minded, and more cautious, but back then life required us to make decisions with the rather meager knowledge that we had at our disposal. Truth must triumph, even tardily. Nor should the country's government remain silent about this question.

If I may speak very frankly, I will say that apparently I have a greater self-interest than others in this kind of commission, because a rather large number of accusations of various kinds have been directed personally to me. But they are accusations that I cannot accept. There were miscalculations and mistakes, but when we were in Gomel Oblast my comrades and I were trying to give our maximum effort, guided by the radiological criteria for the protection of the population.

[Correspondents] Yes, the mail that we receive also includes letters that criticize you...

[A. Kamay] You mean that all these letters are critical?

[Correspondents] No, not all of them. For example, V. A. Fedosov, of Mozyr, wrote us that he reject the wholesale censuring of all the workers in the party apparatus. He respects many for their honesty and decency, and he mentioned among them Gorbachev, Kamay, and the late Mazurov...

[A. Kamay] Thank you, Comrade Fedosov, for your kind word. But, if I may continue the thought that was begun, I would like to say that I have a self-interest in evaluating all the actions during that complicated period. As a human being, it is also difficult for me to walk around burdened down by undeserved accusations.

[Correspondents] In this instance, please allow us to ask one more question that may be somewhat personal for you. When we were in Gomel Oblast recently, we heard

statements made by the current administrators of the oblast to the effect that their conscience, from the point of view of the actions undertaken to eliminate the consequences of the nuclear accident, is as pure as a baby's tears. We also heard those words in your presence. But at that time everyone was working together, and, moreover, under your guidance. How, then, does one differentiate between blame and innocence?

[A. Kamay] I believe in people's common sense. Life will put everything in its proper place.

Shortage of Dosimeters Reported

90UN2517A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
7 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with I.I. Velikoivanenko, chief of the production department of the Kiev enterprise of the All-Union Association "Izotop," by V. Zorya: "Chernobyl Problems; They've Stopped Accepting Orders"]

[Text] We described in detail how to purchase a dosimeter in the interview "Kontroler v...karmane" [A Monitor in...One's Pocket] (21 March). Following this publication, the Kiev inter-republic enterprise of the all-union association "Izotop," was literally swamped with orders from those wishing to acquire the "Bella" home dosimeter. The number of requests received, it was learned later, was roughly equal to the two-year manufacturing program for this type of instrument.

"Since 1 June," says I.I. Velikoivanenko, chief of the production department of the Kiev enterprise of the All-Union Association "Izotop," "we have been forced to temporarily suspend acceptance of orders for our instruments. First of all I would like to offer apologies in the name of Izotop to those who have sent us letters in recent weeks: they can be taken into consideration only as orders for 1992. But as before, the citizens of 'strict' radiation monitoring, who appealed to us in mid-May, can count upon our swift cooperation. Unfortunately, among those 'first in line,' there are quite a few who did not provide complete information, or it was illegible. We simply cannot fulfill that portion of the orders."

[Zorya] Ivan Ivanovich, clearly such a demand was not anticipated, and it greatly exceeded the supply. Why then is production volume for domestic dosimeters growing so slowly?

[Velikoivanenko] It is growing faster than it seems. Beginning in 1990, hundreds of thousands of instruments will be produced annually in the country. It is another matter that they are not freely sold in the Ukraine, even four years after the Chernobyl disaster. In my opinion, it was Ukrainian SSR Gosnab that made an error. First of all, in that it has underestimated the demand. Unfortunately, Izotop's report on guaranteed demand for a half-million dosimeters in the republic was not brought to the attention of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers. And secondly, Gosnab overestimated the prospects for and the period of the start of

wide-scale production of the instruments in the Ukraine. And when delays arose here, it was decided to request of the center for the initial period only 3,000 Bella indicators. As it turns out, that's a drop in a bucket! They should have asked for at least 20 or 30 thousand... And that is why the basic amount of the instruments produced this year will be realized not at our place, but in neighboring Belorussia, in spite of the fact that they long ago began serial production there of local design.

[Zorya] But what will Izotop's contribution be?

[Velikoivanenko] Our association will assist in production of dosimeters, completing their most important components—the gas-discharge counters. In addition, Izotop will soon be receiving simple warning indicators costing up to 60 rubles from national sources. It is planned to sell these instruments via culinary wares stores in retail trade, and by collective orders (on payment in cash). One can already inspect sample instruments in our show-room (Kiev, 152 Gorkiy St.). We anticipate that they will be of particular interest to the rural residents in the areas which suffered most from the Chernobyl AES disaster.

In short, Izotop is fully aware that domestic dosimeters and radioactivity meters will be urgently needed for a long time to come. And the onset of balance between supply and demand in this question can, unfortunately, be expected no earlier than three or four years hence.

Additional Compensation to Chernobyl Victims

90UN2517B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
10 Jul 90 p 1

[Report by Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Information Sector: "Additional Benefits to Victims of Chernobyl Disaster"]

[Text] The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers has adopted two resolutions, through which additional benefits shall accrue to the populace, who were victims of the results of the disaster at the Chernobyl AES.

Country-style homes with outbuildings from the state or public housing supply, into which citizens from the territory subjected to radioactive contamination moved in the years 1986-1990, or will be moving into, shall be transferred to them free of charge as their personal property.

The cost of the housing thus turned over, built or purchased by enterprises and organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, shall be compensated for by means of funds earmarked for the liquidation of the results of the disaster at the Chernobyl AES.

The aforementioned citizens, who built or acquired country-style homes with outbuildings at their own expense in rural areas and urban-type settlements, shall be compensated for their cost, which shall be determined

according to established procedure by appraisal commissions of the executive committees of local Soviets of People's Deputies.

Free supplies of medication with a doctor's prescription or free ambulatory treatment has been established for that portion of the populace living in the populated places subjected to radioactive contamination, as defined in Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and Ukrainian Trade Union Council Resolution No 315 of 14 December 1989, along with the subsequent amendments; and also for those citizens evacuated in 1986, who received a dose of radiation of the thyroid gland that exceeds the allowable.

For this purpose, the Zhitomir, Kiev, Rovno and Chernigov Oblast Ispolkoms have been allocated funds in the amount of nearly 2.7 million rubles.

Ukrainian 'Green' Party Manifesto

90UN2483A Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian No 29, 19 July 90 p 6

[Speech by Yu.M. Shcherbak: "Manifesto of the Ukrainian 'Green' Party"]

[Text] We, the citizens of Ukraine,

- having become aware of our responsibility to our native land and our people in this dire time of historical trial;
- understanding the depth of the political, ideological, economic, ecological, social, and national crises, which have gripped the Soviet Union;
- having the conviction that the existence of the totalitarian pseudo-socialistic empire in the Stalinist-Brezhnevite mold, led by a single party is no longer possible;
- looking forward the ideals of the spiritual and physical rebirth of our people, to a worthy sovereign status in the world, one which is insured by means of all the international standards, which apply to human rights;
- aspiring to put an end to the complete destruction of our native, Ukrainian environment—our steppes and hill, rivers and forests, our cultural and historical heritage—everything which was everlastingly bequeathed to us by God as the Ukrainian people's domestic hearth;
- believing in the need to undertake political action to defend of the people and the natural environment in which they live;
- upholding the principles of humanizing, democratizing, de-ideologizing, and de-militarizing society on the basis of positions of ecological thinking and ecological ethics,

WE ARE SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMING THE CREATION OF THE UKRAINIAN "GREEN" PARTY

Henceforth we are entering Ukraine's political arena in order to struggle to gain a better status for our people and our environment. We are proposing to cooperate in good faith with all the constructive and democratic forces in Ukraine, which aspire [to the goal] of renewing our land.

The Ukrainian "Green" Party rejects all the misanthropic, ideological dogmas of class struggle, national and racial animosity.

Setting forth as its goal the creation of a society that has a sense of ecological solidarity, in which the interests of the individual, of every social and professional group of citizens of every nation will be harmoniously united with the higher laws of Nature's biosphere, the Ukrainian "Green" Party is resolutely rejecting the use of violence as a method to attain its projected goals.

The color of blood will never be on our flags!

Chains and barbed wire will never become symbols of our political beliefs! No bloody tyrant will ever become our spiritual leader!

We are calling on peasants and workers, scientific-technical and artistic intelligentsia, the residents of cities and villages, women and men, the youth, and older people to join our ranks. We are calling on all the unfortunates, those, in need of mercy, and those, who aspire to express their mercy to people and nature. We are calling on people of all nationalities, of all faiths and various world views. We are calling on free-willed citizens, who live on the territory of Ukraine from Kharkiv to Lviv, from Kiev to Odessa, from Donetsk to Simferopol, from Zaporizhzhya to Uzhhorod to join the Party of the "Greens."

Our goal is not divide Ukraine into little bits, not to sow discord among whoever lives in our land, but to unite all the citizens of Ukraine and those, who live beyond its borders, around our party's green flag, around the idea of the humanity's survival, the people of the nation's survival, of saving our ecology for the future.

The Ukrainian "Green" Party is a party for those people who want to remove themselves and their children from the ominous cloud of Chernobyl, from the shadow of chemical and radioactive death, for those who want to see Ukraine green, flowering, flowing with water, as an eternal, genuinely sovereign European nation—in the common home of free and happy people.

Whoever loves his native land, can become a member of PZU [The Ukrainian "Green" Party].

Whoever respects an individual as a creation of God, the most responsible part of Nature, can become a member of PZU. Whoever personally regards freedom, honesty and decency, the right to have independent thoughts and beliefs, can become a member of PZU. Whoever opposes the principles of political terror and state violence, can become a member of PZU. Whoever aspires to gain

radical changes in the economic, political, social life of the country can become a member of the Ukrainian "Green" Party.

Citizens, brothers and sisters!

We are calling on you to morally and materially support the Ukrainian "Green" Party—a party [advocating] community peace, a party [advocating] ecological justice and a thriving society.

The Ukrainian "Green" Party proclaims its existence—from today on and forever!

[Read by Yu. M. Shcherbak on 22 April, 1990 at a meeting dedicated to EARTH DAY]

Ukrainian 'Green' Party Draft Statute

[90UN2483B Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian No 29, 19 July 90 p 6]

[Manifesto: "Project: A Statute of the Ukrainian 'Green' Party"]

[Summary] I. GENERAL REGULATIONS

1. The Ukrainian "Green" Party (PZU) is a voluntary political organization, which unites the citizens in Ukraine for the purpose of preserving a free and healthy life for people in an ecologically clean environment, for preserving Ukraine's environment from the negative affects of economic and political developments. PZU supports the cause of renewing the environment, culture, and freedom of Ukraine by means [fostering] a developing democracy, humanism, and demilitarization of society.

2. PZU acts on the basis of democratic self-administration in accordance to the statutes and programs and the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. The statutes and programs of PZU are to be passed at the party's founding congress.

3. The founding principles of PZU are being proclaimed in the party's manifesto and program.

4. PZU is cooperating with the association "Green World," state, party and community movements in Ukraine, other republics and nations, and the Ukrainian diaspora.

6. [as published] The association "Green World" remains a non-party organization, an unregulated mass organization.

II. MEMBERSHIP IN PZU

1. Members of PZU can be full-aged (from 16 years on) citizens of Ukraine, who participate in party organization activities, adhere to the PZU statute and program requirements, and act in accordance to party decisions, and pay their party dues.

2. In order to join PZU each citizen should write a statement. Membership begins with the moment of acceptance.

3. At the first stage (before the congress) in order to create a party organization in centers, districts, city, oblast, and regional organizations or in centers associated with "Green World," PZU initiative groups are being formed, which will accept statements from people desiring to make them and carry out resolutions concerning accepting people into the party.

After the formation of the party organization, its general meetings will take place, at which its head, secretary, and treasurer will be chosen. At this stage, the head and secretary are delegated to attend the oblast party conference. The first party organization registers itself, if there are no less than five individuals in its ranks.

4. At the second stage of decisions regarding acceptance of citizens to PZU, the first organization is chosen at general meetings by a majority vote. If the party organization rejects an accepted candidate, the candidate has the right to protest to the party's oblast governing body, where a legal commission will be examine his case.

5. Membership in the party ends in the case of leaving it or being expelled, and also for not paying membership dues for a period of two years. In order to leave the party, it is necessary to make a written statement to the PZU party organization or club.

6. A member of the party can be expelled for acts that are at odds with the party's philosophic principles and statute and for discrediting the party. Only the PZU oblast governing body can expel someone from the party [acting on] a statement from the central organization.

III. THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS OF PZU

1. Each member of the party has the right to:

- choose and be chosen to all the party organs;
- cooperate in working out all the resolutions and decrees of the party, statute, and program;
- create together with other members problem-solving groups on any level;
- express and uphold his views;
- participate in all the party actions;
- receive full information about PZU activity;
- receive the party's support in elections to councils at all levels;

2. Each member of the party is obligated to:

- to adhere to the program, statute, and the resolutions at the party congress;

- participate in the work of the local center or other party organ;
- participate in work in improving the republic and oblast ecological and cultural situation at his work place, home, and educational institution.

IV. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PZU

1. The party structures its activity on a territorial-club basis. Party organizations can be created in villages, small-regions, apartments, regions, cities, within the oblast's administrative bounds. The party organizations can also unite people by profession in accordance to a club principal, that is, to create party clubs at business enterprises and in organizations. The administration of the center is made up of a head, secretary, and treasurer, and it serves as the party-organization's executive organ.

2. The party organization elects the delegates to the oblast party conference and also to the PZU congress. The standards for representational governance are determined by the PZU oblast administration.

3. Each party organization in addition to determining the general line and platform of PZU, is independent in terms of working out its own orientation, formation, and methods of activity; each party organization has the right to pass independent resolutions.

4. The oblast party conference:

- meets once a year and elects the party's oblast governing body, the secretary, the legal, and the control-revisionary commission. The head and his deputy or co-head of the party's oblast governing body are elected at the oblast conference. The head or one of his substitutes (the co-head), the secretary, and the treasurer is confirmed by the oblast government staff workers;
- designates the party's political and ecological program of action in the oblast; formulates the principals of cooperation with other parties and political organizations, in conjunction with the oblast and local councils of people's deputies;
- makes an evaluation of the state of the ecology in the oblast;
- determines the need to have referendums, to conduct scientific checks and work, and also to undertake political actions;
- chooses the oblast governing body, the secretary, the legal, and the control-revisionary commission;
- listens to and confirms the reports of the oblast governing body and the legal and control-revisionary commission.
- presents and supports candidates to all councils at all levels;

- introduces propositions to the party's statute and program;

- determines the procedure for elections and the standards for representing groups at the PZU congress.

5. The oblast governing body of the party:

- is chosen at the oblast party conferences; and it has in its composition political and ecological councils, a secretary, a legal commission, an information-press agency, and an administration and supply branch;
- is the main executor and representative organ of PZU, which directs the party work in the oblast;
- represents PZU in state institutions, community organizations of the oblast, and supports ties with them; cooperates with the oblast association "Green World," with parties and organizations of other republics and nations;
- studies the current political, economic, ecological, and cultural problems and discusses the means and methods for resolving them;
- organizes the ecological checks, referendums, meetings, demonstrations, and picketing;
- registers party organizations;
- discusses rank and file issues;
- examines and approves of estimated expenses, accounting reports and the balance books of PZU in the oblast;
- designates an editorial board for the oblast newspaper of PZU; designates the name, circulation figures, and frequency of publication of the newspaper;
- summons the oblast party conference;
- convenes no less than once every two months;

6. The congress of PZU:

- is the most important organ of the Ukrainian "Green" Party convened once a year; and it determines the party's main political direction. By initiative or by demand of one third of the party organization, or in the event of very unusual political events, the congress can be convene an extraordinary PZU congress;
- in addition to the delegates, the regular staff workers from the oblast governing bodies can participate; deputies from the Higher Councils of the Ukrainian SSR and USSR [can participate], but do have the right to cast a deciding vote;
- chooses the central governing body, the head and his deputies or co-heads, the secretary, the leaders of executive organs, the editor, the legal and control-revisionary commission;

- listens to and approves the reports of the central governing body and the control-revisionary commission;
- creates a temporary and permanent commission according to the party's needs;
- determines the main policies, means and methods of party work;
- gives an evaluation of the deputies' actions, who belong to PZU, who have posts in the Higher Councils in the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR.

7. The central governing body of the party:

- is chosen at the party congress and has in its body political and ecological councils, a secretary, a legal commission, an information-press agency, and an administration and supply branch;
- is the main executor and representative PZU organ, which coordinates the party's activities in the period between congresses;
- convenes no less than four times a year;
- registers the oblast party organization;
- convenes and prepares the PZU congress;
- examines current political, economic, ecological, and cultural problems; discusses the means and methods of resolving them;
- represents PZU in state institutions and community organizations of the republic; supports ties with "Green World," parties and state organizations, parties from other republics and nations, and the Ukrainian diaspora;
- coordinates the activity and assists in the work of the oblast party organization, and also deputy's groups in the councils;
- recommends and approves of staff inventories, the estimated expenses, the accounting reports and balance books of PZU;
- approves of the make-up of the legal commission, the editorial staff, the financial-administration and supply division.

The decisions of the central and oblast governing bodies of PZU are passed at the plenums with a majority vote with the presence of two thirds of its members.

8. The Secretariat of the PZU:

- is chosen at the congress (or at the oblast party conference) and is the permanent executor of the party organ, who conducts the daily organizational matters and coordinates work;
- coordinates the constant link between the party organizations at all levels, and also with the community,

state organs, and institutions, the mass media, the association "Green World," and parties and movements in other republics and nations;

- works on projects, like regulatory documents, party resolutions, the party's ecological and political decisions and requirements;

- controls the PZU financial-administration and supply division;

9. The legal commission:

- is chosen at the congress (or at the oblast party conference) and is subordinate to the central (or oblast) governing body of PZU;
- decides the party's rank and file and juridical matters, and also points of argument between party organs of various levels; the legal commission defends party members from persecution;
- decides on questions related with the elections to the councils at all levels;
- decides issues related to bringing violators of ecological laws and requirements to justice, making them answer for their transgressions;

10. The control-revisionary commission:

- is chosen at the congress (or at the oblast party conference);
- insures that the statute is adhered to and the resolutions of the congress are carried out;
- reviews the organizational, administrative and supply and financial activity of the executive organs of PZU.

11. The secretariat, the legal and control-revisionary commission of the oblast party organizations are no under the control of the central organs, except at the congress of the party;

12. The financial-administrative and supply division:

- is determined by the secretariat and is approved by the central or the oblast governing body of the party;
- are occupied in working with the party dues and the financial and administrative and supply matters;
- spends the ecological funds and finances political actions and the party's ecological programs;
- is responsible for the party building sites and possessions.

V. THE BUDGET, POSSESSIONS AND STATE OF PZU

1. The party budget is established with the membership dues, publishing profits, business activities, and voluntary contributions.

2. Membership dues are 5 karbovanets to join and 10 karbovanets annually for employed adults; 3 karbovanets to join and 5 karbovanets annually for students, house wives, pensioners and so on (the cost of dues may be reviewed for adjustment on account of inflation).

3. The local party organizations gives 30 percent of its dues to the oblast division of PZU, which in its turn gives 30 percent of its income to the central governing body.

4. The funds of PZU are used for carrying out political, cultural- educational, natural preservation activities, and also for obtaining material-technical equipment to allow the party to operate and for maintaining needed staff personnel.

5. PZU has its own staff workers to work in the party's organizational, financial, and technical activities.

6. The central and oblast governing bodies create special money funds to grant for ecological assistance, conducting research and academic work, ecological investigations, obtaining new technical supplies, providing of the ecological and cultural programs. The ecological fund of PZU is not subject to paying taxes, customs fees and other fees to the state budget.

VI. THE RIGHTS OF PZU AS A JURIDICAL SUBJECT

1. The central and oblast governing bodies of PZU are juridical subjects. They have a seal, stamp, the right to open an account in the state bank and to receive checks with its name on them.

2. The local and district party organizations based on the resolutions of the oblast or central governing body can also become juridical subjects and receive the right to get a seal, stamp, and open their own account.

3. PZU has its own emblem and symbol, which is being designed by order of the central governing body and is approved at the party congress.

4. PZU can cease its activity on account of the central governing body's decision or the party congress.

Belorussia Gets GDR Chernobyl Relief

90UN2457C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 1 Jul 90 p 1

[BELTA report: "An Air Bridge of Aid"]

[Text] Three airliners carrying medicines, vitamins and children's food landed on 29 June at the airport of the Belorussian capital. Aid for the children of Chernobyl has been sent by the New Forum organization and the Union of Greens-90, a faction in the GDR People's Chamber. The air bridge began operating after a trip to the GDR by people's deputies from Belorussia. Agreement was reached on providing major aid to the republic in medicines and equipment. Belorussian children are being taken for recreation and improving their health. A

new clinic in the republic hematological center will be equipped with the most modern facilities.

Ukrainian CP Statement on Chernobyl

90UN2457A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
29 Jun 90 p 2

[Statement of the 23d Ukrainian CP Congress: "On Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster and Protecting the Public Against Their Effect"]

[Text] The 23d Ukrainian CP Congress feels that the disaster at the Chernobyl AES has been a major disaster in our times, a national disaster which has left its imprint on the fate of millions of people and to a significant degree has influenced the entire political, moral-psychological and economic situation in the republic.

It is essential to point out that from the very first hours of the disaster, all possible resources and means, and the scientific-technical and production potential of both the republic as well as the nation as a whole were called upon to eliminate it. Participating in this work were the representatives of all the Union republics, which made it possible to quickly carry out large-scale measures to localize the disaster and stabilize the radiation situation as well as to prevent a more catastrophic development of events.

To be condemned is the fact that the central state and economic bodies, having brought together in the first stage in their hands the control over the elimination of the disaster, for a certain time were silent about its actual dimensions and consequences; they did not promptly inform the public about the radiation situation during the first days of the emergency which did not make it possible to provide prompt and complete iodine prophylaxis.

All of this reflected the inability of the administrative-bureaucratic system to properly protect the people, the irresponsibility of the Union departments on this question, and the absence of proper supervision over their activities on the territory of the Ukraine by the republic state bodies.

The Congress feels that it was a mistake of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee that it, in sharing responsibility for eliminating the consequences of the disaster along with the governmental and economic bodies, did not come out openly, publicly and primarily in defense of the people.

As a result, time was lost, serious failings and errors were committed in creating safe conditions for the public of the victim areas and the persons involved in eliminating the disaster.

According to a proposal of the Ukraine, Belorussia and the RSFSR, a unified state program has been worked out and approved by a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet to carry out immediate measures to eliminate the consequences of the disaster for the years 1990-1992. A

long-range comprehensive republic program has been worked out. The Congress considers it the most important duty of the party committees and organizations and all communists in the republic and particularly those who have been elected deputies of the soviets and work in the state bodies, to assist actively in implementing these programs, to do everything to protect the people, and to work for constructive collaboration here with all the sociopolitical organizations. It is essential first of all to provide high-quality and complete medical services for the inhabitants of the disaster areas, particularly for children and also persons who have participated in eliminating the consequences of the disaster, to give priority significance to developing the public health system in the disaster areas, as quickly as possible to compactly move people out of the population points where further habitation by humans is impossible, and to create safe conditions for the habitation of those who have remained in the disaster areas. It is essential to organize balanced summer recreation and health measures for children and actually supply the public with "clean" food products.

The Congress emphasizes the necessity of quickly taking out of operation the Chernobyl AES and settling the fate of its labor collective, introducing a moratorium on the further development of nuclear power in the Ukraine, working out a republic Energy Program considering the ecological and economic setting of capacity of the nuclear power plants in the republic's energy balance.

In considering the implementation of measures to improve the radioecological situation on the republic's territory and the protection of persons who have suffered in the disaster at the Chernobyl AES to be a matter of particular state importance and considering the extreme acuteness and complexity of the problem and the necessity of involving many Union ministries, departments and organizations in solving it, the Congress appeals to the deputies of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet with a proposal to revise their decision on the Permanent Commission on the Problems of the Chernobyl Disaster so as to give it the status of an emergency commission. It would also be advisable to introduce a separate position of deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers on the questions of overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

We feel that the Ukrainian Council of Ministers should as quickly as possible resolve the question of recovering and burying the radioactive wastes and used nuclear materials which have built up as a result of the emergency and the shutting down of the Chernobyl AES as well as at the other nuclear power plants operating on republic territory and immediately carry out a competent and public auditing of all the facilities for protracted storage and burying of the radioactive materials.

The Congress favors the accelerated elaboration and adoption of laws of the USSR and the Ukraine on nuclear power as well as state enactments which regulate the status of the disaster victims and the participants in

the eliminating of its consequences, a system of state benefits and compensation for damage as well as the establishing of legal conditions for the ecological disaster zone. We support the scientists and specialists who reject the 35-rem concept for the safety of habitation and who firmly defend a position of non-threshold safety conditions. We are in favor of the complete and objective informing of the public concerning the radiation situation in the republic and the state of health of the public, we favor ensuring the rights of citizens to conduct skilled consultation and objective dosimetric studies of the environment as well as satisfying the demand for individual dosimetric equipment.

The Congress urges the leaders of the state and economic bodies, the production associations, enterprises, institutions and public organizations to do everything necessary so that the citizens, leaving the disaster areas, are given the proper attention and human concern at their new place of residence.

Chernobyl Museum Opens in Ukraine

90UN2457B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 22 Jul 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "The Chernobyl Museum"]

[Text] A museum to the Chernobyl tragedy has been opened in the rayon center of Narodichi the lands of which have suffered severely as a result of the disaster at the Chernobyl AES.

The exhibit shows several hundred documentary evidences of the ecological disaster which descended on the cities and villages of the Ukrainian and Belorussian Polesye. In the exhibits they have brought together numerous publications from Soviet and foreign sources as well as photographs. Here also they present materials on the course of eliminating the consequences of the disaster. The international section of the museum is devoted to the charity actions of foreign countries and their public organizations.

Zhitomir Oblast

Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party's Fundamental Principles

90UN2436A Kiev *LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA*
in Ukrainian No 27, 3 Jul 90 p 7

[Declaration of the Resolutions of the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party issued at its first founding congress in Kiev: "A Declaration: the Fundamental Principles of the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party"]

[Text] On the ninth of June of this year in the buildings of the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy (Kiev, Holosiye), the first founding congress of the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party took place.

106 delegates came to this congress from the Kiev, Lvov, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Rivne, Sumy, and Kherson Oblasts.

Serhiy Plachynda opened the congress with a brief, introductory speech.

A priest from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, Father Yuriy, solemnly blessed the proceedings of the congress.

O. M. Mosiyuk, the vice-chairman of the Kiev city council, gave a welcoming speech.

The people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR, I. O. Zayets, O. P. Kotsyuba, and O. Ye. Shevchenko, spoke to the delegates and the guests of the congress. They made a number of constructive propositions, which were entered into the program documents of the USDP [Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party].

In his welcoming speech, the rector of USHA [Ukrainian-Agricultural Academy], professor D. O. Melnychuk called on the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party to conduct its practical work in cooperation with the Ukrainian Peasants Association.

The delegates discussed projects, a statute and a program for the USDP. Alarm and grief resounded in the speaker's speeches at the fate of the Ukrainian peasantry, which is the foundation of the Ukrainian nation.

To renew the Ukrainian village and restore the Ukrainian peasant to his status of being a master of his own land; to pass a law about private ownership, which would be based on work done by an individual; to defend the individual land owner (the farmer) and the lessee from the administrators' bureaucratic, arbitrary actions; to put a stop to destructive use of chemicals in the peasants' agricultural practices and to shift to a natural means of protecting crops; to insure that the Ukrainian peasant has a reliable well-being and all the living conditions, which the urban dweller has—above all, to see to it that peasant receives medical services, and that the peasant children and mothers get protection from radiation, nitrates, toxins, with which the land, water, and air of the Ukraine is over-saturated—this is an incomplete list of the demands, which delegates to the Peasant's congress were making.

The participants of the forum were very disturbed by Oleksandr Hordiyenko's speech, who is a lessee from the Volodarsky district in the Kiev Oblast (from the village of Lohvyn).

...Four of them leased 200 hectares of land for 10 years. They work by the sweat of their brow, growing wheat, beets, and corn. The entire harvest in accordance with the contract is given to the collective farm. And in order to receive money for production which exceeds the norm, the lessees must...take their case to court.

Actually, after the USDP congress ended, one of the Peasant's Party leaders managed to attend a session of the

Kiev Oblast court, in order to defend the leading land lessees, who, in fact, won their case.

So it seems, the USDP intends to continue defending the rights of wronged peasants.

Four joint chairmen assumed leadership of the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party with the approval of the congress: H. T. Kryvoruchko, P. P. Kuzmych, S. P. Plachynda, V. V. Shcherbyna.

The congress passed a number of resolutions and also a "Declaration of the fundamental principles of the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party," which we are printing.

I. History

The Ukrainian peasant... From the depths of the millennia and from the heights of the Trypilian culture, there extends a generous, life-giving, humble furrow, from which grew hundreds and hundreds of generations of Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians, farmers and craftsmen, Cossacks and carters, leaders of the people and statesmen, writers and scholars, the luminaries of the Ukrainian nation and her traitors, sons faithful and sons prodigal...

From the time when, according to very ancient accounts—the Heaven sent a Golden Plow as a gift of the gods to the Ukrainian land, to the most fertile land on the earth; from those distant times, when the legendary, first plowmen did not flee from the onslaughts of nomads, but became a living part of the soil for eternity so as to make it completely fertile, from that time on this eternal field did not only yield holy bread, but also the wise Ukrainian word, and song, and humor, and good customs. From its generous abundance was born the wondrous character of the Ukrainian peasant, who through the ages bore high moral and spiritual qualities, a creative ability to do all things, an industriousness, a wisdom of life, lightness, sensitivity, hospitality, a philosophic type of thinking, a fine sense of humor, an indomitable love of the soil, of beauty, of the sun, sky and stars...

But who did not but rob the Ukrainian peasant: the Goths and Huns, the Romanies and Khazars, the Polovians and Pechenegs, the Obry and Tatar-Mongols, Turks and Crimeans, Poles and Moscovite generals, and the courtly, feudal army of Peter I, of Catherine II, and of all the Russian tsars, and the ruthless Trotsky-Leninist faction that sold out. But still the Ukrainian field was always richly harvested with the peasants' sweat; it always yielded, always yielded generously, yielded crops for all until the year 1929, when it had seemed that from time immemorial, the endless furrow of the Ukrainian peasant would not end. Just then Stalin and the CPSU Central Committee fooled the Ukrainian peasant, to whom in 1917 land was promised, for which the peasant stormed the Winter Palace and fell in large numbers fighting in Civil War battlefields under the Bolshevik flag. Under these same flags, they took from the Ukrainian peasant what he had won by force of arms, the land,

by collectivizing it. The most industrious and intelligent plowmen, who were called kulaks, were forcibly torn from the soil and chased out into the cold wastes, into forest huts. As regards the other half of the Ukrainian peasantry, which was called the middle sort, they stripped off their homespun shirts, dressed them in a light jackets, and forcibly herded them into collective and state farms, forcing them to work for nothing. For the first time in the history of humanity, the peasant had all his bread suddenly, forcibly taken away from him down to a seed; and he, a tiller of the soil, was brought to the point of artificially starving. For the first time, the Ukraine, an agricultural nation, died from hunger in the generous, mild, most fertile land in the world. Eight million Ukrainians died from hunger—that is the horrible world "record" [resulting from] the resolutions of Stalin, the CPSU Central Committee, and the CP(b)U Central Committee. They brought the Ukrainian peasant down to such an inhuman level that he in his state of insanity from hunger resorted to cannibalism. In this manner the Ukrainian peasant's high moral standards were destroyed, his soul desolated, his will broken; and then even his mind was destroyed: the leading members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were shot. From that time on in the 30s, the intelligentsia was no longer national in character; and diminished by 8 million people, the surviving Ukrainian peasantry, which no longer made up the foundation of the nation, was done in by famine; terrified, speechless, it ended up in the condition of a slave, to whom it was allowed only to repeat the words "life has become better, life has become happier" and to sing one song, "From behind the hills an eagle with grey-blue wings is flying."

And then the men and youths hit by the famine were killed in the war, during which more than 4 million Ukrainians died.

The Ukrainian peasantry that had suffered so much also experienced a post-war famine in 1947, and the peasantry also experienced the cruellest sort of exploitation of the peasant's work in the entire history of humanity—the work of widows, cripples, under-age orphans—work, for which kopeks were paid, these kopeks were taken away for state loans as soon as they were given out. Desolated already by famines and war, the Ukraine village was further desolated by Stalin-Brezhnevite exploitation. This is how the mass flight of the youth began from the village to the city. This was also encouraged by the unceremonious recruitment of the Ukrainian village youth to distant construction projects and pristine areas, and by the draft into the army, from which the youth, as a rule, did not return to their native homes, and by the anti-peasant reactionary "theory" that the villages did not have a future. In only 18 years (1969-1987), 1,502 villages disappeared from the face of the Ukraine—an entire agricultural nation. During those years, the village population decreased by 6 million people. Recently 220,000-300,000 people a year have been leaving the villages for the city. TODAY THERE IS NO ONE LEFT TO LEAVE THE VILLAGE. For in 8

oblasts of the Ukraine, there is a continuing process of depopulation of the village population—this is in such historic, and once flowering oblasts, like Chernihiv, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Sumy, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad. So, then, the process of the Ukrainian nation dying out, the basis for which was always the peasantry, is persisting.

The process of the Ukrainian nation dying out is being reinforced by the radiation pollution, which after the Chernobyl disaster, covered the Ukraine with a fatal cloud and by the use of chemicals in agricultural areas. The Ukraine today is in a state of chemical warfare. In the Ukraine there is not a single hectare of ecologically clean soil—the plowed fields are poisoned with pesticides, herbicides, toxins, nitrates, and radionuclides. All the surface waters and the underground waters are also partially polluted. In the Ukraine there are now 18 million hectares of eroded soil and 2 million hectares of soil chemically polluted to such an extent that it cannot be recultivated.

Because of all this it is precisely in the Ukrainian village today that there is a very high rate of infant mortality, a high level of fetal illness, and a high mortality rate among those capable of working. That is, the genocide of the Ukrainian nation continues. And it is compounded by the criminally unsatisfactory medical service in the villages. Thirty-four percent of the villages do not have medical clinics, and 70 percent of the medical centers are situated in buildings that are inadequate. The village is in fact not supplied with medical items. The economic plundering of Ukrainian villages continues. Only in the Ukraine does one still find the lowest prices to purchase agricultural goods and the greatest amount of such goods being put on the soviet "market" (89 percent); in conjunction with the high prices on imported agricultural technology, building materials, and fuel, this has led to the annual loss of 6 milliards karbovanets.

At the same time, the destructive process of the Ukrainian villages being occupied by people who own dachas, by retirees, and privileged pensioners continues; the dilapidated Ukrainian houses (there are 129,000 in the Ukraine) are occupied by people who have moved from regions without black earth in Russia and other regions of the Soviet Union. In the Ukrainian village, the size of the Russian population is growing considerably, a population which regards the language, culture, and history of the Ukrainian peasantry with contempt, which assimilates Ukrainians, and puts them down. The Ukrainian village is losing its dialects and folklore at a catastrophic rate; it is losing its colorful, melodic Ukrainian language, which always marked the high cultural and spiritual level of the Ukrainian peasantry. The majority of the peasants of central and eastern Ukraine converse in a mixed dialect of Ukrainian and Russian [surzhyk]. At this juncture, the peasantry ceases to be a bearer of the colorful and beautiful features of the Ukrainian nation. And the peasantry's genetic base is being destroyed by radiation, which spread after the Chernobyl disaster. The rash course taken by leaders of the Soviet Union's

administration and the Communist Party to enter into a market economy has worsened the critical situation; this action can put the Ukrainian village on the verge of complete economic catastrophe and destruction.

Because of all of these conditions, a new, mass, independent organization could not but have formed—THE UKRAINIAN PEASANT- DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

II. Its Goal

1. To put a stop to the plundering of the Ukrainian village and the Ukraine by union departments; to struggle to attain political and economic independence for the Ukraine; to nationalize the machine producing enterprises in agriculture and the food processing industry, which are on the territory of the Ukraine, which are owned by the union departments and should become the property of the republic.

2. To renew the economy, culture, and the people of the Ukrainian village. To return the land to the Ukrainian peasant. To restore the status to him of being a master of his own land. To constitutionally insure the improvement of the peasant's well-being.

3. To assist in the spiritual rebirth of the Ukrainian peasant.

4. To insure assistance is given for the ecological state of the Ukrainian village and the peasantry. To assist in the development of an agricultural education for Ukrainians.

5. To demand immediate and appropriate medical services to be provided for assisting the village.

6. To give the Ukrainian village all those living conditions which the city offers.

7. To give the Ukrainian village promising assistance against radiation and nitrates.

8. To demand the further democratization of the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and the laws of the Ukrainian SSR in response to the demands for a completely politically and economically independent Ukraine and the rebirth of the Ukrainian village.

In response to these points, the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party will guide itself by a strategy and tactics that have been worked out in its political activity.

III. The Strategic Goals of the USDP: Sovereignty. Private Ownership. Land. Homesteads.

1. The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party in cooperation with other parties with a democratic orientation and together with Rukh and informal organizations is struggling to gain complete political and economic independence for the Ukraine, a condition which is regarded as the most important factor in the economic, spiritual, ecological rebirth of the Ukrainian people in general and the Ukrainian peasantry in particular.

The most decisive and effective step, which should be taken by the Higher Council of the Ukrainian SSR is to nationalize (to expropriate) all the union administered enterprises and the 100 milliard karbovanets, which are being stolen from the Ukraine by the administrative monopoly and to use [these funds] for the needs of the republic.

2. Of all the forms of ownership—the private one is the most important; it was, is, and will be the moving force in any given society.

The USDP is demanding passage of a law concerning private ownership, which is based on work done by an individual and the work of hired workers in limited numbers and only for seasonal work. Without private ownership, the progress and flowering of the economy of the Ukrainian village as well as the emancipation of the peasant soul are impossible.

The USDP supports share holding, private-family, cooperative, individual and other forms of ownership, which are based on work done on an individual basis.

3. The USDP is insisting on the obligatory passage of a new law concerning land, with its main formulation: *the land belongs to the district councils, which transfer it in perpetuity with the right of inheritance and free use to those peasants, who want and can cultivate it.*

For such a peasant a parcel of land is marked out for plowing in a size in accordance to the decreed law.

The state gives the peasant, who received the land, credit, exempting him from paying taxes for the first three years.

After five years of independent work on the land, which was granted by the district councils, the peasants have the right to freely deal with their land (to sell it, lease it, and will it as part of their inheritance).

To city residents the land is to be sold in limited amounts.

To city residents, who have moved to the village and have become villagers, land is to be freely granted.

Areas not fit for cultivation are transferred to peasants and city residents freely according to resolutions made by the district councils and ecological experts.

4. The USDP defends the homestead system of farming as one of the most important means for implementing its agricultural policy in the Ukraine. As regards this point, the USDP is struggling to gain priority for the Ukrainian village, insuring that it receives building materials, an accelerated rate of building village roads with hard surfaces, and an all-inclusive system of providing gas during the years 1991-1996.

To bring 1,502 ruined villages back to life.

IV. Village Ecology

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party is staunchly and unswervingly struggling for the ecological rebirth of the Ukrainian village. For this [purpose] it is making the following demands:

a) to put a stop to the ubiquitous use of chemicals in agriculture. The use of chemicals combined with the high level of radiation constitutes a fatal verdict for the Ukrainian people. With the current pace of chemical use and the active level of radiation to which the Ukrainian population is exposed, in the view of scholars, the population may die out or degenerate by the year 2040.

The chemical spraying of the village cultivated land from airplanes must be stopped immediately. The thousands of chemical enterprises on the territory of the Ukraine that belong to union departments are to be expropriated; these enterprises export 93 percent of their products. The expropriated funds are to be used for ecological purposes, for filtration and cleansing facilities, for shutting down and reforming chemical enterprises;

b) a complete shift over to the use of a natural means for protecting plant life. It demands that every collective and state farm, cooperative, agricultural firm, share holding association, and so on have an entomophagous biological laboratory;

c) The USDP is consistently and decisively struggling for helping, preserving, and renewing the Ukrainian land, which is dying out. The extensive method of farming is to be prohibited. The process of erosion is to be stopped. Cultivation of soil is to proceed by the rigorous application of the most technologically advanced means. The destructive, sprinkling of the surface soil of the southern steppes is to be stopped; this process poisons, adds salt to, and destroys the black soil. The criminal dredging of the swamps is to be stopped; Polissya should be renewed, restored to its original state as the Ukraine's green oasis. The planting of trees to improve agricultural and sylvacultural reclamation and the planting of orchard terraces should be developed. The peasants should have control over the Ukrainian land restored to them, which is occupied with military and industrial facilities, which should be liquidated. Let there not be a single military ordnance yard in the Ukraine! The uranium mines in Kirovohrad are to be shut down—this is a fatal source of radiation and tumor-related illnesses. We need to deactivate and recultivate the radioactive wastes. We need to prohibit the strip mining of manganese and mineral ore—to shift over to an underground method of mining. We need to completely recultivate the eroded and destroyed land;

d) The USDP in cooperation with the Committee for preserving the Dnieper is concerned with the clean up of small rivers and the restoring the Dnieper to its original state. The Dnieper lowlands after the artificial release of reservoir waters and the de-activation of their radioactively polluted river bed soil should be returned to agricultural cultivation. The USDP is demanding a law

for a three kilometer protection zone running along both sides of the Dnieper and the planting of a one hundred meter wide forest belt along the river;

e) to proclaim that the underground waters of the Ukraine are a national legacy, a reserve of the republic, and to work out a system of protecting the underground waters and the river basins of the Ukraine;

f) to prohibit the building of new atomic energy sites, to shut down in stages the active AES [Atomic Energy Stations] in the Ukraine, to demand the complete expulsion of the Ministry of Energy from the territory of the republic. At the same time, the USDP cares for the development of non-traditional forms of energy use in the villages (particularly, bio- and wind energy). A "bioreactor"—should be in every village yard;

g) The USDP is to conduct systematic ecological propaganda in the village, concerned with the ecological education of the village children and youth, to organize ecological schools and ecological detachments (EKOZAHONY) to which it enlists above all the unemployed people from cities for recultivating the land; and also to undertake a development of terrace planting, the forestation of poor lands, the planting of forest belts, the intensive landscaping of the area around work facilities, the clean up of river basins, and so on;

h) The USDP is assisting in development of phytotherapy as being one of the most effective devices against the poisoning of the human organism by radionuclides and the organization of cost-accountable cooperatives for the dissemination of medicinal herbs, which act against radiation. The USDP supports the republic fund for the renewal and development of phytotherapy in the Ukraine and is putting out the journal MEDICINAL PLANTS OF THE UKRAINE;

i) The USDP together with the Committee for the preservation of the Dnieper is organizing an independent academic expeditions and commissions, which will conduct a systematic analysis of the soils and water in the village and in the fields for those who request it; the USDP is putting out a quarterly (a monthly) bulletin RADIATSIYA I NITRATY to be edited by an academic, independent radiation-chemical center;

j) The USDP is assisting in the development of the agricultural ecological sciences.

V. The USDP and Ukrainian Culture

The national and spiritual rebirth of the Ukrainian village is one of the most important concerns of the Ukrainian Democratic-Peasants Party.

For every village—a Ukrainian school, a Ukrainian kindergarten, a historical-earth-science museum, a medical facility, a memorial sign (a monument) for the victims of the famine in 1933, a library with Ukrainian studies, a church (a cathedral), a radio center, a palace of culture, a coffee shop, a stadium, a swimming pool,

streets with hard top surfaces, and sidewalks. The USDP is demanding raising the salary of village teachers, doctors, and workers in culture. The USDP is allocating 10 percent of its profits for cultural education in the village, for the organization of folklore, dialect, and archeological [scholarly research] expeditions. The USDP is assisting in the development of traditional people's industries by organizing craft associations, cooperatives, firms, workshops, artistic salons, exhibits of people's functional art, folklore holidays, and by supporting the creation of folklore ensembles. The USDP is supporting the re-cast journal SOCIALISTIC CULTURE and the newspaper UKRAINIAN CULTURE which are to be addressed to the village reader. The USDP is founding the press "The Ukrainian Village" and the literary-artistic newspaper PLUG. The USDP is demanding the political press of the Ukraine be re-organized into being a part of the state press of the Ukraine; this press can then publish the materials of the USDP and other parties and informal organizations in the Ukraine.

VI. Farmers, Cooperatives, Agro-Firms

The USDP is above all a party of farmers. Its sacred obligation is to defend the rights of individuals and lessees and to encourage the development of the farm economy in the Ukraine. The party is taking under its defense and guard *every individual (farmer), every lessee, every individual village agricultural concern*. At the same time, the party is assisting in strengthening the industrial and branch cooperatives in the village, the development of leasing, and family undertakings; it is supporting the organization of agro-firms, which can become the base and exemplar of the development of agriculture with a profound academic base.

VII. USDP and the Collective-State Farm System

The collective and state system of agriculture was established in 1929-1930 artificially in a forceful manner as a convenient device for ruthlessly exploiting the peasantry, as a device from which there was no defense, which unceremoniously sucked up the agricultural production of the village. The collective and state farm systems are a product of a totalitarian socialism. It wrought great material and spiritual havoc in the village, almost destroying it. Today it is causing great harm to the state because of the loss of harvests. But in recent years, the collective state farm systems has become comfortable for the majority of the peasants, who work according to their capabilities within their possibilities, and take from the soil what they need, acting alone in expropriating whatever the System comes up short in giving what it promised. At the same time, the majority of the peasants have lost their habit of farming alone, individually. That is why the USDP is supporting the collective-state farm systems, which in its hyper-enlarged state satisfies the needs of the village. Along with this, the USDP is supporting the re-organization of the district farms into people's cooperatives, share holding associations, agro-firms; this is a lawful process of privatization of the means of production. The USDP thinks

that the collective ownership, which until now was a form of state ownership, should in time become the people's property.

VIII. USDP and the Youth

One of the most honorable tasks of the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party is to care for the village youth. The youth is the future of the Ukrainian village, the future of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation. The USDP is allocating 30 percent of its profits to help the village youth, particularly—housing for young families, to acquire technology for young farmers, to create a republic school of the young farmer. The USDP is overseeing SPTU [agricultural vocational technical school] in the Ukraine, encouraging the progressive reorganization and development of the leading methods and programs for educating and teaching village specialists.

The USDP is working in close contact with SNUM [Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth], the Komsomol, and other youth and young adult organizations.

The USDP is demanding that there be a law concerning exempting village mechanics from being drafted into the army. The service in the Soviet Army is a matter of a genuinely free choice for the village youth. The USDP is a national-territorial army.

IX. USDP and the City

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party is struggling for "REPOPULATING THE VILLAGES" and deurbanization of the city by means of established share holding associations of the type CITY-VILLAGE. The party sees the most important members of such associations as being enterprises in the food processing industry, scientific and educational institutes with a village orientation, and also suitable foreign firms.

The USDP is creating provisioning cooperatives, which will enlarge the scope of natural, unadulterated agricultural production to be made available to residents of the city, who are members of USDP.

The USDP is promoting collective orchard planting and gardening for city residents and the development of terrace planting and forestry.

The USDP is taking into its care the unemployed in the cities, enlisting them into ecologic schools and into cost accountable ecological units [ekozahoniv], which work in recultivating the ruined, poisoned lands, in reforested areas, in river bank forest belts and ordnance areas expropriated from the military departments, for planting forest belts and so on.

X. USDP and the Church

From time immemorial the Ukrainian peasant, who was dependent on the heavens, lived with God in his soul; he sent his prayers to HIM concerning a harvest and for

prosperity in his house. **HAVING TAKEN AWAY GOD FROM THE PEASANT**, totalitarian socialism took out of the peasant's soul the most excellent Christian virtues, above all—goodness and sensitivity, mercy and benevolence.

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party supports the return of Christianity and its good virtues to the village, the belief in GOD, in all of Christ's holy testaments, which should merge into the flesh and blood of the Ukrainian peasant, into the soul of a member of the USDP.

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party is uniting with the **UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH**, and it upholds the right for establishing **THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALOUS CHURCH**.

God is the single being above us, and let His wisdom and greatness extend to each one of us.

And let the Holy Scripture be with us:

"THE HARVEST IS GREAT, THE HARVESTERS FEW, SO LET US PRAY TO THE LORD-GOD, SO THAT HE WOULD SEND US HARVESTERS FOR OUR HARVEST."

At the same time, the USDP is affirming the freedom of conscience and choice of faith: even an atheist can be a member.

XI. The Cult of the Mother and Child

In this time when the most tragic fact in the life of the Ukraine has become the dying out of the Ukrainian nation, when from year to year the birth rate is falling in the Ukraine, when the saddest and most heartbreaking phenomenon at the end of the 20th century has become that of children with tumors—the children of Chernobyl and the children of the chemically saturated meadows; in this time when women in the zones of ecological disaster are being forbidden from bearing children, and those who can give birth, fear to become a mother, or avoid the great task of being a mother; in this time when for the faithful daughter of the Ukraine, whom GOD endowed with the sacred feelings of motherhood, it becomes increasingly more difficult and more frightening to give birth to children, who sometimes already in the womb of the mother sicken from nitrates, radionuclides, and toxins; in this time when an endemic illness has infected the youth of the Ukraine and its children, the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party is calling on everyone, who believes in the Ukraine, in her future, for whom the road in life is on the earth, to call on all of their opportunities, abilities, spiritual resources in order to cultivate [the concept of] **THE YOUNG UKRAINIAN MOTHER**, to preserve her while there is time, from the poisonous air and cruel words, from difficult work and nitrates, from the cruel bustle and from our insufficiencies. The USDP is persistently demanding that the government of the republic in cooperation with scholars work out a **NEW**

REGIME OF LIFE and milieu for young couples (newlyweds) and pregnant women, who during their period of pregnancy and feeding of infants need, by the authorized powers of the republic, to be taken to ecologically clean regions, which should be proclaimed reserved and which should be kept up by the entire society. **THE UKRAINE MUST HAVE NATIONAL ZONES OF MOTHERHOOD AND CHILDHOOD.**

The republic should restore the very ancient cult of Berehynya—who is the very first goddess of the shelter of home and guardian of the home hearth; the republic should renew the cult of motherhood—prolonging the [life of the] people and the nation, renew the cult of the child, which we should uphold by means of the entire community.

XII. Widows, Orphans, Single Mothers

They have always been with us, in all ages and times—orphans, widows, and single mothers. They shed rivers of tears in the long, much-suffering history of the Ukraine. Their number was constantly increased by ruthless nomads, barbarians, and the bloody executioners of Peter I, Catherine II, Denikin, Stalin, Beria, Kaganovych, Hitler, Suslov...

In his despair at the fate of the Ukrainian orphaned woman, Dovzhenko named the Ukraine a great widow. Today [the number of] widows, orphans, and single mothers is increasing because of radiation, chemicals, an imperfect socialistic technology, and male amorality, and generously flowing alcohol, which is the biggest "present" to the Ukrainian men from totalitarian socialism and great nation chauvinism.

The USDP is taking into its care widows, orphans, single mothers in the village; it is conducting an appropriate type of propaganda among the male population; it is seeing to it that appropriate medical services are received in the village, that the conditions at work place and technical safety on the job are improved for men, that their salaries are increased in order that they may feed their family and maintain good health. At the same time, the party is allocating 20 percent of its income to assist widows, orphans, and single mothers.

XIII. Concerning Pensioners

The USDP compares the work in the field and on the farm to work in a heated trade corporation. That is why it is requesting the right for peasants to have a state pension: for women at 50 years of age, for men at 55 years of age.

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party is allocating 10 percent of its income for assistance to pensioners who are members of the USDP.

XIV. USDP and Other Parties

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party is closely cooperating with all the progressive, democratic parties.

which are active on the territory of the Ukraine and are favoring the national, economic, spiritual, and ecological rebirth of the republic.

XV. USDP and Factions

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic party recognizes in its ranks factions, funds, and organized groups, which are voicing the special interests of certain regions, groups, or professional circles of Ukrainian peasantry and city residents. The leaders of the factions, funds, and also of the oppositional groups enter into the leading organs of the party. The USDP in its activities takes into account the interests of factions, funds, groups, and opposition groups, which are part of the USDP.

XVI. The Status of USDP

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party is a party of a parliamentary type; it carries out its program through its members and deputies in the local and the Higher Council of the Ukrainian SSR; it acts mutually with community organizations and parties in the territory of the Ukraine and with the parties of the union republics and foreign countries.

The USDP applies these types of NON-VIOLENT means for influencing the state organs and the governing apparatus: the printed word, radio and television, petitions, picketing, boycotts, meetings, strikes, and—as an extreme device—actions of civil disobedience.

The USDP acts within the limits of the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and the laws of the Ukrainian SSR, and in accordance to its own programs and statute.

The USDP supports the formation of a confederation—with elements of a federation—as a model for uniting the republics within the framework of the USSR.

XVII. USDP and the Diaspora

The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party supports business contacts with Ukrainian farmers, scholars in agriculture, and ecologists in the diaspora.

The USDP is requesting that the Ukrainian farmers have the right to move to the Ukraine, to receive free land, and to farm here.

The USDP is encouraging the establishment of share holding associations on the model of the DIASPORA-UKRAINE, especially in the branch of the processing industry, village construction, using natural means of preserving of plants (bio-laboratories and entomophagous laboratories), the development of non-traditional means of energy, the building of roads, the de-activization of the river bed soil in the artificial Dnieper basins and drainage of them, the development of an ecological industry in the Ukraine, and so on.

XVIII. A Prayer

We will not think of a life without You, Ukraine...

We will not have happiness, nor good, nor joy, nor daily bread without You, the great and eternal industrious, UKRAINIAN PEASANT...

We will no longer have our people, nor nation, nor our children, nor grandchildren without You, OUR MOST HOLY MAIDEN, UKRAINIAN WOMAN...

We will not have our roads, nor a destiny, nor a soul without You, OUR LORD MERCIFUL AND OMNIPOTENT...

It is we, Lord, Ukrainian peasants, your children, who have gathered under the yellow-blue banner of rebirth, under the flag of the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party, praying to You, so that you would give us strength, energy, health, firmness of soul, patience, wisdom, and an indomitable will to renew our mother Ukraine, so that she would rise up as Your burning bush above the fatally poisoned waste of our grief-stricken civilization; above the ruthlessness of our plunderers; above the seas of tears and blood, which we shed on account of our hangmen; so that the villages and cities of the Ukraine would flower with an abundant, undying raspberry- yellow-sky-blue flower; so that the Ukraine would grow profusely in the cold, cruel chauvinistic wastes, like a Red Cranberry Tree, and from this tree GOOD and HAPPINESS for Ukrainians, and BEAUTY, and THE WISE, ENCHANTING UKRAINIAN WORD, and OUR DAILY BREAD, and THE ETERNAL BLUE SKY would be reborn in the Ukraine and grow profusely.

Tashkent Housing Exchange Ban Called Unconstitutional, Illegal

90US1195A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by I. Khisamov: "Caution, the Doors Are Closing! How Tashkent Administrators Are Ignoring the Constitution and the Ukase of the USSR President"]

[Text] Tears are streaming down the unshaven cheeks of Ashot Aleksanyan. There are few misfortunes which can be compared to a Soviet citizen losing his residence permit. That is what befell the former frontline reconnaissance soldier and war invalid in his declining years. It has already been half a year that he, his pensioner wife, two grown daughters, and two grandchildren have been, speaking in police language, "without a definite place of residence." They do not receive pensions, they are not registered at the polyclinic, and the communist Ashot Aleksanyan is not registered in the party raykom. His daughters cannot find work and his grandchildren cannot enroll in kindergarten. And now stores are asking for the document—you can hardly buy anything without a notation on the residence permit.

They used to live in Baku, in a four-room apartment. The well-known events there compelled them to decide to leave that city. They found some people who wanted to exchange apartments in Tashkent, an Azeri family. In December of last year they received permission and filled out the documents. They waited in line to send a container, loaded up their belongings, and arrived in the capital of Uzbekistan.

Only one last little thing remained to be done, receive the exchange order. But, as we say in the East, the stars had already changed their position. On 2 February a terse, six-line order from Ye. Mikhaylenko, chief of the housing records and distribution administration of the Tashkent Gorispolkom. They were ordered to stop the exchange of apartments with another city "in accordance with the existing legal situation."

"Vay me!" [translation unknown] exclaimed the shocked Aleksanyan. "You were the ones who gave me permission. I already went into the apartment and moved our things. The other people are already living in my apartment in Baku!"

"There's no way we can help. Go back to the place you're registered in."

The doors of the city closed without warning and "slammed" on another 73 families who did not manage to receive their exchange orders by the day of the unfortunate order but had in fact already moved to the new place. Month after month they sadly pace from one office to another and send telegrams to higher-ups (all these dispatches make the fixed rounds of the offices and then return to the desks of the exchange bureau inspectors) and beg them to investigate, issue the order, and give them the permit. But they do not investigate, they do not issue, they do not give them the permit.

Valentina Sokolova moved to Tashkent from Sumgait. Her son died during the ordeals described above. She is left altogether alone. The USSR People's Deputy General V. Shkanakin appeals to the gorispolkom and asks them to help the unfortunate woman. The response: "It is not possible." It reminds one of the literary hero who dreamed that future city bosses would be nourished not on mother's milk, but the "milk of ukases of the ruling senate and the orders of the bosses." Dreams come true.

But what kind of an "existing legal situation" is being used as the basis to stop the exchange? The author of the order, Ye. Mikhaylenko, is already working in a different administration and categorically refused to comment on what he signed with his own hand. Yu. Shakirova, the procurator of the general supervision department of the Uzbek SSR Procurator's Office, did it:

"Such a ban is a violation of the USSR Constitution, which guarantees citizens the right to freely choose their place of residence. It also contradicts a number of Union and republic laws and regulations. The Uzbek SSR Housing Code does not restrict intercity apartment exchanges."

Let us add to what the procurator said that only the republic legislative organ has the right to introduce any amendments to the republic laws, and only the Council of Ministers—to the present exchange regulations. But not the ispolkom of the local soviet at all, and certainly not its administration.

Twice the procurator of Tashkent ordered that the illegal decision be rescinded. The first time the ispolkom removed the ban on exchanges, but excluded the Transcaucasus republics. When the demand to rescind that restriction too followed, no response came. Moreover, a ban on exchanges with Tashkent was added.

An Ukase of the President of the USSR came out just recently which said the following: "All artificial restrictions should be removed and conditions should be created for unobstructed redistribution and exchange of housing." But even the President did not persuade the city fathers. The republic newspapers have dealt with this subject many times, but the gorispolkom merely waves them away in irritation.

Generally speaking, the very fact that in our country the law is rarely consulted before decisions are adopted is not startling. For the time being we are only talking about a law-governed society. But what are the reasons for the restriction in this case now?

There are two of them. The first one is official, so to speak.

"Limiting intercity exchanges will help resolve the housing question in Tashkent," says the deputy chairman of the gorispolkom, R. Khikmatilloev. "We have almost 70,000 people on the waiting list for housing, and nonresidents aggravate the problem."

However, here are the official data. Last year about 400 families were removed from the waiting list for apartments as a result of these exchanges, and the number of those who improved their housing conditions in this way is twice that. And, not only did it not cost anything, it actually brought many thousands of rubles into the administration budget.

The second argument is given in a low voice:

"We are afraid of the reaction of the informals," the present chief of the housing records and distribution department, M. Musayev, said to me. "The situation is very tense. We don't want what happened in Dushanbe in March to be repeated here."

He also reported that the recommendation to introduce the ban on exchanges came from the temporary city headquarters, which is headed by chairman of the Tashgorispolkom Sh. Shaabdurakhimov. This headquarters was set up in connection with the possible influx of refugees from Baku after the January riots. Its task was to prevent refugees from entering Uzbekistan.

Of the thousands of people who left the capital of Azerbaijan in those days, several dozen landed in Tashkent. The worn and ill-clad Armenians who survived the terrible earthquake were politely but firmly asked to leave the republic and were bought tickets to Moscow at public cost. The eternal fear that "something might happen" outweighed all the arguments of charity and internationalism.

"When we were told about the informals, we began to look for them," says Riza Aliyev. Eight years ago he graduated from the Baku Polytechnical Institute and was sent to Tashkent and worked as a shop chief at the Algorithm Plant. Then he suddenly decided to return to his native city and found an exchange—the finale was the same: it has already been half a year and neither he nor his wife are working, and they have two small children. "We were advised to appeal to one of the leaders of the informals, the writer and people's deputy of Uzbekistan Mukhammad Salikh. He didn't understand what the problem was right away and called the gorispolkom in our presence. He asked that the ban be rescinded and that responsibility not be passed off to others."

All this is difficult to understand. The catastrophe in the Transcaucasus—one door closes, the conflict in Dushanbe—another slams shut. Now things are uneasy in Kirghizia—one must assume that apartment exchanges will be banned in this republic too. Without oversimplifying the situation, let us ask: what does this practice achieve? When nationalist passions are rising, it is not the extremists who go to a different republic. Those very Uzbeks who live in Tajikistan and Kirghizia could normally exchange apartments and return to their homeland, and vice-versa. And is Uzbekistan insured against that? Fergana, Parkent, Baka, Andizhan are the names that say that, no, unfortunately, it is not. We must look truth in the face—there will be more refugees. Removing the artificial restrictions which the presidential ukase

talks of could help alleviate this painful problem. But we apparently have only one recipe for all the accidents of life—close down, restrict.

This is by no means relevant only to Tashkent and Uzbekistan—it is that way throughout the entire country. We have been trying to destroy the administrative-command system for 5 years, but is it in fact getting stronger? Every day provides more examples. There is the decree on banning the export of goods beyond the republic's borders—the peasants are counting their losses. For they planted hothouse vegetables, relying on Siberian and Ural customers. Our neighbors have taken the same measures. And who has gained from it?

We never tire of repeating incantations of openness, federation, direct ties, and consolidation, but all that reaches our ears is a certain metallic voice saying: "Caution, the doors are closing!"

So, what is the next stop?

Observance of Religious Rituals Increasing

90UN2409A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 29, 21-27 Jul 90 p 8

[Interview with A. Kaznovetskiy, archpriest and abbot of the Temple of All Saints in Moscow, by D. Grantsev, correspondent of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY; date and place not specified]

[Text] I would like to know has there been an increase in the number of religious rituals in the country in the last years, such as baptism, wedding ceremonies, and burial services?

A. Zhulina, Moscow

Our correspondent, D. Grantsev, asked the abbot of the Temple of All Saints in Moscow, the archpriest A. Kaznovetskiy, to answer this and other questions.

[Kaznovetskiy] There has been an increase in the number of rituals performed in the last years by a number of times. In our parish alone, 60-80 people are baptized on the average every day. Sometimes there are even up to 120 who enter into the bosom of the church. And 5 years ago, 20-30 people came to us.

Wedding ceremonies have also begun to become more frequent. Basically, these are newly-weds, but there are also people who have grandchildren growing up. In the week after the celebration of Easter, on the so-called "Red Hill", they married in groups of 8-10 couples.

The number of burial services has remained approximately the same as before.

[Correspondent] Is there a queue for baptism and wedding ceremonies?

[Kaznovetskiy] There is no queue for the ritual of baptism. All who desire to accept this sacrament are baptized the same day. But for this, one needs to be especially prepared.

In the case of the wedding ceremony, a preliminary registration is necessary for several days for the preparation of the ritual necessary for this. Only couples who are officially registered may be married. However, queues extending for many months, like in the registration offices, do not exist.

[Correspondent] How much does the performance of rituals cost?

[Kaznovetskiy] This depends on how the ritual is held—with psalm, with the burning of candles and church chandeliers, and other actions. In our temple, a baptism costs 15 rubles, a wedding ceremony—35 rubles, and a burial

service with further prayers for 40 days—48 rubles. In other churches, the prices are approximately the same.

In certain cases, these rituals are also performed free of charge. Thus, recently we baptized the children of several Moscow children's homes. I think that during perestroika more children were baptized than under Prince Vladimir, the equal of an apostle. The baptism of Russia is continuing.

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The words of the abbot are confirmed by data which are at the disposal of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. The number of people who were baptized in the country by 1989, compared to 1985, has increased by a factor of 2.5, those who had wedding ceremonies—by a factor of 2.8, and burial services—by a factor of 1.3.

Number of Rituals Performed in the Country in 1985 and 1989

Year	Baptism	% of the Number Born	Wedding Ceremony	% of the Number of Marriages	Burial Services	% of the Number of Deaths
1985	637,081	16.4	30,085	1.4	249,033	9.6
1989	1,639,285	46.4	83,767	3.8	324,391	13.0

In 1986 there were 682,427 baptized, in 1988—1,142,693. The growth in the number performing this ritual in 1988 was connected, on the one hand, with the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the adoption of Christianity in Russia, on the other—with the abolition of registration for transmittal of this statistic to the local authorities.

Legal Foundation for Religion Justified

90UN2099A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jun 90
First Edition p 2

[Article by E. Lisavets under rubric "Discussing the Draft Law": "Religion in a Rule-of-Law State"]

[Text] Lately the editors have been receiving many letters on the position of the church in modern Soviet society. In one of them our reader P. Rodionov (Pushkino, Moscow Oblast) writes that if a law is passed giving the church the status of a legal person and the right of independent publishing activity this will "cross out the Lenin decree on this question."

Indeed, the published draft Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" speaks of religious organizations as legal persons (Article 11) and of their right to produce and distribute religious literature (Article 20).

Does this mean abandonment of Lenin's principles on attitudes towards religion? The editors asked this question of E. Lisavets, Doctor of Philosophical Science.

I think the reverse is true. The draft law consistently implements Lenin's principle of separation of church and state. Let us examine this. What does the absence of the right of legal person mean for an organization? It

means absence of independence in solving the most diverse issues: property, legal, etc.

For example, the Russian Orthodox Church has substantial holdings abroad, but it is unable to manage or effectively protect them. This is clearly an abnormal situation. A compromise was found by granting the Church limited legal person status. That is, it can be a legal person abroad, but not within the country. The legal pitfalls of this dual status and the difficulties it creates for the state seem obvious.

Take another aspect of the problem. Say the rights of some religious association inside the country have been violated, but it lacks the elementary opportunity (in the absence of the status of legal person) to appeal to a court of law. What should it do? Appeal to government or party agencies, complain to the authorities? On the one hand, this opens up broad opportunities for "office diplomacy," on the other, government agencies are forced to deal with church affairs which are not their concern.

Therefore, in my view, giving religious organizations legal independence (within the framework of the law, of course) is the best—and in a rule-of-law state the only—means of separation of church and state.

Now with regard to publishing activity. Quite a lot of religious literature is published in the country, but it is clearly not enough to meet even elementary needs of believers. There are not enough Bibles, and the situation with publication of the Koran is catastrophic, especially in modern languages. If religious associations are given greater independence in this matter and rid of petty supervision by state agencies the results can be only beneficial. Let that literature be freely disseminated. I am sure that an atheist will not turn religious after

reading the Bible or the Koran. Religion is fostered by appropriate upbringing in the family, by the objective contradictions of life. Incidentally, restrictions on the distribution of religious literature create additionally heightened interest towards it. The forbidden fruit is sweet...

And if religious organizations are also able to acquire printing facilities of their own, this would rid government printshops, already excessively burdened, of the need to print religious literature.

So, in my view, giving greater legal and publishing independence to religious organization is a promising route for a rule-of-law state.

All-Russia Orthodox Conference To Be Held in Autumn

90UN2332A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 24, 24 Jun-1 Jul 90 p 15

[Interview with Priest Sergii Popov by correspondent Nataliya Izyumova: "Russian Orthodox Church—Road to Rebirth"]

[Text] An independent group of Orthodox clergy and laymen, who think that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is in a state of deep crisis, recently announced preparations for an All-Russia Orthodox Conference to discuss church reform and church rebirth. The conference is to be held this autumn and is open for all Orthodox Christians, including those abroad. Priest Sergii Popov is among the initiators of the conference. Our correspondent Nataliya Izyumova interviewed him.

[Correspondent] What is the reason for holding an All-Russia Orthodox Conference?

[Popov] For many decades now the ROC has operated in a state of non-freedom, of kowtowing to an anti-Christian power. At a time when heated discussions are going on in society about the history and destiny of the country, the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate keeps silent about its activities, and accuses clergy and laymen, who are trying to voice their views on the past and present of our church life, of splitting or antichurch activities. The official church is cut off from the unofficial church (the "catacombs") and the Orthodox church abroad. Our Orthodox countrymen must at long last hear the truth about the past and the present within the church.

[Correspondent] You call for a return to Church tradition by restoring the cannons of the All-Russia Local Council of 1917-1918. What does this mean?

[Popov] The 1917-1918 Council elected Patriarch Tikhon, who actively opposed the inhumane activities of the new power, and exposed all its cruelties and bloody crimes. He took the position that the Church must be the defender of its people from all temporal power. Naturally, that did not suit the new rulers of Russia. Subsequent events—the revival of dissent in the 20s, the

political Declaration by Metropolitan Sergius Stragorodsky in 1927—have erased from church life the decisions of the Local Council of 1917-1918. Since that time the Russian Orthodox Church has completely submitted to the state, renouncing charity, education, mercy, community work, the organization of monasteries, and, of course, missionary activities.

Today, too, it is not free in taking decisions, and acts on the basis of the Declaration of Sergius—in the tradition of single power, complete secrecy of church policy (closed councils, with no explanation for decisions made by a group of people close to the Patriarch). An entire caste of priests and prelates has been created who are close to the authorities. They recognize changes reluctantly in the wake of the authorities. Recently, priests who tried to open Sunday schools were persecuted, and the libraries of the Orthodox Church and printshops of the Baptists were destroyed, but not a single church hierarch did anything.

We, a group of clergy and laymen, think that the ROC leadership is a remnant of Stalinism. Our main aim is to overcome the aftermath of the Address by Metropolitan Sergius and to push our prelates to make reforms for the good of believers.

[Correspondent] What is the reaction of the church leadership to your criticism?

[Popov] On the whole, of course, it is negative. And small wonder. Our church hierarchy lives very well. Everything suits them, and in general they got used to considering themselves *infallible* in dealing with any questions. Why do they need changes which will force them to go out and work with the people? I must say, however, that some representatives of the church leadership understand us, realizing that if the ROC does not find a way out of the crisis, this will lead to a new split. It is already being felt by the fact that many worthy priests and laymen are leaving the Church. Many priests are thinking of joining the Russian Orthodox Church abroad.

[Correspondent] As we know, the Declaration of Metropolitan Sergius of 1927, and his cooperation with the authorities were not recognized by the Russians abroad, and, on the other hand, many representatives of the ROC went into the "catacombs." Is the reunification of the ROC, the Russian Church abroad, and the Truly Orthodox ("catacomb") churches possible?

[Popov] I think that if we restore our canonical church life and return to the traditions of the All Russia Local Council of 1917-1918 (both the Russian Church abroad and the "catacomb" Church support them) the differences will disappear. By the way, the "catacomb" Church, thanks to the diligent "work" done by the KGB, which employed great force to smash its parishes, is practically non-existent today. But it does exist in the form of communes united around priests and bishops.

[Correspondent] What do you think the first step of the Moscow Patriarchate in bringing about reform should be?

[Popov] It must start with the acknowledgement of Orthodox martyrs of Soviet times. They must become the ideal for the future church builders, rather than the officials who compromised the Church. By delaying their canonization, the Moscow Patriarchate continues to lose credibility. Just look around—in Poland the Catholic Church saves the country from a civil war, in the GDR the Evangelical Church initiates the entire democratic process, and in Romania the Patriarch confessed his sins and retired. But we don't hear the repentant voice of our church apparat.

We call on the church leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate to find strength within themselves to put an end to the unseemly dependence on an atheistic regime and anti-Christian ideology. We can take to the road of rebirth of the Russian Orthodox Church only through the freedom given to us by Jesus Christ.

Work of Commission to Regulate Ukrainian Religious Conflict Viewed

90UN2573A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 26, 8-15 Jul 90 p 15

[Article by Sergei Bychkov: "Forgetting Old Discords"]

[Text] On the opening day of the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), June 6, it was made public that more than 500 parishes in the Ukraine formed the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, independent of the ROC. One of the reasons is the reluctance of the Exarch of the Ukraine, Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia, to compromise with believers. Aleksy, the newly elected Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, has inherited a sorry legacy—the separation of the parishes in Suzdal, and aggravation of the situation in the Ukraine in connection with the confrontation of believers from the Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches. (MN has published several articles on this subject. A compromise must be worked out. Metropolitan MEFODY of Voronezh and Lipetsk, co-chairman of the four-part commission on the settlement of the ecclesiastical situation in the Western regions of the Ukraine, told MN correspondent Sergei Bychkov about the work of the commission.

[Correspondent] At last year's meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, and Pope John Paul II the mutual desire was expressed to settle all complex international problems peacefully. Later, in January 1990, two delegations—of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, met and worked out the basic principles for settling the conflict between the Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches: by peaceful negotiations, not going into old discords. Who are the members of the commission?

[Bychkov] From the ROC the commission was represented by Feodosy, Archbishop of Ivano-Frankovsk and myself; from the Roman Catholic Church Archbishop Miroslav Marusyn, secretary of the Congregation for the Eastern churches, and Metropolitan Stephan Sulik of Philadelphia; from the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church—Vladimir Sternuk, archbishop of Lvov, and Stefan Dimiterko, bishop of Ivano-Frankovsk; from the Ukrainian Exarch—Irinei, archbishop of Lvov, and archpriest Shvets.

[Correspondent] You faced a difficult task—relations between Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches in the Western Ukraine are difficult. What did you start with?

[Bychkov] In the first place we raised the issue of the urban areas of the Lvov Region, with two or more churches and two communities. If Greek Catholics predominated in some place, it was recommended to turn over to them the bigger church and if the Orthodox made up the majority—the other way round. In its address to believers the commission asked them to contribute to the peaceful settlement of all conflicts, and reaffirmed that we are against the seizure of parishes, preferring quiet and well-balanced consideration to forcible actions.

[Correspondent] What was the atmosphere in which the commission worked?

[Bychkov] We arrived in Lvov on March 8. It is noteworthy that the famous Lvov Council, which had such a sad outcome, opened on the same day 44 years ago. We were met by demonstrators with demands to immediately turn over the churches to the Greek Catholics. We saw how closely church problems were intertwined with political and ethnic issues. On the next day we went to Zolochiv, a town with one functioning Orthodox church. Recently the authorities had turned over to the Orthodox community one more half-ruined church in which Orthodox believers have already invested 43,000 roubles for repairing. This very church was seized by the Greek Catholic community. We met with ordinary believers. Many of them were bewildered: after 40 years of joint prayers suddenly this hostility, division.... In Zolochiv we signed the first report of the commission under which the bigger church remained the property of the Orthodox community, and the second in charge of the Greek Catholics. The Orthodox decided that the money they spent on repairs will be their gift to the Greek Catholic community.

[Bychkov] A complicated situation arose in Nesterov. By a decision of the commission one church was left in charge of Orthodox believers, and the Greek Catholic community received the Bazilian monastery and two small churches (in that town the Greek Catholic community is more numerous).

[Correspondent] How are things going a month and a half after your commission completed its work?

[Bychkov] Out of the eight communities whose problems we examined today only six are registered. Greek Catholics appealed to me demanding that I speed up the registration—it is a very long process. But the Orthodox communities have also to go through the same bureaucratic difficulties. It seems to me that in the new Law on Freedom of Conscience the registration by the authorities of communities and clergymen must be abolished.

[Correspondent] Was any pressure exerted on the work of the commission?

[Bychkov] On the part of the authorities no pressure, but probably it is worth mentioning the demonstrations and pickets near the hotel in which the sessions were held. Nevertheless, the main problems were solved to the satisfaction of all sides.

[Correspondent] Did you manage to observe collective leadership in the work of the commission?

[Bychkov] It wasn't smooth. On the last day of work Vladimir Sterniuk, archbishop of Lvov, was so upset, he brought a small tape recorder, switched it on and said he was leaving our assembly, since he could not continue work. No explanations or reasons, just left and that's all.... He is a serious and kind person, and it's hard for me to say what made him take this step. True, we should not forget about his tragic fate, the Stalinist camps in which he was imprisoned. However, the Russian Orthodox Church sustained just as heavy losses.... Credit must be given to the valour and wisdom of the Greek Catholics: despite his departure they continued the work. The final document was signed by the heads of delegations: from the Greek Catholics it was signed by Stephan, bishop of Ivano-Frankovsk.

The Holy See informed the press that it was satisfied with the results of the work. The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church also approved the commission's report, and passed a decision to continue the work. It is a good beginning and it is important to strengthen what has been achieved, in order to improve the situation in the Western Ukraine.

Rovno Officials Take Oath on Bible

90UN2573B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 26, 8-15 Jul 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "City Authorities Take Oath on the Bible"]

[Text] The inauguration of the new city authorities in the Ukrainian town of Rovno was something new by Soviet standards.

In the presence of one thousand city residents, Communist Vasily Marchuk, the new chairman of the City Soviet of People's Deputies, and Ivan Fedin, an independent, the new chairman of the Soviet's executive committee, were sworn into office on the Bible and promised "to give all their strength and inspiration for the welfare of the Ukrainian people and a sovereign

Ukraine." The ceremony was attended by clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches. As Archbishop Nikolai of Lutsk and Rovno consecrated the ceremony, the bells of the Svyato-Voskresensky Cathedral chimed and two flags flew above the city council: the Republic's official red-and-blue one and the historic, national flag, which is blue and yellow.

Ukrainian Journal to Publish Bible

90P50060A

[Editorial Report] Kiev SILSKI VISTI in Ukrainian of 8 Aug 1990 on page 3 in a 500-word article reports that the Ukrainian-language journal LYUDYNA I SVIT will begin publication of texts and narrations from the Bible beginning with the September 1990 issue. The translations will be in contemporary Ukrainian literary language.

Gideon Society Organizes Bible Reading in Butyrky Prison

90UN2307A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with A.A. Rudenko, executive director of the USSR Bible Society and vice-president of the Moscow branch of the Gideon Mission, by correspondent K. Stanislavskiy: "Praising God From Behind Bars"]

[Text] Picture the Moscow city prison for special criminals number 2, the former "Butyrka". The hall is suddenly illuminated by the lights of the television people. About 200 men and women with embroidered name tags on their chests sit quietly, as if at a movie theater, and listen to a very real sermon from the New Testament. It is read, not by a poet from some Sunday broadcast, but by a man whose sole purpose in life is to serve God. Afterward, he hands each of the prisoners a copy of the Holy Scripture...

This correspondent saw just that picture when I was present at the first such event in the Soviet Union conducted by the USSR Biblical Society, the "Gideon" mission and "Protestant", the publishing house for the evangelical Christian Baptists.

"The 'Gideon Brothers' is a world-wide Christian society of business people, scientists and specialists from 145 countries," says A. A. Rudenko, executive director of the USSR Biblical Society and vice-president of the Moscow branch of the "Gideon" mission. "In the USSR, it has branches in the Ukraine, in Moldavia and in Moscow. The main task of the society is to spread the Gospel to all people everywhere, but primarily among students, teachers, prisoners and the police so they can get to know the Lord Jesus Christ."

[Stanislavskiy] If the "Gideon Brothers" and the Biblical Society are charitable organizations, on what resources do they exist?

[Rudenko] The Society has its central funds, of course, but they exist primarily on charitable donations.

[Stanislavskiy] Did you meet with any obstacles in organizing this event?

[Rudenko] Fortunately not. I went to the deputy chief of the main administration and he even helped to set up this event. We thank him very much for this.

Dukhobors Plan Relocation to Tula Oblast

90UN2388A Moscow ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
20 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by M. Alashvili, K. Kotetishvili: "The Dukhobors: A Time of Hard Decisions"]

[Text] ZARYA VOSTOKA has already written about the fact that last year some of the inhabitants of the Russian villages of the Bogdanovskiy rayon belonging to the religious community of Dukhobors [spiritual warriors] requested that the USSR Supreme Soviet permit them to resettle in their historical homeland—in Russia. They even have specified the precise location: the Chernskiy rayon of the Tula oblast. It is no accident that the Dukhobors have chosen this location, since it is contains the estates of Leo Tolstoy. In his time, the great Russian writer did much to support the community.

The fate of the Dukhobors has been difficult and tragic. In Russia they were subject to continual persecution: at the beginning of the last century they were resettled in the Tavricheskiy province, and in 1839, according to the tsar's decree, these "spiritual warriors" were deported to Georgia, in the mountains bordering on Turkey. But even here, in their new home, oppression by the authorities did not cease. Fleeing persecution, a portion of the dukhobors resettled in Canada. However, many remained and the community was preserved. And it came to pass that, having come as social outcasts, they acquired in Georgia, what they had been denied in Russia—the opportunity to live and work and practice their faith.

The history of the Russian villages in the Bogdanovskiy rayon is over 150 years old. But now a new drastic change has occurred in the fate of the community—the Dukhobors are returning to Russia. The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution concerning the organization of voluntary resettlement of individual citizens of the Georgian SSR in the Chernskiy rayon of the Tula oblast. Several dozen families have already left the Bogdanovskiy rayon. Some of the Dukhobors are ready to follow them. However, one cannot ignore the fact that many do not want to leave the area that has been their home. A fair number of members of the community are in doubt—should they go or stay? A situation has developed in which sheer accident can shift the balance to one side or another, and decide the fate of people. In the Russian villages of the Bogdanovskiy rayon they are now painfully searching for answers to many questions, which fall roughly into two groups.

What will life be like in the Tula oblast? What awaits those Dukhobors who express the desire to stay in Georgia? Answers to these questions were also sought by participants in a meeting held in the Gorelovskiy House of Culture. Representatives of the republic Council of Ministers, the People's Front of Georgia, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as guests from the Tula oblast who work in the Chernskiy rayon ispolkom met with the villagers.

The meeting was heated. It must be said that those in favor of resettlement in Russia explain their decision by reference to the desire to preserve the community, the close-knit existence of the Dukhobors, their unique way of life, customs, and culture. At the same time it would be misleading to fail to mention the Dukhobors's mistrust of the future, which in many respects is a consequence of the fact that the population until very recently did not have complete and accurate information about what was happening in the republic. The situation was made even more complicated by the fact that the spontaneously arising idea of resettling in the Tula oblast, until recently was implemented in more or less the same spontaneous fashion. There was no organizing center and this meant that, on the whole, the people could not get accurate and clear answers to their questions and were compelled to make do with various rumors and conjectures. For this reason, it seems to us, the village meeting should have occurred substantially sooner. After all, it was here that much became clear and the most vital questions were discussed.

To go or to stay? Every member of the Dukhobor community has to make this choice individually. No one and nothing should influence his decision. However, in order to make it, he must be confident that there are no gaps in his understanding of the future that awaits him. And this, it seems to us, was precisely what the village meeting helped to accomplish.

The words of the chairman of the People's Front of Georgia, Nodar Natadze, who spoke of the sincere sympathy the Georgian people feel for the Dukhobors, were listened to with great attention. This sympathy was won, first and foremost, by their exceptional industry and their moral qualities. We are obligated, he said, to defend all who live in our land, including the Dukhobors, to accept responsibility for the fate of all who want to continue living in Georgia. At the same time, we should say friendly words of farewell and provide practical aid to those who have made their choice and decided to resettle in Russia. A very important point is that the homes of the Dukhobors who leave the Bogdanovskiy rayon will be bought at an agreed upon, market price. Of course, under the sole condition, that these prices do not exceed the cost of building new houses.

Who will become the new owners of the abandoned houses? The answer to this question is unambiguous—the victims of natural disasters. There are even some of these in the Bogdanovskiy rayon and, of course, there

will be people who have come from Adzharia, and it is simply the republic's duty to help them first.

All these issues, as Otar Zukhbaya, the head of a division of the Georgian Council of Ministers, informed those present, will be studied by a special state commission. At the same time, Dukhobors who voluntarily, (and this word was given special emphasis) express the desire to resettle in Russia will be given every possible aid by the government of the republic and the local authorities.

Well, what awaits the people over there, in the Tula oblast? The deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the Chernskiy rayon Soviet, Viktor Volkov, spoke on this issue. And it was laudable that he tried here to be extremely honest. He did not attempt to lure them with promises, but attempted to give accurate, objective information about the situation in the rayon. He confirmed that in some places after the Chernobyl tragedy there have been elevated levels of radiation and other problems. At the same time he said that there has been progress for the better in the rayon, and prospects for the future are good. With the specific goal of allowing the Dukhobors to settle in close proximity to each other, two new settlements are being built for them, Arkhangelskoye and Yuzhnoye. Roads are being built and gas lines laid. And there is plenty of land here, not like the situation in the mountains. The choice just has to be made.

And this is what is most difficult for the Dukhobors, who in essence have found a homeland in Georgia. And their words at the meeting reflected the full range of agonizing doubts.

Many questions and problems were raised. We would like to discuss one of these in more detail. The fact is that at the meeting one could sense the concern of the workers that their farms not be allowed to decline, that the fields not lie fallow. The mass exodus of people cannot be allowed to affect the economy of the rayon. The Dukhobors have always been distinguished by their industry. In spite of the fact that they represent only a small percentage of the population, the kolkhozes of the Russian village produce 30 percent of the agricultural products in the rayon. And what will happen after these villages begin to lose a notable portion of their population? This is something for the local authorities and those in charge of the economy to think about. And the villagers themselves are thinking seriously about this issue.

The meeting selected a committee which from now on will concern itself with all question related to resettlement in the Tula oblast.

"We will miss them a great deal," said the first secretary of the Bogdanovskiy party raykom, Ivan Baliashvili, referring to the Dukhobors.

This was before the meeting began. And when it was over, we went to the Historical Ethnographic Museum of the Dukhobors. It was founded by Vladimir Kuznetsov, an enthusiast and a man who knows a great deal about the entire troubled history of the community and passionately wants to preserve it. Only where? This question disturbs Vladimir Kuznetsov. And not him alone. On the street an old woman in a white cotton shawl stopped us.

"What about it, my sons, will we have to move again?"

This is a time of very difficult and responsible decisions for the Dukhobors.

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DATE FILMED

9 Oct. 1990